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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the theoretical and empirical predictions of the effects of reductions 
in hours of work on wages and employment, the economic efficiency arguments for such 
reductions and the related issue of the determination of hours of work in a bargaining 
framework.
The conventional approach, assumes that workers will want to maintain their incomes in 
the face of reductions in hours of work per period. This is difficult to justify theoretically, 
when hours and union/worker utility are taken properly into account. Rather, unions and 
workers that desire reductions in hours of work are likely to opt for the same or even a 
reduced hourly wage, leading to a significant employment effect of any such measure.
We show that this result is true in labour markets and economies where unions determine 
or bargain over the wage and in models where firms set the wage because it affects their 
workers’ productivity. It is also true when firms demand positive overtime, when such 
models account properly for the long-run movement of hours of work.
The thesis examines also the determination of hours, employment and wages in a 
bargaining framework and shows that the employment effects of unionism are likely to be 
overestimated when no account is taken of the hours determination procedure. This allows 
us also to provide an economic rationale for union behaviour regarding reductions in hours
of work and maximum hours legislation and determine the conditions under which 
reductions in standard hours of work can increase union utility and firm profits.
Finally, empirical evidence is provided with a test of the relationship between the hourly 
wage and weekly hours of work, using aggregate data. We use a large number of 
variables and different estimation techniques to avoid simultaneity. Our results suggest, 
in line with the theoretical predictions, that changes in hours of work have no effect on the 
hourly wage.
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OUTLINE
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter I  presents the effects of reductions in hours 
of work on employment in the basic competitive labour demand model which serves as a 
benchmark for the results obtained in later sections. We present also the available 
empirical evidence which suggests that the elasticity of employment with respect to hours 
of work, for a given wage, is significantly negative.
In Chapter II we allow the wage to be determined endogenously within a union and 
efficiency wage framework. We show that under a variety of different assumptions about 
the wage determination process a reduction in hours of work is unlikely to lead to an 
increase in the hourly wage, especially if such a reduction is demanded by the 
workers/unions themselves. This provides a theoretical justification for the income sharing 
hypothesis and suggests that reductions in hours of work will not lead to a negative indirect 
employment effect through increases in the hourly wage.
In Chapter III we relax the assumption of an exogenously given level of hours of work 
and assume that the level of actual hours of work is determined endogenously. We assume 
that actual hours exceed the level of "standard" hours so that workers work positive 
overtime. We show that a realistic modification of the cost structure of the traditional 
model allows us to take into account properly the negative long-run trend of actual hours 
of work. In this case we demonstrate that reductions in standard hours of work are likely 
to lead again to an increase in employment. We also show that if the wage is determined
endogenously, such an increase becomes even more likely. The fact that actual hours of 
work are now endogenous allows us to examine the economic argument for reductions in 
standard hours of work; we show that for both ’’efficient" and "inefficient" outcomes for 
employment, hours and wages, a reduction in standard hours can lead to an increase in 
both union utility and firm profits.
In Chapter IV  we examine in detail the hours determination process in a bargaining 
framework. We first examine the effects of introducing an extra bargaining variable on 
the traditional model where firm and union determine solely or jointly employment and 
wages. We then explain why the observed level of hours of work might exceed the 
optimal for the individual/union. This provides therefore a framework for the observed 
union and firm behaviour concerning reductions in hours of work, which was taken as 
given in Chapter I  and Chapter II. We finally motivate union support for maximum 
hours legislation by determining its effect on the objectives of the union and the firm under 
alternative bargaining solutions.
In Chapter V, we provide a test of the income sharing hypothesis using annual, post-war 
UK data. We first derive a static wage equation based on a general bargaining model and 
then proceed to estimate it using annual data. We then derive a dynamic wage equation, 
based on an intertemporal bargaining model and test it again with annual data. Chapter 
VI contains the main conclusions of the thesis and possible areas for future research.
Notation
h = number of hours worked by those on overtime
r = overtime premium
hs = standard hours of work ( = h, if r = 0)
T = maximum number of hours of work per period
s = number of shifts
m = capital utilisation rate
H = hours of work including overtime payed at the hourly wage = (l+r)h-rh,
G = fixed cost of employment or training costs (G = g,w, g^gl^ or g,=gh when
there is no overtime)
H = H + g,
f  = ratio of fixed to total labour costs (g,/(h+g,))
N = number of employees
w = hourly wage
r = rental price of capital
wh = c (income per period, when r = 0)
wH = c (income per period, when r > 0)
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Profit function 
Utility function of the union 
’’Fall-Back" Level of Profits 
"Fall-Back" Level of Union Utility 
Nash Maximand (X=(P-P)(Z-Z))
Utility function of the individual 
Number of union members 
"Outside" utility 
U - V
Unemployment (rate)
Unemployment benefit
Elasticity of i w.r.t. j (elasticities are not defined in absolute values) 
Direct elasticity of i w.r.t. j (ie holding other variables affecting i constant).
Optimizing value for variable X (where necessary)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND THE BASIC 
LABOUR DEMAND MODEL
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Introduction
The significant increase of unemployment in the 1980s and the apparent inability of 
demand and supply policies to reduce it, have generated significant interest in a reduction 
in the rate of labour utilisation 1 as a way of increasing employment, particularly in 
Europe (Fitzroy (1981), Blyton (1982), AGF (1983), Charpin (1984), Dreze (1986), White 
(1987)), but also in N.-America (Best (1981), Owen (1989)). Amongst the policies 
suggested the shortening of the working week has been supported as the measure with the 
greatest employment generation potential 2 (Cobham (1979), Van Ginneken (1984), 
Whitley and Wilson (1988), Plasmans and Vanroelen (1988)). A shorter working week 
has also been a persistent union demand which reflected union members’ wishes for more 
leisure and their concern for high unemployment - see Bienefeld (1972) for the history of 
hours reductions and Jones (1985) for a survey of more recent developments.
The implications of a reduction in the length of the workweek for unemployment become 
even more important in the light of the persistence of unemployment in recent years 3. 
In this context, a policy of reductions in hours of work could imply a permanent increase
1 It should be noted that interest in the issue is not new. According to Bienefeld (1972) 
the earliest documented case of work - and income - sharing in the UK was by the 
coalminers in the 1850’s.
2 Other measures include early retirement, longer holidays and promotion of part-time 
employment. Hart (1984b) describes their main characteristics and gives a good 
account of the state of the various dimensions of working time in OECD countries.
3 One of the more popular explanations provided is based on a distinction between the 
currently employed "insiders” and the unemployed "outsiders" (see Lindbeck and 
Snower (1984) and Blanchard and Summers (1986)).
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in employment without inflation if there was full income sharing which means no increase 
in the hourly wage. This is not accepted however by a number of authors (Department of 
Employment (1978), Hughes (1980), Hoel (1987), Layard et al (1986)); they claim that 
reductions in the length of the workweek would lead to a higher hourly wage than would 
otherwise be the case; this would therefore have an adverse effect on employment through 
the increases it would imply in labour costs and the ensuing fall in competitiveness and 
output.
Empirical research on the subject is based on survey evidence and direct observation, 
which usually confirms the view that workers do not accept a fall in their weekly income 
proportional to the fall in hours; in most cases income compensation clauses are explicitly 
included in labour contracts (Bosch (1986), Richardson and Rubin (1993)). However, such 
reductions in hours are jointly negotiated with other measures aimed at reducing costs for 
employers and increasing productivity, like reductions in setting-up times and breaks, the 
extension of the period covered by the contract, greater flexibility, etc (Charpin (1984), 
Bosch (1986, 1990)).
White (1983), after surveying 204 firms in 1982, following the introduction of shorter 
hours in 1981 through national agreements in the engineering, pharmaceuticals and printing 
industries, reports that "simple productivity improvements even after a year were common, 
like elimination of tea-breaks, although incidence of more complex changes were also 
found".
In the most recent study for the UK, Richardson and Rubin (1993), after surveying 102
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establishments of the engineering sector that introduced shorter hours between 1989 and 
1991, report that "over half of the cost of the reduction would be absorbed by productivity 
improvements and lower wage increases linked to the cut in the working week" and that 
"the two hours reduction added less than one per cent to expected manual labour costs 
when the responses were weighted by factory size"; They add that in large factories facing 
greater than average competitive pressure and where managers judged that unions resisted 
less to change "the shorter working week would actually lead to a fall or at most no 
increase in labour costs". These results suggest that it is difficult to derive definite 
predictions on the effects of lower hours on labour costs, from this type of analysis.
On the other hand macroeconomic simulations about the effect on employment of 
reductions in hours make assumptions about the reaction of the hourly wage rather than 
test it (eg Allen (1980), Whitley and Wilson (1988)). Similarly, simulations based on 
theoretical models (Booth and Schiantarelli (1988), Hoel (1987)) impose or derive rather 
than test the reaction of the hourly wage to reductions in hours.
Despite the importance of the argument there is little direct econometric evidence on the 
subject for European countries. In the UK, after estimating a real wage equation using 
annual post-war data, we were unable to establish a significant negative link between 
weekly hours of work and the hourly wage - Chapter V. Other studies following a similar 
framework (Andrews and Nickell (1983), Bean et al (1986), Layard and Nickell (1986)) 
did not report such a link - although not explicitly testing for it. Nymoen (1989), using 
quarterly data for Norway, found a small short-run effect4 which disappears completely
4 The elasticity of the hourly wage with respect to weekly hours is -0.26.
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after one year. These results, although limited, contradict the conclusions based on simple 
direct observation and lend support to the hypothesis of income sharing.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical and empirical base of the income 
sharing hypothesis when the wage and hours determination process is considered explicitly 
and the effects of changes in hours of work on individual and union utility are taken into 
account. We aim to show that, under plausible assumptions, reductions in hours of work 
will not be accompanied by an increase in the hourly wage, especially if these are 
demanded by unions or desired by individuals. In such a case, employment will increase, 
if a reduction in hours of work leads to an outwards shift of the labour demand curve; any 
given amount of hours of work will thus be shared amongst more people.
In order to explain the effects of changes in hours of work on individual and union utility 
we provide a theoretical framework for the determination process of hours of work, wages 
and employment in a bargaining environment. This allows us to provide some answers to 
the relatively unexplored question of the economic efficiency of reductions in hours of 
work, to examine the implications of maximum hours legislation and to re-examine the 
employment effects of unionism.
-17-
1.0 LABOUR DEMAND
The effect of a reduction in weekly hours of work on employment will, generally, consist 
of a direct effect - assuming that the hourly wage does not change - and an indirect effect 
- which will depend on the size and sign of the hourly wage change.
In the simplest of frameworks, a labour (number of employees) demand function is derived 
with exogenous weekly hours of work exogenous and a fixed capital stock and utilisation 
rate (see for example Hart (1987)). Assume that the firm produces output according to a 
continuous twice differentiable production function with employment and hours as the 
only inputs. In this case the firm sets employment in order to maximize:
max N P = F(N,h) - whN (1.1)
where N is the number of employees, h the number of hours worked per period and w the 
real hourly wage. We make the standard assumptions FN, Fh > 0, F ^ , Fhh < 0. The FOC 
for the problem is:
F„ = wh (1.2)
Assuming that the wage is some function of hours, differentiate equation (1.2) with respect 
to N and h to get in elasticity terms:
-18-
e Nh —Nil "*■ e Nw e wh (1.3)
It follows from equation (1.3) that the total effect on employment from a reduction in the 
level of hours is the sum of a direct effect (e^) and an indirect effect, through the wage 
(® N w  e w h ) -  We analyse and present evidence on the direct effect in this Chapter and focus 
on the indirect effect (ie e^) in Chapter II.
To get an expression for e^, differentiate equation (1.2) holding w constant to obtain, in 
elasticity terms:
—Nh = e Nw (1 “ ( h ^ N h  /F n»  (I»4)
Since eNw is negative, employment will increase directly following a reduction in hours if 
the elasticity of the marginal product of employment (MPN) with respect to hours (hF^ 
/Fn) is smaller than unity. Any given reduction in hours leads to a proportional reduction 
in the marginal cost of an employee (RHS of (1.2)). Under the realistic assumption that 
the marginal product of employment falls following the reduction in hours of work (F^O ), 
employment will increase if the MPN (LHS of (1.2)) falls by less than the marginal cost, 
ie if [(IiFnJ /F n] < 1. The firm in other words, will find it profitable to expand employment 
if any given reduction in hours of work leads to a proportionately smaller fall in the 
marginal product of labour, because of more flexible schemes, better morale, improved 
organisation, etc. Note also that the number of people employed following a reduction 
in hours can rise even if total employeehours - and output, if a function of Nh - fall, as 
long as e^, is negative but absolutely smaller than unity. Hence, in this simplest of
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frameworks, a reduction in hours of work has ambiguous employment effects - unless one 
makes specific assumptions about the form of the production function.
If the production technology is Cobb-Douglas (CD) then the elasticity of the MPN with 
respect to hours is the elasticity of output with respect to hours; if this is smaller than unity 
or equal to that of output with respect to employment 5 then employment will increase 
following the cut in hours. Note that in this case productivity, defined as 
output/employeehour, will also be higher following the reduction in hours of work.
Two other plausible formulations of the production function which allow us to get definite 
results, are obtained from assuming that the long run production function is linear 
homogeneous of the form F(hN,mK) (Johnson and Layard (1984), Calmfors and Hoel 
(1989)). If the number of shifts is denoted by s then m = sh and if  s is fixed , we obtain 
(omitting constants) a short run production function of the form F(N,h) = h F'(N). In this 
case a cut in hours of work has no effect on employment6 since it reduces proportionately 
the marginal product of employment (hF1’) and its marginal cost (wh).
If m is fixed then we obtain (omitting constants) a short run production function of the 
form F(N,h) = F2(Nh). The number of hours capital is now used per period is fixed (the 
number of shifts will increase following the cut in h) and Nh is a constant for a given
5 In the CD case ( F(N,h) = Nahb ) it is easy to show that
N = (w/a)1*-1* h (|-bV(a*,) and = (l-b)/(a-l) .
6 FOC is hF” - wh = 0 => F” = w and dN/dh = 0.
-20-
wage 7.
Note that in both of these cases productivity is unaffected, although employment in the first 
case is unchanged whereas in the second it increases proportionately to the fall in hours. 
This implies that there is not necessarily a negative link between employment changes and 
productivity changes following a reduction in hours of work, because output produced after 
the hours reduction need not remain the same.
7 FOC is hF2’ - wh = 0 => F2’ = w and eNh = -1.
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1.1 Fixed Costs
With fixed employment costs a positive response of employment to a cut in hours is less 
likely. If  we assume, for simplicity, fixed costs to be a proportion g, of the wage, the 
firm’s problem and FOC are:
P = F(N,h) - w(h+gl)N (1.5)
Fn = w(h+g,) (1.6)
If  f  is the ratio of fixed to total costs, g,/(h+g,), it follows that:
eNh = eNw (1 - (hFNh / FN) - f) (1.7)
Although it is not possible to say in general whether the elasticity of employment with 
respect to hours when g,>0 is larger or smaller than when g,=0 (since if g,>0 employment
will be lower for given w and h) it is possible to derive eNh for the three specific cases
considered - see Table 1. In the CD case eNh will be absolutely smaller and could become 
positive and in the case where the number of shifts per period is constant employment will 
now fall following a cut in h. In the case where the number of hours capital is used per 
period is fixed, employment will increase, for plausible values of the elasticity of labour 
demand and of the ratio of fixed to total costs, but the increase will be smaller than in the 
g,=0 case.
-22-
Note that in practice, legislation for reductions in fixed costs of employment has 
accompanied government initiated reductions in hours of work, with the explicit aim of 
increasing employment - eg Hart (1984a) for the French "Solidarity" contracts.
TABLE 1
Production
Function
Hours Elasticity 
with fixed costs
Hours Elasticity 
without fixed costs
CD £m, = [(l-b)-f]/(a-l) § N h  = (1 -b)/(a-1)
Linear homog.
fixed number 
of shifts(s) § N h  f  > 0 § N h  — ^
fixed capital 
utilization rate(m) — Nh ( f  ® N w  “* " 0 —Nh 1
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1.2 Variable Capital Stock / Utilization Rate
In order to be able to make comparisons with the case where the capital stock is fixed, we 
will illustrate the implications of assuming that the firm also chooses the capital stock by 
using a CD production function.
As one would expect in this case, the reduction in hours is less likely to lead to increased 
employment since the firm can also adjust the level of the capital stock. The profit 
function in this case is (r is the rental price of capital):
P = N'hbKc - whN - rK (1.8)
The FOCs with respect to employment and capital are:
PN = 0 => aN*1 hb Kc = wh (1.9)
PK = 0 => cN* hb Kc 1 = r (1.10)
and the SOC requires a+c < 1. Taking the ratio of equations (1.9) and (1.10) we obtain:
N/K = (r/wh) (a/c) (1.11)
A reduction in the level of hours of work will therefore lead to an increase in the labour 
capital ratio since the ratio of marginal products is unaffected but employment becomes
-24-
less expensive than capital at the margin (this is a general result if F(h,N,K) = 
g(h)Gl(N,K), G l^  >0 and G1 is homogeneous). Solving equations (1.9) and (1.10) for N 
and K and taking logarithms we obtain:
logN = -(l-c-b)/(l-c-a) logh + f(w,r,a,c) (1*12)
logK = -(a-b)/(l-c-a) logh + f  (w,r,a,c) (1.13)
It follows that employment will rise following a cut in hours if c + b < 1 (ie b > a), which
is a stronger condition than b < 1, a necessary condition for employment to rise in the case 
where capital is fixed. Employment is therefore less likely to rise following a cut in hours 
if the firm is free to adjust the level of the capital stock.
It is also straightforward to consider within this context the case where the number of shifts 
(s) is fixed and the case where the utilization rate of capital (m=sh) is fixed. If s is fixed 
then F(hN,shK) = Na h(a+c) Kc sc and therefore (since b=a+c):
eNh = -(l-a-2c)/(l-c-a) (1.14)
The long-run direct elasticity of employment with respect to hours can therefore be
negative (if a+2c<l) even if the number of shifts is fixed.
If m=sh is fixed then F(hN,shK) = Na ha Kc (sh)c and therefore:
-25-
fiNh “1 (1.15)
In this case, the result is the same whether the firm chooses capital or not, since what 
matters for the firm is the level of Nh and not its composition.
Another variable that can be set by the firm is the capital utilisation rate, ie the number of 
shifts. Since shiftwork is a common occurrence 8 in manufacturing and especially 
services, Calmfors and Hoel (1989) examine the effects of reductions in the exogenous 
level of hours of work on employment when the number of shifts is variable. They argue 
also that major reductions in hours of work could make it profitable for firms to introduce 
multiple shifts and separate capital operating time from the length of the working week. 
A reduction in hours in this context is equivalent to a reduction in standard hours when the 
firm chooses actual hours of work and the marginal product of overtime hours is less than 
the marginal product of standard hours. A formal proof is presented in Appendix E of 
Chapter III but the essential idea is that in both cases the reduction in hours is equivalent 
to an increase in fixed employment costs so that employment unambiguously falls.
It should be noted however that the majority of overlapping shiftwork is concentrated in 
the non-manufacturing sector and real shiftwork (ie consecutive shifts) is much less 
widespread - Calmfors and Hoel (1989) report it at 12.7% of total shiftwork in Sweden.
8 This is particularly true when shifts are overlapping; 37% of establishments in the UK 
used such shiftwork according to Millward and Stevens (1986) and 29% of the 
Swedish labour force performed such shiftwork in 1984 (Calmfors and Hoel (1989)). 
Figures for the rest of Europe in 1979 vary from 10.6% in the Netherlands to 41.5% 
in Luxembourg - see the study of the European Trade Union Institute (1979), quoted 
in Hart (1984b, p. 62).
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Also, the introduction of flexitime accompanying hours reductions agreements (ie the 
possibility of spreading for instance 35 hours per week unequally on different days and/or 
take days off, as done in Germany, see Bosch (1990)) implies that cost increases due to 
increased shiftwork can and probably will be negligible. In this case, the model collapses 
to the one already analysed, where either shifts or capital operating time is held fixed. All 
these arguments imply that the negative effect on employment from a variable number of 
shifts, especially in manufacturing, is likely to be negligible 9.
9 This seems to be supported by Calmfors and Hoel (1989); they comment that 
according to their simulations the direct employment effect is not very significant.
1.3 Firm Output Constrained
Given that high and persistent unemployment triggered the argument for a reduction in 
hours of work a number of authors looked at the implications of cuts in hours of work on 
employment in a cost minimizing framework where the firm is output constrained, (Nickell 
(1983), Hart (1984a, 1987), Bosworth and Westaway (1985), Neale and Wilson (1985)).
To illustrate the point consider a firm which sets employment and capital in order to 
minimize costs taking the level of hours as exogenous subject to a CD technology. The 
cost function in this case is:
C = whN + rK (1.16)
and K = Y 1/0 N ( #/c) h ( b/c), where Y is the fixed level of output. Solving for N and taking 
logarithms we get:
logN = - [(b+c)/(a+c)] logh + f 3(w,r,a,c,Y) (1-17)
As expected, given that the level of output is fixed, employment will now definitely 
increase following a cut in h (this is a general result if the marginal product of capital is 
increasing in hours (K^ > 0)). The same is obviously true if the level of capital is also 
fixed.
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Toedter (1988) examines the same question using a CES production function within a 
fixed-price Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud model, by assuming that the firm can be in either 
a "Keynesian" (output constrained) or a "classical" (excess labour supply) regime. The 
main findings are similar to above - ie employment is more likely to rise in the 
"Keynesian" regime - but the use of this framework allows him to examine the possibility 
of a feedback from the goods market.
If the reduction in hours leaves total employeehours (Nh) unaffected - which is true in 
Toedter’s model - then a reduction in hours will have a positive effect on employment 
from the goods market if the hourly wage rises to compensate fully or partly for the hours 
fall. In this case an increase in the hourly wage enhances the positive first round effect 
on employment by increasing demand. This example serves to highlight that in studies 
which assume no income sharing - ie they assume full or partial income compensation 
following a reduction in hours the total effect on employment might be positive if 
proper account is taken of second round effects.
In summary, if hours are determined exogenously the direct effect of a cut in hours of 
work on employment is ambiguous. If the long run production technology is linear 
homogeneous and the number of shifts is fixed then a reduction in hours of work will have 
no effect on employment. If the rate of capital utilisation is fixed or the short run 
production technology is CD with the output elasticity of hours smaller than unity then the 
reduction in hours of work will increase employment. If fixed costs of employment are 
important and/or the firm is free to adjust the level of the capital stock an increase in 
employment becomes less likely. The opposite is true if the firm is output constrained.
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1.4.1 Empirical Evidence on the Direct Employment Effect of Hours Reductions
UK employment and actual hours of work in Manufacturing are plotted in Figure 1. The 
empirical evidence on the effect of hours reductions on employment is summarised in 
Table 2A and Table 2B; it comes firstly in a direct form, by estimating a labour demand 
equation (number of employees) and including a labour utilisation variable (usually weekly 
hours of work). This should provide a consistent estimate of e,^ as long as variables 
capturing the effects of the other inputs and their adjustment costs are included. In Table 
2A we present estimates of the coefficient of the utilisation variable from such studies. 
These are negative and range from -0.3 (Whitley and Wilson (1988)) to -1.7 (Pencavel and 
Holmlund (1988)).
The relatively small coefficients reported by Hart and Sharot (1978) are not elasticities. 
They are better thought of as adjustment coefficients - along the lines of Nadiri and Rosen 
(1969) - since their data is monthly; nevertheless in this case also, the long-run coefficients 
are significantly higher. The Whitley and Wilson (1988) elasticity of -0.3 is obtained as 
an average of 5 macroeconometric models which assume that there will be an increase in 
the hourly wage which will partially compensate for the income loss caused by the
reduction in hours; this is partly the reason for which the long-run elasticity is (absolutely)
lower than the short-run, unlike the other studies.
The estimates reported for the Belgian economy on the other hand (Plasmans and
Vanroelen (1988)) assume no income compensation - full income sharing - in which case 
the SR/LR elasticities are almost the same. Van Ginneken (1984), p. 38-39) and Plasmans
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and Vanroelen (1988, p. 600) report also a number of elasticities for other European 
countries, derived from simulating macroeconometric models; for France and Germany 
these are negative and range for Germany from -0.62 to -0.84 and for France from -0.33 
to -0.63, depending on the assumptions made about the size of the reduction in hours of 
work and the reaction of the hourly wage and output. For the Netherlands the estimates 
range from -0.48 to +0.19, the only reported estimates where a reduction in hours could 
lead to a fall in employment ,0. Ball and St Cyr (1966) impose an elasticity of -1 by 
assuming that the production function is of the form F(Nh). We conclude that a sensible 
range of e^  for the UK is -0.5 to -0.8 which means that a 5% reduction in the length of 
the workweek (going from 40 to 38 hours) would increase by 2.5% to 4% the number of 
people employed; at the average of UK employment for the period 1980-85 (17.5 mn) this 
means between 439,000 and 700,000 more jobs.
1.4.2 Empirical Evidence on the Size of the Output Elasticity of Hours of Work
The other body of evidence about the effect of reductions of hours on employment is 
indirect and comes from production function estimates of the output elasticity of hours. 
If the production technology can be approximated by a Cobb-Douglas function 11 then 
following a reduction in hours of work employment will increase if this elasticity is smaller 
than one - the reaction of employment will now depend also on the size of fixed costs,
10 Note that the +0.19 estimate assumes full wage compensation and a reduction in 
capacity following the hours reduction.
11 This is a widespread assumption in the literature. Non-constant elasticity alternatives 
exist also (Hazledine (1978)).
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whether the firm is output constrained or not and whether we are looking at the short run 
or the long run. In theory a fatigue effect from long hours would push the elasticity below 
unity but longer hours reduce the ratio of non productive - setting up time, tea-breaks, etc - 
to productive hours which would push the elasticity above unity.
Table 2B reports such estimates. The range of estimates is large but note that the three 
earlier studies reporting a range for the elasticity of 0.8 to 2.5 are based on a relatively 
small number of observations (36, 24, and 72 respectively) and are all estimated with OLS.
The Leslie and Wise (1980) study on the other hand uses a sample of 588 observations and 
instrumental variables estimation; in addition it shows that the elasticity of output with 
respect to hours falls from above unity to below it if one accounts properly for labour 
hoarding, cyclical effects and the possibility of different rates of technological growth for 
different industries. The Hart and McGreggor (1988) study of the W.-German 
manufacturing industry, by using also a large number of observations (380) and 
instrumental variables estimation, confirms the Leslie and Wise estimate of an elasticity 
below unity. The same is true of the Aberg (1987) study for Sweden.
According to the most reliable estimates therefore the elasticity of output with respect to 
hours is significantly smaller than unity, in line with the earlier reported results of a 
negative direct effect of reductions in hours on employment.
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Conclusions
The aim of this Chapter was to examine the theory and available empirical evidence on the 
direct employment effect of a reduction in hours of work. We found that reductions in 
hours of work have an uncertain theoretical effect, that depends on the extent to which the 
marginal product of employment falls following the reduction in hours of work. We 
therefore examined the available empirical evidence from studies that estimated the direct 
employment effect of hours and studies that estimated production functions that included 
hours of work as one of the inputs. We concluded that reductions in hours of work will 
lead to an increase in employment with an elasticity in the region of -0.5 to -0.8; at the 
average of UK employment in the 1980-85 period (17.5 mn), this means that a reduction 
of the working week from 40 to 38 hours would lead to an increase in employment of 
between 439,000 and 700,000.
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TABLE 2A
Hours Elasticities of Labour Demand
Study Data/Estim. Method N^h
Brechling (1965) 
(p. 200, eq. 17a)
British Manufacturing / TS 
1949-63 / Quarterly / OLS
-0.8 (LR)1
Ball & St. Cyr (1966)
(p. 180)
British Manufacturing / TS 
1955-64 / Quarterly / OLS
-1 (SR/LR)
Hart & Sharot (1978) 
(p. 305, table I)
UK Manufacturing / TS 
1961-72 / Monthly / OLS
-0.01/-0.03(SR)V 
-0.1/-0.4 (LR)1
Hart & Wilson (1988) 
(p. 176)
UK Metalworking / 52 firms 
Pooled CS / 1978-82 / GLS
-0.5 2
Pencavel/Holmlund (1988) 
(p. 1109, table l(iv))
Swedish Manufacturing / TS 
1950-1983 / Annual / IV
-0.8 (SR) 
-1.7 (LR)
Plasmans/V anroelen( 1988) 
(p. 576, table 26.6 3)
Belgium Private Sector 
MARIBEL Macro-model
-0.8 (lyr) 
-0.7 (5yrs)
Whitley & Wilson (1988) 
(p. 295, table 12.3)
Average of 5 Macroeconometric 
models for the UK
-0.6 (lyr)4 
-0.3 (4yrs)4
CS/TS: Cross Section/Time Series LR/SR: Long Run/Short Run (where appropriate)
1 Not an elasticity. 2 For non-overtime firms.
3 Our estimate based on percentage change of N and h.
4 Assumes partial income compensation.
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TABLE 2B
Output Elasticity of Hours of Work
Study Data/Estim. Method ®Yh
Ball & St. Cyr (1966) 
(p. 192, table VI)
British Manufacturing
TS / 1955-64 / Quarterly / OLS
0.8-1.6
Feldstein (1967)
(p. 382, table V, eq. 1 
p. 379, table II, 1957)
UK - 24 Manufacturing Industries 
CS / 1954,57,60 / OLS
1.1-2.5
Craine (1973) 
(p. 43, table I)
US Manufacturing
TS / 1949-67 / Quarterly / OLS
0.9-2.2
Leslie & Wise (1980) 
(p. 81, equat. 4*)
UK - 28 Manufacturing Industries 
Pooled CS / 1948-68 / OLS-IV
0.64
Aberg (1987) 
(p. 38-44)
Sweden
Pooled CS / 1963-82 / OLS
0.55-0.73
Hart & McGreggor (1988) 
(p. 958, table 1)
German Manufacturing Industry 
Pooled CS / 1968-78 / Biannual / IV
0.81
CS / TS Cross Section / Time Series
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FIGURE 1
Hours and Employment (Male) in Manufacturing
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CHAPTER II
REDUCTIONS IN HOURS OF WORK, EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGES
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Introduction
In this Chapter we examine the effects of reductions in hours of work on the hourly wage 
by examining the determination of wages in a union and efficiency wage framework.
When considering economies which are unionized the conventional wisdom is that 
reductions in hours of work are associated with an increase in the hourly wage which 
compensates partly or fully for the per period income loss due to the fall in hours (eg 
Johnson and Layard (1984), Hughes (1980), Hoel (1987), White (1983)). It is then argued 
that even if a cut in hours increases employment directly, a rise in the hourly wage will 
indirectly reduce the size of the effect and could even counterbalance the direct effect, 
leading to a fall in employment.
In what follows we first highlight the forces at work when the wage is determined by a 
monopoly union by deriving an explicit expression for the elasticity of the hourly wage 
with respect to hours of work. We then show that if hours of work are at the optimal level 
for the individual initially, the wage will not react at all to any "small" change in hours. 
This means full income sharing which implies that, whether in a unionized economy or 
not, only the direct effect is relevant for assessing the employment implications of 
reductions in hours of work.
We then examine the robustness of our result assuming that the firm bargains with the 
union about the wage and that the union does not care about employment. In addition, we
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assume that the whole economy is unionised and analyse the general equilibrium 
implications of hours reductions. We show that in this case a reduction in hours will have 
an uncertain effect on the hourly wage. Unemployment however is likely to fall, because 
following a fall in hours of work, any given volume of work will be shared amongst more 
people and employment is likely to become more attractive relative to unemployment.
In efficiency wage models, the wage is set by firms who recognise that it affects their 
profitability through the productivity or turnover of their workers. The explanations given 
rest usually on some sort of asymmetry in information and include the firm trying to 
reduce turnover in the face of costly quits (Salop (1979)), reduce shirking due to imperfect 
monitoring (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) or select the best from a pool of heterogeneous 
workers (Weiss (1980)). Yellen (1984) provides an informal description of the basic ideas 
and Akerlof and Yellen (1986) present a number of formal models. The hypothesis has 
also been supported by econometric evidence (Krueger and Summers (1988), Wadhwani 
and Wall (1990), Drago and Heywood (1992) and Levine (1992)).
In the second section of this Chapter we examine the effect of reductions in hours of work 
on employment using two efficiency wage models. In the first one, a higher wage 
increases the effort of the workers and therefore their productivity. In the second, the 
wage reduces the quitting rate and therefore training costs for the firm, but in this model, 
any given reduction in hours of work may have a smaller effect on employment, if training 
costs are assumed to be external to the firm and independent of hours of work.
In both cases we show that under the assumption of a constant elasticity of utility with
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respect to income the basic results are very similar to the monopoly union model. In 
partial equilibrium only the direct effect matters if hours are at or above their optimal level 
for the individual. In general equilibrium a reduction in hours has an uncertain effect on 
the wage but is likely tq reduce unemployment.
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2.0 UNION MODELS
2.1 The Basic Monopoly Union Model
Consider the standard monopoly union model (see for instance Oswald (1982)) where a 
union sets the wage in order to maximise the expected utility of its members subject to 
employment being determined unilaterally by a profit maximising firm. Union membership 
(M) is fixed and lay-offs are decided by random draw. If c is consumption and 1 leisure 
and if we denote by U(c,l) the common utility function of the union members and assume 
that there are no savings or dissavings (c=wh) and 1 = T-h (where T is the maximum 
number of hours per period), then the union sets the wage in order to maximise:
max w Z = N DU + MV (ELI)
subject to FN(N,h) = wh, which is the FOC for maximisation of profits (P=F(N,h)-whN,
see equation (1.1)). DU = U(wh,T-h) - V, w is the hourly wage rate, V and h are the 
exogenously given levels of utility if unemployed and hours of work per period 
respectively and T-h is leisure for those employed. We also assume that prices are fixed 
and U„ U2 >0, Un, U22 <0. The FOC for this problem is:
Zw = 0 => Nw DU + NhU, = 0 (II.2)
and SOC is = N ^  DU + 2hNw U, + Nh2U,, < 0. It follows from equation (II.2) that
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dw/dh = - Z ^ /Z ^  and dw/dh will have the same sign as Z ^ . Calmfors (1985) derives 
dw/dh in the general case and shows that it can not be signed without further assumptions 
for functional forms. A reduction in hours of work has in general an ambiguous effect on 
the hourly wage set by a union.
More can be said however by re-arranging equation (II.2) to get - see for instance Manning 
(1991):
U = [ eNw / ( eNw + eUc ) ] V = k V (II.3)
The union then sets the wage so that union members’ utility is a mark up k > 1 on
"outside” utility, which will be higher the smaller the absolute value of the elasticity of 
labour demand with respect to the wage - since in that case any given wage increase will 
lead to smaller employer losses - and the higher the elasticity of utility with respect to 
income - since in that case any given wage increase provides a higher benefit to union 
members.
If we assume that k is constant, by differentiating equation (II.3) with respect to w and h 
and rearranging we obtain:
ewh = - (hUh/wUJ = -1 + (U2 / wU,) (IL4)
where ewh is the elasticity of the hourly wage with respect to hours of work at the
optimum; this elasticity will therefore determine the sign and size of the indirect effect of
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reductions in hours on employment (second term on the RHS of equation (1.3)).
It follows from equation (II.4) that the elasticity will be equal to minus one, which means 
that the union will demand an exact compensation for the loss of the per period income 
of its members -no income sharing - if and only if union members derive no utility from 
leisure 1 i.e. if and only if U2 = 0.
Although this is a widespread assumption in the union literature it is not a plausible one 
when examining the effects of hours reductions; it implies that unions have demanded 
persistently a policy which, ceteris paribus, would decrease the utility of their members and 
possibly of the unions themselves. Furthermore, both the history of determination of hours 
(Bienefeld (1972)) and the available survey evidence (Millward and Stevens (1992), Clark 
and Oswald (1991)) suggest that the issue of hours of work is of great importance to union 
representatives and members 2. The evidence suggests that a reduction in hours will not,
1 The assumption of a constant eUc is not necessary and the assumption of a constant e ^  
only sufficient to deliver the above result. It can easily be proved that if e^. is not a 
constant (eg if the utility function is Stone-Geary (SG)) then:
e*, = - 1 + { (e^, U2 + whU,2) / (wU, (1 + - R* ))}
where Rr is the relative degree of risk aversion. The above expression also equals -1 
if U2 = U12 = 0. Similarly, if F(N,h) = F3(N) + F4(h) and the labour demand elasticity 
is not a constant, then if U2 = Ul2 = 0, e^  = -1.
2 This is evident in the detailed history of hours determination in the UK since 1820,
presented in Bienefeld (1972). More recently Clark and Oswald (1988) reported that 
93% of the UK unions that responded to their survey "usually negotiated hours of
work per week". This is the highest percentage amongst issues other than pay - 
employment and working practices. Millward et al (1992) report that, other than pay, 
managers considered working hours to be the most important employee relations issue 
in 1984 and 1990. Union demands for shorter hours were associated with the longest 
strike in German history - 6.5 mn days lost in 1984 (Bosch (1986)).
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ceteris paribus, leave individual members’ utility unaffected. We therefore adopt U2>0, as 
the more realistic and plausible assumption when examining the effects of reductions in 
hours o f work.
2.1.1 Reductions in Hours and Individual Utility
Additional insight about the likely reaction of the hourly wage can be gained by analysing 
the effect of a reduction in hours on individual and union utility. Under the assumption 
that leisure matters, note that the second term of equation (II.4) will be bigger than (equal 
to) unity if hours are initially above (at) their optimal level for the individual 3. This is 
consistent with union demands and means that if the cut in hours increases the individual’s 
utility - and the union’s if e^  < 0 -, or if hours of work are initially at the optimal level' 
for the individual, then a reduction in hours of work will not lead to an increase in the 
hourly wage.
Note that this prediction is in line with the econometric results reported in the introduction 
(Nymoen (1989) and our results presented in Chapter V) which failed to establish a 
negative - let alone a compensating - response of the hourly wage to reductions in weekly 
hours of work when controlling for other factors influencing the hourly wage (productivity, 
union power, taxes). Although this is not the only explanation for the absence of such a 
link - see Nymoen (1989) - our analysis provides a plausible economic rationale within a 
trade union framework.
3 The economic rationale underlying these initial conditions is provided in Chapter IV.
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The above results suggest therefore that it is misleading to assume that unions will demand 
compensating increases in the hourly wage following reductions in the length of the 
workweek, based simply on observation of specific incidents. An explicit modelling of the 
hours determination process is needed to derive definite welfare/policy implications4. Our 
analysis suggests however that reductions in hours of work are unlikely to lead to an 
increase in the hourly wage, especially if such reductions are demanded by the unions 
themselves, as is usually the case.
Is it then possible to provide alternative convincing explanations for what is argued to be 
an observed negative ewh ? If hours are at (or above) their optimal level for the individual 
initially then we must drop the assumption that both the mark up (k) and the level of 
"outside" utility (V) are constant. In order to get an increase in the hourly wage "outside" 
utility must increase when hours fall. This is not realistic however and in section 22  we 
show that the more plausible result is that utility from employment relative to 
unemployment increases when hours fall. Alternatively, if the mark-up is not constant - 
eg if the utility function is Stone-Geary (SG) (Booth and Schiantarelli (1988)) -, 
differentiate equation (II.3) to obtain:
ewh = - (hUh - hkhV)/(wUw - wlOO (II.5)
Assume that hours of work are initially at their optimal level for the individual and e ^  is 
constant. The wage will increase following a cut in hours as long as the mark-up increases
4 See Chapters III and IV, on the determination of hours of work.
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(k,, is negative 5). It seems implausible however to try and explain union demands for 
increases in the hourly wage as a result of the greater importance of any wage increase 
following reductions in hours of work.
If the initial level of hours is below the optimal for the individual then Uh is positive and 
the second term of equation (II.4) is smaller than unity ((Uj/wU,)^). The wage will 
therefore increase following a reduction in hours. To determine the conditions under 
which such a reduction would be desired by the union differentiate Z with respect to hours 
to get:
Zh = Nh DU + NUh (II.6)
where N* denotes the direct effect of hours on employment. A reduction in hours will 
therefore increase union utility and decrease individual utility if employment increases and 
the gain to the union from the additional utility of more employed members - the first term 
of equation (II.6) - outweighs the loss of existing employed members - the second term of 
equation (II.6).
This is then the only plausible explanation within the monopoly union model with a 
constant mark-up, for the co-existence of unions demands for lower hours and increases
5 This is what will happen if the utility function is SG; a reduction in h increases the 
elasticity of utility with respect to income and therefore increases the mark-up.
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in the hourly wage 6. Even in this case, inspection of equation (II.4) reveals that the 
increase in the hourly wage would not compensate fully for the income loss (e^ is 
absolutely smaller than unity) and some income sharing would result.
2.1.2 Wage Bargaining/ Efficient Bargaining
The monopoly union model has been criticized both because it is not consistent with 
observed union-firm behaviour and for delivering Pareto inefficient employment-wage 
outcomes. We deal with the first point by examining the employment implications of 
reductions in hours when the union and the firm bargain about the wage with the firm then 
setting employment unilaterally (the so called "right to manage" model (Nickell, (1982)). 
The reason for examining reductions in hours of work within this context is that when the 
firm has some power over the determination of the wage and a cut in hours of work 
reduces or leaves profits unchanged then one would expect that it will be less willing to 
accept a large hourly wage increase following a reduction in hours of work per period. 
We assume that the solution to the wage bargaining problem is the symmetric Nash 
solution in which case w solves:
max w X = (P-P) (Z-Z) = (F(N,h) - whN) (NDU) (II.7)
s.t. Fn = wh
6 Note that optimal hours for the individual and the union will coincide if either e ^ O  
or the union bargains about the wage and does not care about employment - see next 
section. The optimal level of hours will also be the same if unions and firms bargain 
over wages, employment and hours of work - see Chapter IV.
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where we made the assumption that the bargaining power of the firm and the union are the 
same, the fall-back level of union utility (Z) is MV and the fall-back level of profits (P) 
is zero. The FOC for this problem is:
X* = Pw Z + Z, P = -hN NDU + [Nw DU + NhUJ P = 0 (IL8)
and SOC is <0. As is known the wage-employment outcome in this case lies below 
the monopoly union outcome on the labour demand curve.
In this case dw/dh = - and therefore the sign of dw/dh will be the same as the
sign of X*:
Z + Pw Z, + Z»„ P + Z. P„ (0.9)
Equation (II.9) includes as one of the arguments and although Pw is negative and Zw
is now positive it is not possible to say in the general case whether a cut in hours is now 
more likely to lead to a smaller increase in the hourly wage 7. We can get however an 
expression similar to equation (II.3) for the union members’ utility as a mark up on 
"outside" utility by rearranging the FOC:
u  = [ ( -  e„  - eNw}/( - ep» - eNw - eUt)l V = k’ V (0.10)
7 It is possible to say however that if the firm bargains with the union about the wage
then dw/dh is more likely to be a positive (or a smaller negative) number if Zh is 
negative and Ph is positive, which is what seems to happen in reality since firms have 
usually opposed reductions in hours of work.
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where ^ ^ (N w h /P ). Note that [Nwh/P]=[l/((F/NFN)-1)] and if e ^  is a constant this term 
will also be a constant8. It follows that k’V will also be a constant if eUc is a constant and 
the results with regard to the elasticity of the hourly wage with respect to hours (e^) are 
identical to the monopoly union case; the wage and employment reaction to a reduction 
in hours is therefore the same whether the union sets the wage or bargains about it with 
the firm.
If the union does not care about employment (Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Oswald 
(1985)) it is easily proved that equation (II.8) can again be rearranged in the above form - 
with the mark up independent of the labour demand elasticity - and therefore the results 
with respect to reductions in hours carry through. Furthermore, the first term of equation 
(II.6) is zero and Zh has always the same sign as Uh; a reduction in hours is desirable for 
the union - ie is negative - if and only if it is also desirable for its members; in this 
case, the second term of equation (II.4) is larger than unity and the model predicts that the 
union will accept a cut in the hourly wage if hours of work fall. Note also that if output 
is a function of employeehours - F(N,h) = F2 (Nh) - then any movement of hours away 
from the optimal for the individual in this case is inefficient, in the sense that both the 
individual and the union will be worse off and profits will be unaffected.
Efficient Bargaining and Simulation Results
Both the monopoly union model and the right to manage model result in a Pareto 
inefficient wage-employment outcome for the two parties; one or both of the parties can
8 This is proved by integrating FN = CnJ ^ F ^  (e^  = constant).
-49-
be made better off without the other party becoming worse off. To deal with this point 
consider the efficient outcome assuming for simplicity that the union and the firm bargain 
simultaneously over employment, the wage and hours. Assume again that the solution is 
the symmetric Nash one in which case the firm’s problem and FOCs are:
max N h,w X = (P-D (Z-Z) = (F(N,h) - whN)(NDU) (0.11)
XN = PNZ + ZNP = 0 (11.12)
Xh = PhZ + Zh P = 0 (11.13)
Xw = PwZ + ZwP = 0 (11.14)
Booth and Schiantarelli (BS, 1988) calculate the effects of a reduction in hours of work 
when they are either set exogenously - i.e. they are not bargained over and equation 
(11.13) is not satisfied - or they are initially at their optimal level and equation (11.13) is 
satisfied. Although the theoretical prediction about the response of employment is again 
uncertain, BS say that simulations of their model for a plausible range of parameter values, 
imply that a reduction in hours of work is unlikely to lead to an increase in employment. 
We express doubts however about similar simulation results below (see 2.1.4) because of 
their unrealistic prediction that union utility might also fall when hours are reduced. 
Furthermore, when we consider such bargaining models in more detail in Chapter IV, we 
show that realistic parametrisations of the production and utility functions imply that both 
union utility and employment are likely to increase following a reduction in hours of work.
-50-
2.1.3 Total Effect on Employment
Having examined the likely sign of e^  in the presence of a union we can now turn to the 
total effect on employment following reductions in hours of work. Recall that the total 
effect on employment is the sum of the direct and indirect effects, the first and second term 
of equation (1.3). By substituting equation (1.4) in (1.3) we obtain:
«Nb = ®nw (1 + - (hF™, / Wh)) (n.15)
Since in general both the direct and indirect effect are uncertain we present in Table 3 the 
total effect on employment under different assumptions about and the sign and size of
®wh (® w h 1 ^  ®wh ^  e^ > 0).
If, as we have argued, the elasticity of the hourly wage with respect to hours is zero, then 
the only relevant effect on employment of a reduction in hours is the direct effect (e^,) 
which is presented in the second row of the table, under the total effect (e^). This allows 
us also to see under what conditions a union presence can reverse a direct positive for 
employment effect and whether these conditions are realistic (Hughes (1980)).
As we move down the table a direct positive employment effect becomes less likely. As 
we move from right to left an indirect positive employment effect becomes also less likely. 
Row (e) is more of a theoretical possibility, given the empirical evidence presented in 
Table 2A and table 2B in Chapter I. Row (a) is also unlikely, since it implies that the 
output gains from improved efficiency following the reductions in hours of work exceed
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the loss in output for the marginal worker. We include it however for completeness, since 
it might be relevant to firms and/or periods of time with significant labour hoarding or 
where the "efficiency" factor per unit of labour input is very important.
Column (A) leads to the most unfavourable indirect employment effect. This is also the 
only case in which the indirect effect can definitely counterbalance a direct positive 
employment effect (case (cA)). We have already argued however that both theory and 
empirical results suggest that e^  is close to zero; even if it is negative, we should expect 
it to be closer to zero than to minus one, so that we should consider this possibility to be 
unrealistic.
In row (d) a fall in hours leads to an equal fall in its marginal product and cost and has 
therefore no direct effect on employment. In this case union and individual utility move 
in the same direction; if the union demands a reduction in hours it will also accept an 
hourly wage cut, if the mark-up is constant - column C; the indirect effect in this case will 
therefore lead to an increase in employment.
Summarizing the results from Table 3 we note that if the mark-up of union over alternative 
utility is a constant and leisure matters we can exclude the first column. The empirical 
results we have reported earlier suggest that e^  is negative or at worst zero so that row (e) 
can also be excluded. If the direct effect is zero (row (d)) we already argued that the 
union will not demand an increase in the hourly wage if it also demands the cut in hours 
so that we can also exclude case (dB). In all but one of the remaining cases a reduction 
in hours will definitely increase employment. The presence of a union may therefore
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reverse a direct positive for employment effect in one out of the seven possible outcomes 
of the table (case (cB)).
2.1.4 Simulation Results of Employment Reaction to Reductions in Hours of Work in the 
Monopoly Union Model
Other evidence about the total effect on employment from a reduction in hours of work 
comes from simulation of theoretical models. Booth and Schiantarelli (1988) carry out 
such simulations using a monopoly union model and assuming that the production 
technology is CD and the utility function Stone-Geary.
Using estimates for the parameters of interest - elasticities of output with respect to 
employment and hours, elasticities of utility with respect to consumption and leisure, 
"reference" levels of consumption and leisure, etc - from other econometric studies they 
say that a reduction in hours of work is not likely to lead to a rise in employment.
The authors comment however that union utility can also be reduced following a reduction 
in hours of work for plausible values of the relevant parameters. This result contradicts 
clearly the well documented persistence of unions for reductions in hours of work since 
the 1850’s (see Bienefeld (1972)).
Furthermore, in a slightly modified model where the elasticity of utility with respect to 
consumption is constant, employment and union utility move in the same direction if hours 
are reduced (see Table 3, col. C and Appendix A). If therefore we adopt the realistic 
assumption that, ceteris paribus, union utility must rise following reductions in hours of
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work, employment will also rise. The above arguments confirm therefore the sensitivity 
of simulation results to changes in the functional form assumptions and suggest that results 
like the ones obtained by Booth and Schiantarelli (1988) must be treated with caution, 
given their unrealistic predictions about union utility.
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2.2 Hours Reductions in General Equilibrium
To examine the effects of reductions in hours of work on unemployment we look at the 
general equilibrium (GE) implications of a cut in the exogenously given level of weekly 
hours in a context similar to the partial equilibrium framework already analysed; the 
difference lies in the assumption made about V, which in GE will be determined rather 
than taken as exogenous. Note that expected utility if not employed by the firm (V) is 9:
V = u U(b,T) + (1-u) U(wh,T-h) (11.16)
where u is the unemployment rate with N = L(l-u), L is the constant labour force, b the 
unemployment benefit, w the alternative wage and leisure when unemployed is T. Since 
all firms and unions are identical in general equilibrium w is equal to w. By substituting 
w=w and equation (11.16) in equation (II.3) we obtain:
U(wh,T-h) = k (uU(b,T) + (l-u)U(wh,T-h)} (H.17)
Denoting utility when unemployed (Uu = U(b,T)) to utility when employed (Ue = U(wh,T- 
h)) by B, substituting for k and re-arranging equation (11.17) we can solve for the 
unemployment rate:
Unemployment condition: u = - [eUc / eNw] (1-B)'1 (11.18)
9 Layard and Nickell (1990) have an exposition of the approach.
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|
1
If e ^  and are constant any changes in the unemployment rate will come through B; 
unemployment will thus be increasing in U“ and decreasing in Ue. To solve for the wage 
note that the partial equilibrium employment condition, equation (1.2) becomes the general 
equilibrium wage condition:
Wage condition: FN (L(l-u),h) = wh (II. 19)
We have plotted equations (II. 18)-(II. 19) in Figure 2 as the u-line and w-line respectively. 
Measuring unemployment on the horizontal axis and wages on the vertical, the w-line 
slopes upwards since the marginal product of labour is falling.
The u-line will have a negative slope if the ratio of LF to Ue (B) is decreasing in the wage 
- Proposition 1, Appendix B. When the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption 
is constant this will be true if the unemployment benefit b is partially indexed or not 
indexed at all to the hourly wage. In this case a higher wage leads to a smaller increase 
in U 1 relative to Ue so that the ratio (B) falls; this means that unemployment will be lower 
and the u-line is negatively sloped. If b is fully indexed to the hourly wage then the 
proportional increase in utility from unemployment and employment following an increase 
in the hourly wage is the same, B is constant and the u-line is vertical - see Pissarides 
(1985) and references therein. Figure 1 assumes partial indexation in which case the initial 
equilibrium unemployment rate is ul.
A fall in hours of work will shift the w-line inwards if it leads to higher employment for 
a given wage in partial equilibrium - see equation (1.4). If the production technology is
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CD, this means that b, the elasticity of output with respect to hours, must be smaller than 
unity.
The u-line will shift inwards following a reduction in hours of work if utility from 
employment relative to utility from unemployment increases. This will be true if:
(a) hours are above the optimal level for the individual initially - so that Ue 
increases and B falls -, or
(b) hours are at their optimal level for the individual initially but the 
unemployment benefit is indexed - partially or fully - to hours of work so 
that utility when unemployed and B fall - Proposition 2, Appendix B.
The u-line will not shift if a change in hours does not affect B - Bh=0. When this 
assumption is made with respect to hours of work - Johnson and Layard (1984) - and 
workers derive some utility from leisure, it will only hold if a change in hours does not 
affect Uu - b is not indexed to hours - and Ue - hours are at their optimal level for the 
individual initially. The replacement ratio - unemployment benefit divided by basic weekly 
earnings - has remained fairly constant in the long-run however (see Figure 20 in Chapter 
V), which suggests that the unemployment benefit is indexed to hours - or weekly/monthly 
earnings - rather than the hourly wage alone. In Chapter IV we show also that there is no 
reason to expect, within an efficient bargaining framework, actual hours of work to be at 
the optimal level for the individual.
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Table 4 summarises the unemployment outcomes for the eight cases combining the 
assumptions of a vertical or negatively sloped u-line with inwards or no shifts of the two 
curves. Given the evidence on the replacement ratio the last row of Table 4 is unrealistic. 
It follows that a reduction in hours is likely to lead to a reduction in the unemployment 
rate by increasing directly the number of employees needed for any given volume of work 
and by making employment more attractive relative to unemployment.
For a constant mark-up and for a given shift of the w-line, the reduction in unemployment 
will be larger, the more actual hours exceed the optimal for the individual, the less the 
unemployment benefit is indexed to the hourly wage and the fuller the unemployment 
benefit indexation to hours.
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3.0 EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS
3.1 Employment and Hours Reductions in the Basic Model
To illustrate the effects of hours reductions within efficiency wage models we will use first 
the most general version of the standard model where output depends on employeehours 10 
multiplied by the "effort” or "efficiency" function. This in turn is a function of utility with 
the firm (U(wh,T-h)) relative to expected "outside" utility (V) which we assume to be 
constant in partial equilibrium. The firm sets employment and the wage to maximize:
max Kw P = F(Nhe(R)) - whN (11.20)
with R = (U/V), e’ > 0 and e”  < 0. By solving the FOCs we obtain the familiar elasticity 
result, modified to take into account the effect of a change in the wage on utility:
eUc R (e’/e) = 1 (11.21)
The wage is therefore set so that the elasticity of the effort function [R (e’/e)] times the 
elasticity of utility with respect to consumption (eUc) is unity. If eUc is constant then by 
rearranging equation (11.21) and solving for R we get:
10 Using the general F(Ne,h) instead of F(Nhe) does not affect the main argument. We 
comment where other results should be modified.
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R = f  (eUc) = k, => U = k, V (11.22)
Utility is therefore again a mark-up k, on outside utility (V); it follows that for constant 
and V, the expression for the elasticity of the hourly wage with respect to hours of work 
is identical to the expression we derived in the monopoly union case -equation (II.4); the 
wage reaction following a reduction in hours in the two cases is therefore the same.
Employment will again be affected directly and indirectly; to see this solve the FOCs to 
get:
F’(Nhe) e = w (11.23)
If hours are initially at the optimal level for the individual then a reduction in hours of 
work will not affect the wage which means that the RHS of equation (11.23) is constant. 
Since effort is a constant (e(R) = e(k,)) it follows that for equation (11.23) to hold F’ must 
remain constant. Hence, by differentiating the LHS of this equation we obtain that the 
elasticity of employment with respect to hours is minus one (e^ = e^, = -1) ll.
If hours are above the optimal level for the individual then, ceteris paribus, a reduction in 
hours of work makes the employees better off and therefore allows the firm to offer a 
lower hourly wage. This means that the LHS of equation (11.23) must fall and since effort
11 The elasticity can be smaller (absolutely) for different forms of F - see Table 1 in 
Chapter I.
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remains constant, employment will increase more than proportionately to the hours fa ll12.
In this case the utility maximising level of hours is also the efficient one, in the sense that 
any move away from that level will make the employee worse off and leave the firm 
indifferent; a change in hours does not affect profits if  the firm chooses employment since 
effort is constant 13. It follows that a reduction in hours away from the optimal - which 
would be needed in order for the hourly wage to increase following a reduction in hours - 
would never be efficient since it would leave the firm indifferent but make the employee 
worse off.
To examine now the effects of reductions in hours of work on unemployment we follow 
the same steps as in section (2.2): assuming that V is given as in equation (11.16) we can 
again derive an expression for unemployment from equation (11.22):
Unemployment condition: u = [k,/(k,-l)] (1-B)'1 (11.24)
Similarly, since N = L(l-u) using equation (11.23) we get 14:
Wage condition: F ’(L(l-u)he) e = w (11.25)
12 A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that F” <0.
13 This is not necessarily true if F does not take the form F(Nhe).
14 If F takes the form F(Ne,h) then the wage condition would take the form FN(L(l-u)e,h) 
= wh.
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If the elasticity of utility with respect to income is constant - and the labour demand 
elasticity in the monopoly union case changes in hours will affect unemployment and the 
hourly wage through equations (II.24)-(II.25) as they did through (II.18)-(II.19), since 
effort is constant. The results with respect to the effects of reductions in hours on 
unemployment and the hourly wage are therefore identical to the union case.
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3.2 Employment. Hours Reductions and Quitting Costs
An alternative version of the efficiency wage hypothesis assumes that a higher wage 
implies a fall in the quitting rate and therefore a reduced cost for the firm because of lower 
training and firing - costs (Salop (1979)). In the most general formulation of the quitting 
function, an employee will be less likely to quit the higher the benefit of staying with the 
firm relative to outside opportunities. We assume therefore that the quitting rate will 
depend negatively on R = (U/V). The rest of the problem is standard so that the firm sets 
employment and the wage to maximize:
max NtW P = F(N,h) - whN - G N q(U/V) (11.26)
where q is the net quit rate, with q’<0. We assume that the training costs are internal to
the firm so that every period the firm has to hire qN employees which leads to training
costs G=gwh per employee. From the FOCs with respect to employment we obtain a 
slightly modified version of equation (1.6), taking into account the quitting rate:
FN(N,h) = wh (1 + gq) (11.27)
The FOC with respect to the wage is:
i  + gq + gq’eUc R = o (H.28)
Rearrange equation (11.28), noting that q and q’ are functions of R, to obtain:
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R “  f  5 (g» ©Ue) => U = k2 V (n.29)
where k2 is constant if  g and e^ are constant. Utility with the firm is therefore again a 
mark-up on V and a reduction in hours will have exactly the same effect on the hourly 
wage as in the monopoly union case - equation (II.4) - and previous efficiency wage model 
- equation (11.22) 15; if hours are initially at (above) the optimal for the individual level 
then the hourly wage will remain unchanged (fall). Employment will rise if the fall in its 
marginal cost - RHS of (11.27) - is larger than the fall in its marginal product (F ^ .
To understand the results in this context note that if hours are at their optimal level initially 
then a reduction in hours does not affect the quitting rate and implies a proportional fall 
in variable employment - whN - and training - gwhNq - costs. The marginal cost and 
benefit of a wage rise fall proportionately and the hourly wage is therefore unaffected. 
The marginal cost of employment on the other hand falls following the reduction in hours 
by w(l+gq). If the marginal product of employment is not affected (F ^O ) or if it falls 
by less than its marginal cost (FNh<w(l+gq)) then employment will increase, just like in 
the basic labour demand model in Chapter I.
If hours are above the optimal level for the individual initially, then a reduction will, 
ceteris paribus, reduce the quit rate and lead to a fall in the hourly wage. An increase in 
employment is now more likely compared to the case where hours were at their optimal
15 In general equilibrium we can use equations (11.27) and (11.29) together with the 
equation for V - (11.26) -, to derive again the wage and unemployment conditions. 
These are identical to the monopoly union case but for the fixed costs - Table 1 in 
Chapter I -, so we do not report them here.
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level initially, since the reduction in hours will lead to a larger fall in the marginal cost of 
employment ,6.
If training costs are external to the firm but proportional to hours - which will be true if 
hours are reduced throughout the economy - then the results are qualitatively identical to 
the case we just analysed. In Appendix G in Chapter III, we provide a formal model 
where a firm choosing the length of the training period for its workers and the amount of 
training per period in order to maximise profits can find it optimal, under quite general 
assumptions, to index its training costs to basic weekly earnings.
If training costs are external to the firm and independent of both hours of work and the
hourly wage (G=constant), the effects on the wage and employment may be different. In
this case the FOCs with respect to employment and the wage are:
FN(N,h) = wh + Gq (11.30)
1 + G q’e^ R = 0 => wh + Gq eqR eUc = 0 (11.31)
A reduction in hours of work will now reduce variable labour costs (whN) but will not 
affect training costs (GqN), if hours are at the optimal level for the individual initially 
(Uh=qh=0). Since from equation (11.31) the ratio of variable labour costs to training costs
16 Note that a fall in hours reduces the marginal cost of employment by [w(l+gq) + 
whgqj, since the firm sets the wage. If hours are above the optimal for the individual 
level initially then Uh<0, q^O, so that the marginal cost of employment will fall by 
more than in the case where hours are at the optimal level for the individual initially 
(Uh = q, = 0).
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must be constant at the optimum ,7, a higher wage is needed to bring back this equality. 
Employment is therefore less likely to rise. Note that, even for a given wage, the structure 
of training costs implies that employment is less likely to rise. This is because the 
marginal cost of employment (RHS of equation (11.30)) falls by less that in the case where 
training costs are linear in hours of work.
If hours are above the optimal for the individual (Uh<0), a reduction will lead to a lower 
quit rate and will therefore imply again a fall in variable labour costs (whN) and training 
costs (GqN). The reaction of the wage becomes uncertain and could rise, fall or remain 
unchanged depending on the size of Uh. Employment is again more likely to increase 
because of a larger fall of its marginal cost, compared to the case where hours were 
optimal for the individual.
In general equilibrium now, maintaining the assumptions of a constant eUc and eqR and 
assuming that the unemployment benefit is fully indexed to the wage, a reduction in hours 
will increase unemployment if (a) hours are at the optimal level for the individual initially 
and (b) the unemployment benefit is not indexed to hours of work. This corresponds to 
the last row of Table 4 which we assessed as very unlikely and, if either of these two 
assumptions is not satisfied, the result becomes uncertain. Even the least favourable 
training costs structure for the effectiveness of hours reductions, does not necessarily imply 
therefore that a reduction in hours will increase unemployment.
17 This follows from equation (11.31) if the elasticity of the quitting function with respect 
to R (eqR) is constant. This is true at the optimum when training costs are internal 
(G=gwh).
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Hoel and Vale (1986) and Layard et al (1986) however, derive negative for unemployment 
results by using this cost structure. In the efficiency wage model of Layard et al, the firm 
is assumed to use a production technology with output proportional to hours (F(N,h)=h 
F'fN)). The FOC with respect to employment is:
It is easy to show that in this case, and for given w and q, employment will fall following 
a reduction in hours since the marginal cost of employment falls by less than its marginal 
product. If the firm sets also the wage then lower hours can have an additional effect on 
employment through the wage (and q) on the RHS of equation (11.32). It is easy to show 
however, that any change in the wage does not affect the RHS of equation (11.32) precisely 
because the firm sets the wage. It follows that whether the firm sets the wage or not, a 
cut in hours in this model will reduce employment and that is a direct effect of the 
structure of training costs. The efficiency wage argument made by Layard et al is 
therefore irrelevant to the result they obtain. The empirical evidence we have already 
presented - see Tables 2A and 2B in Chapter I - suggests that output is not linear in hours 
and that a reduction in hours has a direct positive effect on employment.
Hoel and Vale (1986) assume that the new qN workers hired every period work only h-T 
hours in which case effective labour input is Nh-qNT and the firm’s problem is:
hF”(N) = wh + Gq (11.32)
max N w P = F(N(h-Tq)) - whN (H. 33)
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Because the quit rate is now included in the production function any change in hours will 
have in addition to the direct effect on employment18 an effect through the wage - strictly 
speaking the quit rate. The direct effect is uncertain but a reduction in hours will now lead 
to an increase in the hourly wage, if hours are at the optimal for the individual level 
initially, and therefore to a negative indirect employment effect.
Note however that Hoel and Vale’s results depend crucially on the assumption they make 
about training time being independent of hours. If training is internal however then one 
would expect it to be proportional to hours of work. If it is external then again one would 
expect the time spent training to be reduced when hours are reduced, to the extent that the 
aim of the exercise is to evaluate the effects on employment of economy-wide hours 
reductions. Furthermore we show in Appendix G of Chapter III that, under quite general 
assumptions, indexation can be the optimal response of a profit maximising firm. It 
follows that T=th is a more attractive formulation in which case the results are identical 
to the first case we analysed in this section; any reduction in hours implies no change (a 
reduction) in the hourly wage if hours are at (above) the optimal level for the individual 
initially and leads to a proportional increase in employment.
Hoel and Vale (1986) ignore this possibility and conclude that ’’reduced working hours are 
likely to increase unemployment". This is not a proposition supported by any of the 
models presented in this section or the empirical evidence presented in the introduction. 
The more plausible conclusion - which the authors, somewhat paradoxically, also draw - 
is that it is possible to construct an efficiency wage model where reductions in hours
18 A fall in hours will again imply, ceteris paribus, a smaller increase in employment.
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increase unemployment but we would not consider this to be a surprise finding.
Schmidt-Sorensen (1991) allows for a number of different channels through which changes 
in hours can affect productivity. His results suggest also that the effect of shorter hours on 
employment is uncertain, allowing for a general form of the effort function and overtime.
The last model we examine very briefly in this section is the shirking model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984). A reduction in hours in this model can reduce the incentive to shirk 
by reducing the gain from shirking - assume that effort is proportional to hours of work 
i.e. e=ha, where a can be interpreted as a factor transforming actual hours (h) into "effort 
units" (e). In this case the wage premium the firm needs to pay to avoid any shirking 
taking place is also reduced and with it the amount of equilibrium unemployment.
In summary, a reduction in hours of work in efficiency wage models in partial equilibrium, 
will probably have no effect on the hourly wage and will lead to an increase in 
employment. In general equilibrium, a reduction in hours will have an uncertain effect on 
the hourly wage but is most likely to lead to a fall in unemployment, just like in the union 
models.
If training time is independent of hours of work then a reduction in hours can lead to a 
higher hourly wage. We expressed our doubts about the realism of the assumption but 
even if it is partially true, the intuition behind it is not related to income compensation. 
It is related rather to cost reduction through a lower net quitting rate; we doubt that the 
size of any such effect will be significant in practice.
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Conclusions
The aim of this Chapter was to use a union and efficiency wage framework to assess the 
conditions under which reductions in hours of work will have a negative indirect 
employment effect. We found that the impact of reductions in hours of work on the wage 
depends on:
• the constancy of e ^ e ^  and the initial level of hours relative to the optimal for the 
individual,
• the extent of indexation of the unemployment benefit to hours, if any, and
• the structure of training costs and in particular the degree of indexation to hours.
If the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage (eNw) and the elasticity of utility 
with respect to consumption (eUc) are constant then, a reduction in hours of work will leave 
the hourly wage unchanged (reduce it) if hours are initially at (above) the optimal level for 
the individual. This proposition holds true in union and efficiency wage models alike. In 
general equilibrium, a reduction in hours of work will lead to a lower wage and a 
reduction in unemployment if it increases the utility from employment relative to 
unemployment. This will be true if hours are initially below the optimal level for the 
individual or if hours are at their optimal level for the individual and the unemployment 
benefit is partially or fully indexed to hours of work.
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TABLE 3
Total Effect on Employment of Reductions in Hours of W ork
(A) (B) (C)
e wh = -1 ©wh > - 1 e wh > 0
*0 ^ N h  ^  0 ®Nh ^ e Nh < ' 0 eNh ^
? N h ®Nh ^ &* <0
b) = 0 2 Qm =0 e Nh “^ 0 e^  <‘0
&>Jh — e Nw ^N h  “  ®Nw —Nh ~ eNw
c) 0 < Fn1i < w 3 >0 eNh >or<0 e^
—Nh <0 ? N h  ^ ^ N h
d) ^ N h  —  W ®Nh ®Nw 0  —  eN h  < " e Nw e^
N^h = 0
oIIJr e>ih = 0
e) Fjsn, > w e^  > -eNw eNh ^0 e^  >or<0
N^h &Jh —Nh
NOTE: If ewh=0, the total effect on employment is given in the second row.
1 F(N,h) = F2(Nh) and -hNF2”  > F2\  This is however an unlikely possibility.
2 F(N,h) = F3(N) + F4(h).
3 F(N,h) = N*hb. The results assume b< l.
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TABLE 4
Unemployment Effects of Reduction in Hours of W ork
w-line
Inward
Shift
(if CD b<l)
No
Shift
(ifCD b=l)
Negative 
Slope 
e*. = 0 or
e6.  < 1
Inwards
Shift
h > h* or 
h=h* & ebh < 1
u4=ua < ub u2=ua<ub
u-line
(constant
mark-up,
U2 >0)
No Shift
h=h* & ebh=0 u3=ua < ub ul=ua=ub
Vertical
Slope
v  = 1
Inwards
Shift
h > h* or 
h=h* & ebh < 1
ua < ub ua < ub
No Shift
h=h* & ebh=0 ua = ub ua = ub
ua/ub unemployment rate after/before hours reduction (u4<u3<u2<ul, see Fig. 1).
e^ = 0 unemployment benefit not indexed to x.
e^ < 0 unemployment benefit partially/fully (</=) indexed to x.
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FIGURE 2
Wages and Unemployment in General Equilibrium
W
h falls 
dB/dh > 0
w - l in e
u- l ine
u4 u3 u2 u1 u
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APPENDIX A
Proof of proposition of section 2.1.4 that employment and union utility move in the same 
direction if the mark-up is a constant. To prove the result we will use these four equations:
®Nb —Nh ®Nw (1.3) (Al)
N . DU + NU„ = 0 (H-2) (A2)
U(wh,T-h) = k  V (II.3) (A3)
Z, = N„ DU + NU, (H.6) (A4)
Note that in equation (A4) we use to indicate the direct rather than the total effect (Nh) on
employment of reductions in hours. Rewrite equation (Al) in partial derivative form:
N„ = EL, + N . wk (A5)
From equation (A3) it follows that:
chv/dh = - (Uh/Uw) (A6)
From equation (A2) it follows that:
DU = - (NUW/NW) (A7)
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Put (A6) in (A5), substitute Nh from (A5) and DU from (A7) in (A4) to get:
Zh = {N„ - Nw (-Uh/Uw)} (-NU,/NJ + NUh =>
Zh = - (NUyNw) Nh (A8)
Nw is negative and therefore Nh and Zh will have the same sign if the mark-up is constant.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of propositions in section 22. The equations for the ratio of utility when unemployed 
to utility when employed (B) and for unemployment are:
B = U7Ue = U(b,T)) / U(wh,T-h) (Bl)
u = - [eUc / eNw] (1-B)-1 (11.18) (B2)
Proof of Proposition 1: "If eUc and eNw are constant the u-line will have a negative slope if 
b is indexed partially or not at all to w. The u-line is vertical if b is fully indexed to w".
It follows from equation (B2) that:
duldw = k2 (B„) (B3)
Since k2 is positive (B3) implies that du/dw will have the same sign as Bw (Bw=dB/dw). The 
u-line will be vertical in w-u space if Bw=0.
Differentiating equation (Bl) with respect to the wage and rearranging we get:
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Bw = (U7wUe) eUc {ebw - 1} (B4)
If b is partially indexed (ebw<l) or not indexed at all to the hourly wage (ebw=0), Bw is 
negative and the u-line is negatively sloped. If b is fully indexed to the hourly wage ( e ^ l ) ,  
Bw = 0 and the u-line is vertical.
Proof of Proposition 2: "If hours are at their optimal level for the individual initially the u- 
line will not shift (shift inwards) if b is not indexed (partially or fully indexed) to hours. If 
hours are above the optimal level for the individual initially the u-line will shift inwards".
It follows again from equation (B2) that :
du/ah = k2 (Bh) (B5)
The u-line will shift inwards following a reduction in hours in w-u space if Bh is positive and 
will not shift if Bb=0.
Differentiating (Bl) with respect to hours and rearranging we get:
Bh = (U7hUe) {(eUc ebh) - e,,} (B6)
where e^  is the total elasticity of utility with respect to hours of work ie it includes the effect
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through a change in consumption.
If hours are initially at their optimal level then e^  is zero and Bh>0 iff ebh>0. If hours are 
above the optimal level for the individual, then e^  is negative and Bh is positive.
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CHAPTER III
REDUCTIONS IN HOURS OF WORK, EMPLOYMENT AND 
WAGES WITH POSITIVE OVERTIME
Introduction
In this Chapter we examine the effects of reductions in standard hours of work on 
employment when actual hours of work are chosen endogenously and exceed the 
exogenously determined level of "standard” or "normal" hours (h j - ie there is positive 
overtime. This can be justified on the grounds that the level of actual hours may be 
determined regularly at a firm or industry level whilst the level of standard hours is 
determined at a higher level at infrequent intervals and is taken as given by the individual 
firm and union.
There are two reasons for examining the case of positive overtime separately. First, the 
theoretical predictions about the effects of reductions in standard hours of work on 
employment can be the opposite of the case where overtime is zero and since the incidence 
of overtime is uneven 1 the analysis of this Chapter is only relevant to those sectors/plants 
that use extensive overtime. Second, since actual hours are now determined endogenously, 
more can be said about the economic efficiency of reducing standard hours of work. Such 
arguments could not be made in Chapter II since we did not provide there a detailed 
framework about the way in which the level of hours of work is determined initially.
1 More than 60% of operatives in GB manufacturing worked no overtime at all in 1989 
- see Table 6. In the detailed study of Ehrenberg (1971), 37% of his 2,013 
establishments in non-manufacturing industries used no overtime at all. Most 
manufacturing industries did but there is very large variability in overtime hours 
worked both across different industries and across establishments within the same 
industry.
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The existence of overtime is considered to be one of the main reasons for which reductions 
in standard hours of work may not lead to significant employment gains (Allen (1980), 
Hart (1987), Booth and Schiantarelli (1988), Calmfors and Hoel (1988)). The reason is 
simple: when the firm sets employment and actual hours of work, a reduction in standard 
hours is equivalent to an increase in fixed costs of employment. It therefore leads 
unambiguously to a fall in employment as firms substitute more expensive "employees" 
with extra hours of work.
The main problem with this approach however is that for most "standard" production 
function formulations, a reduction in standard hours is accompanied by an increase in 
actual hours of work. The prediction is clearly against the empirical evidence which 
suggests that the elasticity of demand of actual with respect to standard hours is positive 
and near unity (Hart and Sharot (1978), Bodo and Giannini (1985), Bosworth and 
Westaway (1985, 1987)). An argument could be made that this reflects compositional 
effects, since the aggregate observations include overtime and non-overtime establishments. 
This is clearly rejected however by the very detailed study of Hart and Wilson (1988) 
covering 52 establishments in the UK Metal Working industry for the 1978-82 period. The 
authors distinguish explicitly between overtime and non-overtime establishments and find 
a significant positive elasticity of actual with respect to standard hours, in the overtime 
establishments (+0.802).
The prediction is also not supported by survey evidence; White (1983), after surveying 123 
firms that introduced shorter hours in 1981 in the engineering and printing industries, 
comments that attitudes to overtime seemed to have changed from "inevitable consequence"
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in 1979 to "actively trying to reduce it" in 1981.
The predicted increase in actual hours is also against the long-run movement of average 
weekly hours in most industrialised countries, especially in Europe 2 - see Table 7. The 
conventional explanations for this trend are a positive relationship between standard and 
actual hours on the supply side due to a strong income effect and structural changes in the 
labour market - increased participation of women and part-time workers. It is difficult to 
accept the first argument as sufficient explanation if, ceteris paribus, following a reduction 
in standard hours, the demand for actual hours increases. The explanation is even more 
implausible given the very low estimates of the elasticity of hours demand with respect to 
the wage (Pencavel and Holmlund (1988), Riechel (1986), Bosworth and Westaway 
(1987)).
Concerning compositional and structural changes in the labour market note that the figures 
of Table 7 refer to manufacturing which has witnessed relatively minor structural changes - 
see Wilson (1985, Table 2.9) for a detailed analysis of the UK. Even in this case the long- 
run paths of actual hours are fairly similar across countries that have witnessed different 
changes in the structure of their labour markets. In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we show also 
that a negative long-run trend is present in actual hours worked by male manual full-time 
workers in GB manufacturing; these are the workers who work predominantly overtime - 
see Table 8. Structural and compositional changes in the labour force, can not provide
2 In the US, a very large reduction in weekly hours has taken place in the pre-war 
period; average weekly hours of work have fallen by 32% in the 1900-1940 period 
(Kniesner (1976)). In the post-war period, the level of annual hours of work has been 
reduced mainly with increases in holidays rather than further reductions in the length 
of the working week.
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therefore a satisfactory explanation of this trend.
We show in this Chapter that a realistic modification of the assumptions concerning the 
fixed cost and payment structure implies that demand for actual hours of work will be a 
positive function of standard hours. This means that reductions in standard hours can have 
a positive effect on employment and we determine the conditions under which this will be 
true.
We examine next the effects of lower standard hours of work on employment when the 
wage is determined endogenously. The structure is similar to the models analyzed in 
Chapter II so we present only the case where the wage is determined by a monopoly union. 
We show that the union is now even less likely to demand an increase in the hourly wage, 
compared to the case where there was no overtime; employment is therefore even more 
likely to increase.
The endogenous determination of hours of work allows us also to address the relatively 
unexplored issue of the economic efficiency reasons behind demands for reductions in the 
length of the workweek. In this Chapter we concentrate on the implications of the 
bargaining structure. We show first why unions might demand reductions in standard 
hours, if the first best solution of simultaneous bargaining over all relevant variables can 
not be implemented. We then present the conditions under which such reductions will be 
efficient. We show next that even when employment, hours of work and wages are 
bargained over simultaneously between the union and the firm, reductions in standard hours 
can improve efficiency and increase employment.
4.0 LABOUR DEMAND WITH POSITIVE OVERTIME
4.1 Sources and Movement of Overtime
Almost all studies examining overtime take the existence of a two-tier wage schedule as 
given. We also make this assumption in the models analysed in the remainder of this 
Chapter, but we review very briefly here some of the reasons offered for the existence of 
an overtime premium.
When hours paid at a premium are perfect substitutes for hours payed at normal rates 3, 
the basic explanation for the existence of an overtime premium is wage discrimination on 
the part of monopsonistic employers (Bilas (1984)). Trejo (1991) has argued that in a 
large number of cases where firms offer overtime, they offer weekly earnings that do not 
differ from equivalent non-overtime jobs, by paying a lower standard wage.
If on the other hand, demand for overtime hours is more inelastic than demand for normal 
hours, it will be in the interest of unions to wage discriminate between normal and 
overtime hours - see Appendix C. In the face of uncertainty, firms are also likely to offer 
state dependent overtime (Ashworth et al (1977)) 4. The varying cyclical patterns of
3 This is not necessary always the case, see Santamaki (1988).
4 In the model of Ashworth et al (1977) employment is fixed and cannot change after
the realisation of demand which corresponds to frequent relatively "small" demand 
shocks. Note that in the equivalent certainty case the firm will offer no overtime so
that the positive overtime outcome is purely a result of the uncertainty and the
assumption about constant employment.
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different industries contribute then to the existence of positive overtime hours throughout 
the cycle.
Ehrenberg (1970) has also shown that in the face of a perfectly anticipated absentee rate, 
firms will use overtime because overtime payments will only be made if an employee is 
present whereas the firm will have to incur the fixed cost of hiring and training an 
employee, whether the employee is present or not. The proposition has found some 
support in a positive and significant relation between work injury rates and overtime 
(Mabry (1976)) but the direction of causality could be questioned.
In empirical studies, demand for overtime hours is usually modelled as an increasing 
function of fixed costs of employment and a decreasing function of the overtime premium 
(Appendix D, Hart (1987)). The empirical evidence however is somewhat mixed. 
Ehrenberg (1971) has used cross-section 1966 data from 4,009 establishments for the US 
non-agricultural sector to estimate an overtime hours equation by industry. He found that 
the ratio of fixed employment costs to overtime premia is positively related to overtime 
hours for all 24 industry groups, but he does not report separate coefficients. Bosworth 
and Westaway (1987) on the other hand, using quarterly post-war UK aggregate data, 
found a significant positive effect on overtime from higher fixed costs but no effect from 
the overtime premium.
Tables 6 and 8 and Figures 3 and 4 provide some evidence on the occupational 
characteristics of the workers working large amounts of overtime, the distribution of 
overtime hours and percentage of operatives on overtime and the movement o f average
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overtime hours in the UK in the post-war period. The evidence on the distribution of 
standard and actual hours suggests that it is the majority of manual males that work 
overtime - see Table 8.
Table 6 reports the breakdown of overtime into the proportion of operatives working 
overtime and average overtime hours per operative in 16 manufacturing industries in 1970, 
1980 and 1989. For the whole manufacturing industry, in 1989, less than 40% of 
operatives worked any overtime, but there is some variability across industries. The 
correlation between the two variables is positive but not significant; the Chemical Industry 
for instance, has the second lowest percentage of operatives on overtime but the highest 
level of average overtime hours 5.
Both overtime hours and the percentage of operatives on overtime are cyclical depending 
on the industry (eg Motor Vehicles, Timber and Furniture) and are relatively stable for less 
cyclical industries (eg Other Transport Equipment and Food, Drink and Tobacco).
Figures 3 and 4 show the path of actual and standard hours for full-time manual males in 
UK Manufacturing. Figure 4 includes a linear trend which shows a small positive long-run 
trend in overtime, but the period is somewhat short for a definite conclusion. For a 
detailed descriptive analysis of the way in which overtime hours have developed in post­
war UK by occupation and by industry see Wilson (1985).
5 Our analysis concentrates on the level of overtime hours. The percentage of operatives 
or workforce on overtime is taken to be exogenous throughout.
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4.2 Employment and Reductions in Standard Hours of Work
In all of the models examined in this section we will assume that the firm faces a given 
overtime premium (r), which it must pay for the number of hours it demands in excess of 
the exogenous level of standard hours. We assume also for simplicity, that standard and 
overtime hours are perfect substitutes in production and fixed employment costs are 
proportional to the hourly wage (G=g,w). The firm’s problem then is to choose actual 
hours of work and employment - the number of employees - to maximise 6:
max Nh P = F(N,h) - Nwh, - Nw(l+r)(h-ht) - g ^ N  (IH .l)
By rearranging the cost side of equation (III. 1) we obtain:
max Nh P = F(N,h) - Nw(l+r)h - Nw(g,-rhs) (ffl.2)
As can be seen from equation (III.2), a reduction in the length of the standard week (h j 
is now equivalent to an increase in the fixed costs of employment (g,) and implies an 
increase in costs without a direct effect on output. The ratio of marginal products is 
unaffected, but an employee now costs more than an hour at the margin and employment
6 We assume that all employees work some overtime; assuming that an exogenously 
determined proportion of the workforce is doing any overtime makes no qualitative 
difference to the results. For a formal solution to the problem, along with the 
implications for the employment impact of reductions in standard hours with a variable 
capital stock, when the firm is output constrained and when the marginal product of 
standard and overtime hours differs see Hart (1984a, 1987).
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unambiguously falls.
The reduction in employment implies that the cost of an extra hour is now lower. What 
happens to actual hours worked will therefore depend on the sign and size of the effect the 
reduction in employment has on the marginal product of hours. If the reduction in 
employment increase the marginal product of an extra hour or leaves it unaffected then it 
is profitable for the firm to expand actual hours. The same is true if the fall in 
employment decreases the marginal product of an extra hour but the reduction is smaller 
than the reduction in the marginal cost (ie the hourly wage). In all these cases actual hours 
worked and income of those employed - when the wage is fixed - will rise. With a CD 
technology, demand for hours of work and employment is (see Appendix D):
h‘ = (b/(a-b)) (l/(l+r» (gl - rh.) (IH.3)
N* = (wCl+rJ/b)1*-” h(, b)/(,1) (ni.4)
Note that, conditional on hs, demand for hours is independent of the hourly wage, but 
depends positively on the ratio of fixed employment costs (w(g,-rhs)) to the overtime wage
rate (w(l+r)). This is an attractive feature of the CD and labour cost structure
assumptions, given that there is weak econometric evidence about demand for hours of 
work depending negatively on the wage 7.
Note also that fixed employment costs affect employment only through changes in actual
7 See Hart and Sharot (1978), Riechel (1986), Bosworth and Westaway (1987), Pencavel 
and Holmlund (1988).
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hours of work. Although a reduction in employment reduces the marginal product of an 
hour the condition we mentioned above is satisfied and actual hours worked unambiguously 
rise *. As we argued earlier this prediction is not in line with the movement of actual and 
standard hours in the manufacturing sector of the UK and most other industrialised 
countries.
It seems therefore appropriate to alter the model in order to take into account the fact that 
actual hours of work fall or remain unchanged following a cut in standard hours and we 
do that in the next section. Within the current model, increases rather than decreases in 
standard hours would be a more accurate reflection of union demands and would be in 
accordance with the long run negative movement in actual hours - although the model 
would now predict a reduction in overtime hours. In this case however the direct effect 
on employment will be positive; In section 5J_ we show that in such a case employment 
is also likely to rise, when the wage is set by a monopoly union.
A final point concerns the analogy between the model we presented above and the one we 
referred to in section L2 of Chapter I, where the firm can choose the number of shifts. 
In Appendix E, using a CD technology, we show that a slight modification of the overtime 
hours model allows us to interpret overtime as shiftwork. Assuming then that shiftwork 
is paid at a premium we show that the qualitative effects of reductions in standard hours 
on employment and actual hours of work/the number of shifts are the same.
8 The same is true for realistic values of a CES function and other production function 
formulations which deliver a positive overtime demand like F(N,h)=F(NJ(h)). If 
F(N,h)=F2(Nh) or F(N,h)=hF'(N)), the results are trivial ie either no overtime is 
demanded or no output produced.
-89-
4.3 Employment and Reductions in Actual Hours of Work
Within the conventional competitive model there are two plausible ways in which a 
reduction in standard hours can increase the ratio of the marginal cost of hours to 
employment and thus produce a negative effect on the demand for actual hours. First, the 
marginal cost of an hour following the reduction in standard hours might rise, which will 
be true if the overtime premium is rising in the level of overtime hours (r=r(h-hj, r(0)=0, 
r’>0) 9.
Second, the marginal cost of employment can fall and that will happen if fixed costs of 
employment are a positive function of standard hours - we will assume for simplicity that 
fixed costs are fully indexed to basic weekly earnings, ie g,=ghs and G=gwhs.
Consider first the case where the overtime premium is increasing in overtime. The firm 
must choose the number of employees and hours of work in order to maximise:
max Nh P -  F2(Nh) - Nwh, - Nw(l-fr)h0 - Nwg, (111.5)
where h0 is overtime hours (h ^h -h j, r=r(h0), r’>0 and r(0)=0. Assume for simplicity that 
output is a function of employee-hours (F2(Nh)). Solve the FOCs to get (Appendix F):
9 Hart and Ruffell (1993) have found little evidence to support this hypothesis in UK 
production industries.
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h* = (grrh,)/(rerh0) (III.6)
Subtract h, from both sides of equation (III.6) to get:
h0‘ = (g,/rerh0) - h, [l+ (l/erh0)] (III.7)
where we use e ^  to denote the elasticity of the overtime premium with respect to overtime. 
Assume this elasticity is constant, differentiate equation (III.6) and rearrange to obtain:
3h/3h, = (grti-hye^)) [g .+ rh j1 (ffl.8)
Equation (III.8) can be positive or negative. If it is positive note that it will be smaller 
than unity so that any fall in standard hours will increase overtime. A fall in standard 
hours is also more likely to lead to a fall in actual hours, the larger the fixed costs of 
employment (g,) and the larger the elasticity of the overtime premium with respect to 
overtime (e^). Equation (III.8) can be evaluated for realistic values of actual hours, 
overtime and the premium ,0. For a relatively high value of g„ 311/3115=0.75 and this 
means that a 2 hours fall in the length of the workweek implies a 1.5 hours fall in actual 
hours. For a lower value of g„ 3h/3hs=0.50, so that a fall in standard hours leads again 
to a fall in actual hours but implies a relatively large increase in overtime.
10 The assumptions made are ly=40, h0=8, r=0.3, g=21.6/16.8 (which corresponds to a 
ratio of fixed to total labour costs of 30% and 25% respectively). For the large g, 
value, 3h/3hs=0.75, for the small one, 3h/31y=0.50 - see Table FI in Appendix F.
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By differentiating the FOC for employment - see equation (F2) in Appendix F - we obtain:
(m.9)
i  Nh* = " (h,/h) [wr(l+erh0)/NhF2” ]
The direct effect on employment is now made up of two components. The first one (e 
is positive and reduces employment, since a reduction in standard hours still acts as an 
increase in the fixed cost of employment; as can be seen from equation (III. 10), further 
assumptions about the production function are needed in order to determine its size. The 
second one (e^ ehhs) increases employment through the reduction in actual hours of work 
since = -1. In the two examples used earlier, the second component of the direct effect 
on employment (e,^ ehhs) is -0.625, if dh/dh, = 0.75, and -0.415, if dh/dhs=0.50. A 
reduction in standard hours of work will lead to an increase in employment if the direct 
elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours (e is smaller than 0.415 (if 
dh/dhs=(J.50) or smaller than 0.625 (if dh/dhs=0.75)Tl.
The justification for fixed employment costs being a positive function of standard hours 
is twofold. First, the ratio of fixed to total labour costs has been constant or slightly rising 
in the long-run, if one controls for changes in employers’ tax rates - see Table 9 and
11 The available econometric evidence (Hart and Wilson (1988, Table 9.4)) suggests that 
6^=0.802 and e ^=0.411. If -1, the net direct effect of a 10% reduction in 
standard hours would be a 4% increase in employment in overtime establishments.
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Figure 5 for the UK 12 and Hart (1984b, p. 14), for other OECD countries. In the UK, 
during 1975-1986, employers’ National Insurance Contributions were fully indexed to 
weekly earnings; assuming that fixed costs are indexed to standard weekly earnings is 
therefore not a bad approximation of their movement. Second, if  fixed costs are training 
costs, then one can argue that they should be modelled as a linear function of standard 
hours 13.
We use again a CD production function which allows us to compare with earlier results 
and will also be used in the following section. We assume for simplicity that the amount 
of time spent training per period (g,), is some proportion g of standard hours M. In this 
case the firm chooses employment and actual hours of work to maximise:
max Nh P = N'hb - Nwh, - Nw(l+r)(h-h1) - gwh.N (H l.ll)
Note that other than the assumption made about the production function, the only 
difference with the conventional profit function (see III. 1) is the last term. The solutions 
for hours and employment are:
12 Note that for the UK, strictly speaking, it is not possible to distinguish between the 
National Insurance Contribution rate for the employer and the base on which it is 
calculated before 1975.
13 Assume that training increases the marginal product of employment per period and a 
minimum amount of training per period is necessary to achieve this increase. It can 
be shown that in this case the firm will choose this amount - rather than more training 
per period for fewer periods. If this minimum amount of training is some proportion 
of standard hours, then training time -and costs - will also be a proportion of standard 
hours, see Appendix G.
14 Assuming that g, is partially indexed to standard hours does not affect qualitatively the 
results. We comment where it makes a quantitative difference.
-93-
h* = (b/(a-b)) (l/(l+ r»  (g-r) h, = d h, 
N* = (w(l+r)/b),/(- ,)
(111.3’)
(m.4)
The solution for employment is identical to the earlier case. The solution for hours 
however implies that actual hours of work are a proportion d of standard hours, d must 
be larger than unity if firms employ overtime. This means that actual and standard hours 
move in the same direction but implies also that overtime hours will be falling with 
standard hours. If training time is only partially indexed to standard hours, the elasticity 
of actual with respect to standard hours would be below unity; this means that overtime 
would be approximately constant, or even rising, in the long-run.
By differentiating equation (III.4) with respect to standard hours we can now obtain an 
explicit expression for the direct effect of reductions in standard hours of work on 
employment. Using also equation (III.3’) we get in elasticity terms:
eNhs = [(l-b)/(a-l)] ehhl = (l-b)/(a-l) (m.12)
The RHS of equation (III. 12) is negative since the SOCs require 0<b<a<l. The condition 
b<a implies also that the elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours is 
absolutely larger than unity. If training time is only partially indexed to standard hours, 
e ^  will be smaller than unity and any given change in standard hours will lead to a smaller 
increase in employment.
It should be noted that this result does not depend on the CD assumption. In the general
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case the firm’s problem is:
max N>h P = F(N,h) - Nwh, - Nw(l+r)(h-h,) - gwh,N (m.13)
It is easy to show that in this case the total effect of a reduction in standard hours on 
employment is:
aN/ah, = w(g-r)Fhh / D (HI.14)
where D = - [FN1)-w(l+r)]2 and must be positive for the SOCs to be satisfied. It
follows that, since Fhh <0, a reduction in standard hours will always increase employment, 
when fixed employment costs are indexed to standard weekly earnings, if total fixed costs 
of employment - ie (g-r) - are positive.
5.0 UNION MODELS WITH POSITIVE OVERTIME
5.1 Employment. Wages and Reductions in Standard Hours
In order to look at the total effect on employment from a reduction in standard hours we 
must take again into account the way in which the hourly wage will react to such a 
reduction. In Chapter II we examined wage determination in monopoly union, bargaining 
and efficiency wage models. We showed there that the basic results concerning the effects 
of reductions in hours on employment and unemployment were unaffected by the wage 
determination process. We will therefore illustrate the main argument in this section using 
only the basic monopoly union model.
Since we have now added actual hours to the set of variables to be determined we must 
also specify which variables are set by whom and the timing of this process - for the 
implications of the timing of the process in a wage-employment framework see Manning 
(1987). There is no consensus in the literature about either of the two l5, which should 
come as no surprise, given the conflicting evidence on the appropriate model of 
employment determination.
We make the relatively simple assumption that the employer has unilateral control over 
both hours of work and employment and sets both simultaneously, after the wage has been 
determined by the union. The main theoretical argument for such a solution is that the
15 See Pencavel (1991, p. 108-114) for a summary.
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unions/employees cannot monitor costlessly the level of employment and hours of work, 
if the firm can make them contingent on the state of demand - see Farber (1986). They 
therefore bargain only over the wage, avoiding concessions in their wage demands for 
promises of higher employment - and lower hours, see Chapter IV - that can not be 
confirmed and therefore enforced. Alternatively, firms follow a LIFO policy in which case 
unions may be indifferent about employment (Oswald (1985)).
The assumption is also in accordance with observed firm behaviour of making specific 
hours offers to employees and has been used and supported in the literature 16 (Booth and 
Schiantarelli (1988), Earle and Pencavel (1990)). The problem then facing the union is to 
maximise its expected utility subject to the factor demand functions of the firm:
max w Z = N{U(wH,T-h)-V} + M V  = NDU + MV (111.15)
s.t. PN — Ph = 0
where DU = U(wH,T-h) - V and H=((l+r)h-rhs). With a general specification of the 
production function the results are uncertain. The union must take into account the effect 
its wage setting behaviour will have on employment and on actual hours. The reaction of 
both to an increase in the hourly wage is ambiguous. We adopt therefore the profit 
function we presented in the previous section in which case the union’s problem is to
16 Earle and Pencavel (1990) present a number of alternatives and express support for 
the assumption made in the text. They ask the question "Should work hours be 
characterised as a variable subject to joint control by the union and management or ... 
as determined unilaterally by the union or by management?". Their answer is "The 
industrial relations literature does not provide a clear answer to this question...". 
Neither does any quantitative empirical evidence to date.
maximise equation (III. 15) subject to the factor demands given by equations (III.3’) and 
(III.4). It is now again possible to derive an expression for union utility as a mark-up on 
outside utility - see Appendix H:
U (wH, T-h) = [eNw / ( eNw + eUc)] V = k V (111.16)
The expression is similar to the case where there is no overtime I7. We can obtain the 
effects of changes in standard hours on the hourly wage, when eNw and eUc are constant, by 
totally differentiating equation (III. 16) with respect to w and h*:
aw/ah, = - (uhs/ u j  + [ - (uh/uw) (ah/ah,)]
= (rw/H) + [ - [(w(l+r)U1-U2)/(HU1)J dhfdhsI (111.17)
Note that the expressions above will be identical to the case where there is no overtime 
(r=0) if H=h=hs. A reduction in standard hours now has a direct positive effect on the 
hourly wage because it leads, for given actual hours, to an unambiguous increase in income 
and therefore moderates union wage demands - first term of equation (III. 17). The indirect 
effect, through actual hours of work, depends on the direction of movement of actual hours 
following the standard hours reduction - in this case 0h/3hs=d, see equation (III.3’) - and 
on the level of hours relative to the optimal for the individual (ie whether Uh is positive, 
zero or negative at the level of actual hours demanded by the firm). The second term of
17 Recall that Trejo (1991) found evidence which supports this result namely that in a 
large number of cases where firms offer overtime, they offer weekly earnings that do 
not differ from equivalent non-overtime jobs, by paying a lower standard wage. This 
will be true under the assumption that k and V are the same for overtime and non­
overtime employees.
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equation (III. 17) will therefore be positive or zero if actual hours are above or at the 
optimal for the individual; it will be negative if they are below it.
These results are therefore very much like the no-overtime case, except for the first term 
o f equation (III. 17). This was absent in the no-overtime case and implies that the union 
will set a lower hourly wage following a reduction in standard hours, even if the level of 
actual hours is optimal for its members.
To calculate the total effect on employment we must once more sum up the direct and 
indirect effects from the fall in standard hours. In elasticity terms the total effect is:
e Nh* "  —Nhi ^ e Nw e wh* (III. 18)
In the CD case e ^  = e^  ehhs. Substituting the relevant elasticities from equations (III.3’) 
and (III.4) we obtain:
eNh* = l(l-b)/(a-l)] + [l/(a-l)J ewh, (111.19)
The first term is the direct effect which will increase employment following a reduction 
in standard hours. The second term is the indirect effect and will also increase 
employment under the assumptions we made earlier (ie e^^O). It is worth noting that
these findings are contrary to the common belief that the existence of overtime makes an
increase in employment following a reduction in standard hours much less likely. This is 
even more the case if a union is present.
It is also interesting at this point to present briefly the effects of reductions in standard 
hours on the hourly wage and employment using the "traditional" model, where the 
overtime premium is constant and employment costs are not indexed to standard weekly 
earnings. We can again use equations (III.3), (III.4) and (III. 16) to determine hours, 
employment and the wage. By differentiating equation (III. 16) we obtain:
aw/ah, = (rw/H) - [(w(l+r)U1-U2)/(HU,)] ah/ah, (111.20)
The first term is again positive. If actual hours are above the optimal level for the 
individual - which would justify union demands to reduce them - then the second term of 
the above expression is negative. If it is larger than the first one, equation (111.20) will be 
negative. In this case a reduction in standard hours will reduce employment, profits and 
individual and union utility so that it is not possible to provide any justification for such 
a reduction 18.
In such a model, an increase in standard hours would be a more accurate reflection of 
union demands and would also be consistent with observed movements of actual hours. 
Since overtime in such a case would fall the analysis can also be used to examine the 
employment effects of an induced rather than compulsory reduction in demand for 
overtime19.
18 Doubts about the employment generation potential of reductions in standard hours 
have been expressed however, based on variations of this model - see Booth and 
Schiantarelli (1988), Calmfors and Hoel (1988).
19 Note that most countries - the. UK is in fact an exception - have mandatory limits for 
overtime. For a comprehensive overview see Arrowsmith (1988).
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If standard hours are increased in the "traditional" model, employment will also increase - 
directly. When the wage is set by a monopoly union and actual hours are above (at) the 
optimal for the individual, then the increase in standard hours and ensuing reduction in 
overtime will increase (leave unchanged) individual utility and will lead to a reduction in 
the hourly wage and a positive for employment indirect effect. An increase in standard 
hours in this model will therefore increase employment both directly and indirectly, just 
like in the first case analysed in this section, where actual and standard hours move in the 
same direction.
A final point in this section concerns the implications of assuming that V is determined 
endogenously by noting that V now is:
V = u U(b,T) + (1-u) U(wH,T-h) (111.21)
where H ^O +rjh-rhJ. Substituting this back in equation (III. 16) we can obtain again an 
unemployment condition and, after substituting N=L(l-u), use equation (III.4) as a wage 
condition, just like in section 2 2  in Chapter II. The results are therefore very similar to 
the no-overtime case with a CD function and we therefore do not repeat them here.
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5.2 The Efficiency of Reductions in Standard Hours
We have assumed implicitly so far that reductions in hours of work are desirable if they 
increase employment and reduced unemployment, without providing any efficiency 
argument for reductions in hours of work.
The main economic argument for reductions in hours of work in the current literature relies 
on efficiency gains from redistributing the total volume of work in cyclical downturns. 
Fitzroy (1981) discusses informally the economic reasons and Dreze (1986) provides a 
more formal model. He claims that the absence of future workers - the "young” - from 
current wage bargains prevents the wage contract agreed from guaranteeing employment 
to the young in the event of a downturn in the future. The participation of the "young" 
in current wage bargains could reverse the market failure but Dreze calls such an idea 
"preposterous". The argument is similar to the "insider-outsider" models such as the one 
developed by Blanchard and Summers (1986).
Fitzroy and Hart (1985) show also that efficient labour contracts will include state 
dependent hours, in at least some states. The realisation of a bad state will therefore not 
necessarily lead to lay-offs only, when hours of work are taken into account.
In this section we look at the implications of the assumed cost and institutional structure 
for the efficiency of reductions in standard hours of work. A reduction will be taken to 
be efficient, if  it increases either or both of the parties’ pay-offs, without reducing the pay-
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off of the other.
We will use two models. In the first one the firm sets actual hours of work and 
employment after the union has determined the wage. As argued earlier, this is a realistic
model and it is identical in structure to the one presented in section 5J_; we also use the
same functional forms. In the second model, we address the problem of the "inefficient" 
outcome generated by the first model, by assuming that the union and the firm bargain 
simultaneously over employment, the wage and hours of work. Further assumptions on 
functional form are needed in order to derive definite predictions about the employment 
effects of lower hours. We show again that reductions in standard hours can improve 
overall efficiency.
Consider first the model we presented earlier in section 5J,. With a Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, the profit function of the firm and the - expected - utility function 
of the union are:
P = N*hb - wH - gwh,N (111.22)
Z = N{U(wH,T-h)-V} + MV = NDU + MV (111.23)
where H=(l+r)h-rhs. Since we assume that the firm determines employment and hours of
work after the union has determined the wage, N*F, h*F and w*B will satisfy:
PN = P„ = 0 (HI.24)
Zw = 0, s.t. PN = Ph = 0 (III.25)
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Assume now that h’F, exceeds the optimal level of hours for the individual, h*,^. Since 
the direct effect on employment from a reduction in hours of work is negative - due to the 
CD assumption - and the union cares about employment, h*^  exceeds the optimal for the 
union (h*^). In such a case therefore, unions would be justified to demand reductions in 
standard/actual hours of work.
What are the effects of such a reduction on union and firm objectives? By using the 
envelope theorem it follows that:
PhI = Pw (3w/3hs) + P,, (111.26)
z hs -  Nh, DU + N (Uh hhl + U J  (in.27)
where P^ and Uj,s denote the direct effects from reductions in standard hours on profits and 
union utility respectively, holding all other variables constant. Starting with profits, note 
that the first term on the RHS of equation (III.26) is negative, since Pw is negative (Pw = - 
N(H+wghs)) and (dw/dhs) is positive, since h*p>h*,ND. A reduction in standard hours 
increases profits because it leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower hourly wage. The second term 
( B , s  = -wN(g-r)), is also negative, if total fixed costs of employment are positive - which 
is necessary for actual hours to exceed standard. A reduction in standard hours will 
therefore increase profits under these conditions because it leads to a lower hourly wage 
and to lower fixed employment costs.
Looking next at union utility, note that the first term of equation (III.27) is negative since
Nhs = Nhhhs, and Nh<0 with hhs>0 - see equations (III.3’) for h and (III.4) for N. The
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second term is also negative since Uh and are negative, Uh by assumption and TL—rw. 
A reduction in standard hours increases therefore also union utility under the assumptions 
made, because it increases employment, utility from leisure and income of those employed.
Given the framework for the determination of employment, hours of work and the wage 20 
and a constant mark-up, it is not unrealistic to assume that the actual level of hours might 
exceed the optimal for the individual/union, when most reductions in hours of work have 
been demanded and initiated by unions. The key assumption therefore for the above result21 
is the proportionality between fixed employment costs and standard weekly earnings. This 
implies that actual hours are proportional to standard and that a reduction in standard hours 
reduces, ceteris paribus, labour costs (Phs<0). We have argued that this is a realistic 
assumption. The evidence about the way in which reductions in standard hours have been 
introduced in practice 22 supports also the argument made about the efficiency of 
reductions in standard hours.
Consider now the case where the firm and the union bargain simultaneously over 
employment, hours of work and the wage 23. Assume that the objectives of the firm and 
the union are the same as earlier but without loss of generality, rewrite individual
20 The monopoly union wage determination assumption is made for simplicity. All 
results would carry through if the union bargained with the firm over the wage and 
then the firm determined employment and hours of work unilaterally.
21 The CD assumption (Nahb) is not necessary for the result; this is important since in 
order for the profit maximisation problem to be well defined with a CD function b 
must be smaller than a. This is not always supported by the empirical evidence.
22 We refer to the French '’solidarity” contracts of 1981, see Hart (1984a).
23 This model is analysed in detail in the next Chapter.
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preferences as U(wH,h), U,>0, U2<0, U,„ U22<0; this simply facilitates the derivation of 
some of our results. We assume that the solution to the bargaining problem is the
symmetric Nash one, so that employment, hours of work and the wage are set to
maximise:
max NhtW X = (P-P)(Z-Z) (111.28)
where P, Z are the levels of profits and utility obtained by the firm and the union if a 
bargain is not struck - the "fall back" levels. If we assume that P = 0 and Z = MV, the 
problem becomes:
max Nh)W X = [F(N,h) - wHN - gwh.N] [NDU] (111.29)
The FOCs are:
Xn = Pn Z + D U P = 0 (111.30)
Xh = Ph Z + NUh P = 0 (111.31)
Xw = (-N(H+ghJ Z + NUW P = 0 (111.32)
Equations (III.30) to (III.32) determine then the efficient levels of employment, N*EB,
hours, h*^ and wages, w*^. Without solving for an open solution we can derive at this
stage the effects of reductions in standard hours on X, by applying the envelope theorem:
Xhl = P., NDU + P =>
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Xh, = {-wN(g-r)} NDU + {-rwNU,} P (ffl.33)
The RHS of equation (111.33) will be negative if g>r, ie if total fixed costs of employment 
are positive. This result depends again on the assumption made about fixed employment 
costs being fully indexed to standard weekly earnings. The assumption of simultaneous 
bargaining delivers now the somewhat remarkable result, that, irrespective of production 
function technology and preferences, reductions in standard hours will increase the pay-offs 
to the two parties by lowering costs for the firm and increasing income for the employed 
union members.
To derive definite predictions about the effects of lower standard hours on employment, 
actual hours and wages it is necessary again to introduce specific functional forms. Under 
the assumptions of a CD technology and a constant elasticity of utility with respect to 
consumption, equations (111.28) and (III.30) can again be solved for - see Appendix J:
N*eb = (2w/(l+a)},/(- ,) h(, by(- ,) {(l+r)+[(h1/h)(g-r)]},/(a l) (111.34)
U*eb = k, V (in.35)
where kE will be constant since eUc is constant. Equation (111.29) becomes:
Ph = -P (Uh/DU) (in.36)
Unlike the earlier models, without further assumptions about the form of the utility
function we can not derive an explicit solution for IT^. It follows from equation (111.36)
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however, that either Ph=Uh=0, or Ph and Uh have the opposite sign. We can therefore 
distinguish between three regimes for h*EB - see also Figure 6 in Chapter IV:
(i) h*EB is such that Uh = Ph = 0
(ii) Ii’eb is such that Ub < 0, Ph > 0
(iii) h*EB is such that Uh > 0, Ph < 0
In regime (i) the level of hours bargained is such that the firm and the union would not 
benefit from an ex post unilateral movement away from that level. In this case it is 
possible to determine what that level of hours is by using the Ph=0 condition - see 
Appendix J:
h*EB = {[2b/((l+a)-2b))] (l/(l+r)) (g-r)} h, = d’ h, (111.37)
Inspection of equation (111.34) reveals that, in this case, any "small" reduction in standard 
hours will lead, through a reduction in actual hours, to an increase in employment.
If h*EB is in either regime (ii) or (iii), the former being the more realistic, in order to obtain
an explicit solution for actual hours, we need to make the further assumption that the
elasticity of utility with respect to hours of work for given consumption (e^), is constant. 
This means that, ceteris paribus, individual hours supply is independent of the wage. In 
this case equation (III.36) can be rearranged in a quadratic in the variable (h/hj. If  a 
solution therefore exists, and assuming it is unique and acceptable (ie h*EB > hs), it will 
have the form:
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h * E B  = /  (euc>?Mk>a>b,r,g) h ,  =  d ”  h # (HI.38)
where d”  is just a constant, assumed to be larger than unity.
The elasticity of actual with respect to standard hours is again unity. It follows that in 
regime (ii), where, unions would desire reductions in actual hours of work opposed by 
firms, a reduction in standard hours will reduce actual hours and the hourly wage and 
increase employment.
Conclusions
The aim of this Chapter was to examine the extent to which overtime work implies that 
reductions in standard hours of work will have less favourable employment effects. We 
showed that the impact of lower standard hours of work on employment depends crucially 
on the extent to which fixed costs of employment are really fixed. If these costs are 
indexed to standard hours of work, then a reduction in standard hours is likely to lead to 
lower actual hours. This is consistent with the observed movement of standard and actual 
hours. The results concerning the direct and indirect employment effects of reductions in 
standard hours are then similar to the case where there is no overtime.
We also provided in this Chapter an economic rationale for reductions in standard hours 
of work, by demonstrating that, under the assumption of hours indexation of fixed 
employment costs, reductions in standard hours of work can improve efficiency:
• when a firm sets employment and hours of work after a union sets the wage, and
• when a firm bargains with a union about actual hours, employment and wages, 
because of the structure of labour costs.
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TABLE 6
Overtime Hours and Percentage of Operatives on Overtime 
UK Manufacturing: 1970 - 1980 - 1989
1989 1980 1970
Industry Oper Overt Oper Overt Oper Overt
(y) W (y) (*) (y) (x)
Mechanical Engineering 47.7 9.7 30.2 8.3 51 8.2
Other Transport Equip. 46.3 9.4 43.5 7.1 43.8 7.6
Motor Vehicles 45.8 9 13.7 7.5 42.1 6.8
Metal Goods NES 43.3 9.8 22.8 7.5 39.7 7.9
Timber/Wooden Fumit. 42.2 10 28.2 6.8 41.8 7.7
Non-Metallic Mineral 39.9 10.5 30.5 10.1 17.9 8.5
Metal Manufacturing 39 9.4 38.6 5.3 30.5 8.8
Rubber & Plastics 38.8 10.5 20.4 7.3 38.5 8.8
Food, Drink & Tobacco 36.5 10.1 35.5 9.6 34.1 9.6
Paper, Printing & Publ. 35.8 10.2 30.7 7.9 36.3 8.1
Electr. & Electron. Eng. 34.3 9.4 24.4 7.6 32.4 7.6
Instrument Engineer. 32.3 8.3 23.9 6.2 40.1 7
Textile Industry 29.9 9.4 18.7 7.7 21.9 8.1
Other Manufacturing 29.1 8.9 22.8 8.6 32.6 8.5
Chemical Industry 29 10.6 26.3 8.7 26.1 9.3
Footwear & Clothing 12.4 5.8 4.7 5.4 9.8 5.2
All Manufacturing 37.5 9.7 26.3 7.9 34.4 8
Mean (Unweighed) 36.4 9.4 25.9 7.6 33.7 8
Standard Deviation 8.8 1.2 9.4 1.3 10.6 1.1
y: Percentage of all operatives working overtime in GB manufacturing industry,
x: Average number of overtime hours worked per operative working overtime.
Source: Department of Employment Gazette (DEG)
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TABLE 7
Actual Hours in M anufacturing in 13 OECD countries: 1950-91
(1950=100)
55 1960 65 1970 75 1980 85 1991
1950-91 
GROWTH % 
Total pa1
USA 100.3 98.3 101.7 98.7 98 98.3 100.3 100.8 +0.8 +0.0
JAP2 104.8 109.5 101.5 99.1 89.5 94.2 94.7 91.4 -8.6 -0.21
CAN 96.3 95.7 96.9 94.9 92.1 91.7 92.4 90.1 -9.9 -0.24
GER 100.2 90.2 84.5 83.1 75.3 74.5 72.9 70.4 -30 -0.72
FRA 102.1 106.9 105.3 103 96.5 94.2 89.6 89.8 -10 -0.25
UK 101 99 95.8 92.5 85.9 82.7 85.4 84.4 -16 -0.38
ITA 103.3 103.6 92.2 91.1 77 79.2 75.9 79.63 -20 -0.55
NET 100 101.4 94.9 88.9 80.9 78.3 77.2 16.2* -24 -0.61
SWE2 99.5 94 89.8 83.2 76.9 71.4 64.8 56.3 -44 -1.1
DEN2 98.2 93.2 90.3 83.3 74.6 74.1 75.1 66.6 -33 -0.81
NOR 100 97.5 89.8 85.2 78.9 77.9 76.84 -23 -0.80
BEL2 100 97.8 92.5 80.7 80.5 66 64.7s -35 -1.2
SWI 1006 99.1 97.8 96 92.5 -7.5 -0.42
1 Not compounded 2 Monthly Hours 3 1987 4 1989 5 1990 6 1973
Sources: OECD, Economic Indicators - EUROSTAT (Hours Worked in Industry, Italy 1980;
1987) - Yearbook of Statistics of the Netherlands (Male Weekly Hours it 
Manufacturing, 1980-89). j
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TABLE 8
Distribution of Actual & Standard Hours in 1970 (%)
Aver. <37 37-39 39-40 40-45
Manual Male
Standard Hours 40.2 3.9 6.6 78.7 8.1
Actual Hours 45.8 8.2 4.2 22.4 19.7
Manual Female
Standard Hours 38.4 17.5 9.7 65.6 6.4
Actual Hours 39 28.1 10.2 39.5 14
Non-manual Male
Standard Hours 37.8 38.5 32.4 19.4 7.1
Actual Hours 39.1 33 28.9 14.5 13.7
Non-Manual Female
Standard Hours 36.8 47.9 29.3 9.7 12.8
Actual Hours 37.1 45.2 28.9 9.4 15
Source: New Earnings Survey, 1970.
45-49 >49
1.3 1.4
16.1 29.4
0.8 
4.7 2.7
1.2 1.4
4.8 5.1
0.3 
1.0 0.5
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TABLE 9
Fixed Employment Costs and Employers’ National Insurance Contributions
Year Estimated Fixed Costs 1 Tax Rate 2
1955 0.063 0.023
1960 0.074 0.027
1965 0.087 0.054
1970 0.100 0.147
1975 0.133 0.069
1980 0.157 0.109
1985 0.157 0.083
1990 0.134 0.069
1991 0.142
1. Ratio of Employment Contributions to Wages and Salaries -
Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO) Monthly Digest.
2. Ratio of Weekly National Insurance Contributions to Weekly
Manual Earnings for Males - Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics.
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FIGURE 3
Actual and Standard Hours of Manual Males
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FIGURE 4
Actual and Standard Hours of Manual Males 
(With Linear Trends)
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FIGURE 5
Fixed Employment Costs and Employers’ National Insurance Contributions
0 . 2
0 . 1 5
0 1
0 05
0
6256 1960 76 i960 82 88 1990
55 59 63 69 73 81 93 87 89
_ m_  F i xed Costs CFCs} Employer N I Cs CTAX}
Source: See Table 9.
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APPENDIX C 
Monopoly Union and the Overtime Premium
Assume that a monopoly union can set the standard wage and the overtime wage in order 
to maximise expected utility of its members, subject to the firm’s demand functions for 
standard (h,=h,(w,X)) and overtime hours (h0=h0(wp,Z)). w is the standard wage and pw 
the overtime wage (p=l+r). X and Z are other variables affecting demand for standard and 
overtime hours respectively - eg absentee rates, uncertainty in demand, etc. Assume for 
simplicity that employment is fixed and that there is no disutility from work. The union’s 
problem then is:
max w# Z = N{U(wh, + wph0) - V} + MV (Cl)
s.t. h^h.CwjX) and h0=h0(wp,Z)
where V is outside utility and M is membership, both fixed. U{.} has the usual properties 
and 5hs/5w=hs_w <0, 3h0/dpw=h0pw <0. By substituting the constraints in the union objective 
and differentiating we obtain the first order conditions:
Zw = NU,(hs + ph0) + NU.w hsw + NUjWp2 h0.pw = 0 (C2)
Zp = NU, wh0 + NU,w2 p ho pw = 0 (C3)
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By rearranging equation (C3) we get:
ho (1 + eh0.Pw) = 0 (C4)
where ehopw is the elasticity of overtime hours with respect to the overtime wage - 
[(w/h0)(h0 pw)]. Substituting this back in equation (C2) we obtain:
h, (1 + ehf J  = 0 (C5)
The union therefore sets w and p so that the elasticities of standard and overtime hours 
with respect to their prices are equal to minus one. By using equations (C4) and (C5) and 
expanding the elasticity expressions we obtain that:
(w/hs) (-h,w) = (wp/h0) (-ho pw) (C6)
If demand for overtime hours is more inelastic than demand for standard hours, then 
( A J  > (-hopJ .  For equation (C6) to hold, (w/hj must be smaller than (wp/h0), which in 
turn means that p*>l and h0* < h/.
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APPENDIX D 
Profit Maximisation with a Cobb-Douglas Technology 
and Positive Overtime
The profit function is:
P = N*hb - NwH - g,wN where H = (l+r)h - rhs (Dl)
FOCs are:
PN = 0 => aN'1 hb - wH - g,w = 0 (D2)
Ph = 0 => bhM N* - Nw(l+r) = 0 (D3)
SOC requires a,b <1 and DET = - (F,^ - w(l+r))2 > 0.
In the CD case (F^, - w(l+r)) = {b(a-l)Na-' hbl)}
and thus DET = a(a-1 )b(b-1 )N2a'2h2b'2 - {b(a-1 )Na-‘ hb*1 }2
For X=N2a'2h2b'2 => DET = a(a-l)b(b-l)X - (b(a-l))2X
= (a-l)bX (a(b-l) - b(a-l))
= (a-l)bX(b-a) => DET > 0 iff a>b.
Solving for h and N we get:
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h‘ = {b/((l+r)(a-b))} fe-rh,) 
N* = (w(l+r)/b)1/(, l) h(1-by(,-1)
(D4)
(D5)
It follows that g! must be larger than rh, so that the total fixed cost of N is positive. Note 
also that the ratio of fixed to variable costs must be:
(g.-rhJ/Kl+Oh] = (a-b)/b
The comparative statics are:
Sh/cKv = 0
dN/dw = N/w(a-l) < 0
dh/dT = -[bfe+hj] / [(l+r)2(a-b)] < 0
d-N/dr = [N/(l+r)] [(l-b)/(l-a)] [((g.+l^yCg^h,)-1/( 1 -b))] >or<0
dh/dg, = b/[(l+r)(a-b)] > 0
aN/agl = [(l-b)/(a-l)] (N/h) [b/[(l+r)(a-b)]] < 0
ah/ah, = - br/[(l+r)(a-b)] = -(h/hj [rh /fe-rh j] < 0
aH/ah, = -ar/(a-b) = -[H/hJ [arh/H(a-b)] < 0
aN/ahs = -[N/h] [(1 -b)/(a-1)] (ah/ah,) > 0
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APPENDIX E
Equivalence of Variable Number of Shifts and Overtime
In this Appendix we show the equivalence between a variable number of shifts and a 
variable number of overtime hours, when considering the effects of reductions in hours of 
work on employment. In order to be able to compare the two cases assume first that actual 
hours are a proportion q of standard hours (h=qhs, q>l) and s is the number of shifts. 
Using a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the firm’s problem when it can choose 
employment and overtime (ie q) is:
where h„ is overtime hours (h ^h -h j, A,=sd and f,(q)=(l+r)(q-l). Solve for q and N to get:
max N?q PI = N*hbsd - Nwh, - Nw(l+r)h0 - Nwg, 
= A, N*(qhs)b - Nw(h+g,) - Nwh, f,(q) (El)
q = (b/(a-b))(l/(l+r))[(g1/hs)>r] (E2)
N = [w(l+r)/(A,b)],/(a,) (qhI)(i bV(- 1) (E3)
A reduction in standard hours decreases employment and increases actual hours, like in the
model presented in section 4.2.
Assume now that shiftwork is payed at the rate of (l+r(s)) and r(l)=0, r’>0 and the firm 
chooses s and N (instead of q and N) to maximise profits. To allow for a variable number 
of shifts write profits as - the level of hours is now exogenous:
max N4 P2 = N*h,bsd - Nsh,w(l+r(s)) - Nwg,
= A2 N V  - Nw(h,+g,) - Nwh, f2(s) (E4)
where A2=hsb and f2(s)= s(l+r(s)). Inspection of equations (E l) and (E4) shows that the 
number of shifts (s) in P2 plays the same role as overtime (q) in PI; the results with 
respect to the effects of reductions in standard hours on employment will therefore be 
qualitatively the same.
APPENDIX F
Increasing Overtime Premium
The firm’s problem and FOCs are - where h0 are overtime hours, h=h0+ l\ r ’(hj>0 and 
r(0)=0:
max Nll P = F2(Nh) - Nwhs - Nw(l+r)h0 - Nwg, (FI)
PN = hF2’ - w(hs+g,) - wh0(l+r(h0)) = 0 (F2)
Ph = NF2’ - w(l+r(h0))N - wh0r’N = 0 (F3)
Substitute F2’ from equation (F2) in (F3) and solve for h to obtain:
h* = (g,-rhj/(rer J  (F4)
where ertl0 is the elasticity of the overtime premium with respect to overtime. Subtract h,. 
from both sides of equation (F4) to get:
V  = (g./re,J - h. [l+(l/erJ ] (F5)
Assume that erho is constant and differentiate (F4) to obtain, after some rearrangement:
3h/3h, = (g,-rh„) [g,+(rh„/erto)] ' (F6)
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Equation (F6) can be evaluated for various values of the relevant parameters. To ensure 
consistency, we use first equation (F5) to derive the value of eAo necessary to deliver 8 and 
5 hours of overtime, when standard hours of work are 40 and 37 respectively and the 
premium is 30%, for a range of values of g, 24.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table FI below. The value of eAo is quite low, 
but this is partly a result of assuming that the output elasticities of employment and hours 
of work are the same.
TABLE F I
FIXED/TOTAL 
LABOUR COSTS
g> r h. ® rh o dh/dh,
30% 21.6 0.3 8 0.66 + 0.75
25% 16.8 0.3 8 0.33 + 0.50
25% 14.5 0.3 5 0.27 + 0.56
24 These are broadly consistent with the values for Non-Wage Labour Costs as a 
Percentage of Total in the 1972-1980 period, as reported in Hart (1984b, Table 1, p. 
14); these range from 19.4% for the UK in 1972 to 43.6% for Italy in 1978.
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APPENDIX G 
Optimal Training Costs
The problem facing the firm is to choose the number of periods it will train its workers 
(t) and the training cost per period - by choosing the time spent training per period (hj 
to maximise its expected lifetime profits per worker.
We assume that the training time per period can not fall below a minimum efficient level, 
htmin- We assume also for simplicity, that revenue per worker per period, is only a linear 
function of the number of periods spent training 25, Yt = k* t, where k,, is a positive 
constant. If the cost per period spent training is wfy, the worker retires after R periods and 
r is the discount rate (r>0), the problem facing the firm is:
maxa, p = E M(1+r)~' - E wh,t(i+rY‘ ,rn
r=0 t =0
By expanding equation (Gl) we obtain:
maxtht P = kt rt A - w h t t f  (t) (G2)
25 A rising revenue per worker makes no difference to the result.
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where A=[(l+r)/r] [l-(l+r)-(R+,)] and f'(t)=[(l+r)/r][(l-(l+r)
The FOCs are:
Pt = k,r A - wht f  - wht t(df/dt) = 0 (G3)
Pk( = - w t f  (G4)
According to equation (G3) the firm chooses t so that the increase in output from training 
a worker an extra period (k* A) equals the increase in cost (wh, f  + wh, t(df/dt)).
From equation (G4) it follows, that if t is positive, Phl will be negative for all t. The firm 
would therefore like to set h, as low as possible and chooses h^h, min.
For any given total amount of training the firm wants to spread training costs as much as 
possible since this does not affect revenue per worker but minimises the present value of 
the training cost per worker. It chooses therefore to train the worker the minimum 
"efficient" amount of time per period at a cost of wh, min. It follows that if h, min=qh1, 
0<q<l, then training costs per period will be linear in standard weekly earnings.
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APPENDIX H 
The Utility Mark-Up with Positive Overtime
The union now sets w in order to maximize:
max w Z = N{U(wH, T-h) - V} + MV = NDU + MV (HI)
s.t. h = (b/(a-b))(l/(l+r))(g1-r) h, = d h, and 
N = (w(l+r)/b)l/(,1) h (1'b)/(- ,)
where H = (l+Oh-rh,. The FOC is:
Nw DU + NHU, = 0 (H2)
SOC is DU + 2HNW U, + NH2Un <0. By rearranging the FOC we obtain:
U(wH, T-h) = [ eNw / ( eNw + e j ]  V (H3)
where eUc is the elasticity of utility with respect to wH.
We can therefore look at the effects of changes in hs on the wage, when eNw and eUc are 
constant. Differentiate the above expression with respect to the wage and standard hours 
to get:
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3w/3h, = 3w/3h, + 3w/3h 3h/3h,
= - U JU . - ( ly u .)  3b/3b,
= (rw/H) - [(w(l+r)U,-U2)/(HU,)] 3h/3h,
= (rw/H) - A 3h/3h, (H4)
where A = [(w( 1 +r)U1-U2)/(HU,)]. A is larger than, equal to or smaller than zero as the 
level of hours demanded by the firm is below, at or above the optimal for the individual.
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APPENDIX J  
Efficient Bargaining with Positive Overtime
The profit (P) and union utility (Z) functions are:
P = Nahb - NwH 
Z = N{U(wH,h)-V] + MV
where H = [(l+r)h + h.(g-r)], H = [(l+r)h - rh j, U^O, U2<0, Uu<0, U22<0. 
symmetric Nash solution is obtained from maximising:
max Nih.w X = (P-P) (Z-Z)
Assume that P is zero and Z=MV in which case X becomes:
max NjM X = (Nahb - NwH) (NDU)
FOCs are:
XN = PN NDU + P DU = 0 
X„ = Ph NDU + P NUh = 0 
Xw = (-NH) NDU + P NUW = 0
(J l)
(32)
The
(J3)
(J4)
(J5)
(J6)
Substitute PN = aNa ,hb - wH in equation (J4) and divide through by NDU to obtain:
(aN* *hb - wJf) + (N* *hb - wH) = 0 (J7)
Divide through equation (J7) by h and rearrange to obtain the solution for
N*eb = {2w/(l+a)},/(*-!) h(, b)/(- ,) {(1+r) + [(hI/h)(g-r)]}1/(,1) (J8)
To obtain the mark-up equation, divide through equation (J6) by NP and multiply by w 
to get:
(-wNH/P)DU + U eUc = 0 (J9)
Denote (wNH/P) by A and rearrange (J9) to get:
U‘EB(wH,h) = kE V (J10)
where kE = (- A)/(- A + eUc), A = (l+a)/(l-a) and kE > 1.
Assume now that the hours solution from equations (J8), (J10) and (J5) is such that 
Pb=Uh=0. We can obtain an explicit solution for hours by using the Ph=0 expression. This 
is:
Ph = bN*hb_I - wN(l+r) = 0 (J ll)
Multiply through by h, substitute N‘hb=[2wNH/(l+a)] from (J7) and then solve for actual
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hours to get:
h*EB = {[2b/((l+a)-2b))] (l/(l+r)) (g-r)} h, = d’ h, (J12)
To obtain an explicit solution for hours when Ph is not zero, substitute Ph in equation (J5) 
and divide through by PDU to obtain:
Xh = [{bN*hb - whN(l+r)} / {N*hb-wNH}] + hUh/DU = 0 (J13)
Substitute N‘hb=[2wNH/(l+a)] from equation (J7), denote (h/hj by x and rearrange
equation (J13) to obtain:
{[(2b-(l+a))jc + 2ba0]/[(l-a)(jc + a0)]} + {hUh/DU} = 0 (J14)
where a*, = (g-r)/(l+r). The second term of equation (J14) is the product of {hUh/U} and
{U/DU}. These in turn are:
{hU„/U} = {[(e^+e^a^ - eUh] / [a,*-lj} (J15)
{U/DU} = kE/(kE-l) = [l+a]/[(l-a)eUc] (J16)
where a,=(l+r)/r, and e^  is the elasticity of utility with respect to hours of work, holding 
consumption constant. Substituting equations (J15) and (J16) in (J14) and solving we get:
Ko^  + K,a: + k2 = 0 (J17)
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where the coefficients are:
Ko ^ 1 ^ 2  ®Uc ^ 4  Y l  ^3^1® U c "  ^2®Uc “ ^U h ^ 0 ^ 4
K 2 =  _ a 3e Uc "  a < £uh
ao = (g-r)/(l+r) a, = (l+r)/r a, = {[2b/(l+a)]-l}
a3 = 2ba0/(l+a) a4 — (Cuc~*”&jh)ai
Equation (J5) is therefore a quadratic in (h/hs). If e^  is constant, then if a unique solution 
exists, it will have the form:
h*E = /  (euc>£m>a,b,r,g) h, = d” h, (J18)
where d”  (d” = f  (eu^e^ajbj^g)) will be a constant that must be larger than unity, if firms 
employ overtime. In the case of simultaneous bargaining between the firm and the union 
over all relevant variables, the actual hours agreed upon will be linear in standard hours. 
The necessary conditions for this result are that fixed costs must be linear in standard 
hours, all the relevant elasticities must be constant and a meaningful solution must exist.
i
I
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CHAPTER IV
THE DETERMINATION OF HOURS OF WORK AND THE 
EFFECTS OF MAXIMUM HOURS LEGISLATION
-135-
Introduction
In this Chapter we examine the determination of hours of work in a bargaining framework 
and the effects of maximum hours legislation. The determination of employment and 
wages in a bargaining framework has been examined extensively but the determination of 
hours of work is a fairly neglected issue. There are two reasons for this. First, bargaining 
models become more complicated when hours are introduced, especially when allowing for 
alternative sequences in the determination of hours, wages and employment - Earle and 
Pencavel (1990) show that there are 27 possible permutations. For this reason, it is more 
difficult to obtain clearcut results, unlike in the simple wage-employment bargaining 
models ’. Second, empirical evidence on the appropriate model of wage-employment 
determination is conflicting and there are good reasons for which it might not be possible 
to discriminate between competing models - see Pencavel (1991, p. 108-114). It is 
therefore thought that extensions of the model are not likely to clarify the issue.
There are however exceptions in the current literature. Bienefeld (1969) was the first to 
provide an examination of the determination of hours of work in a bargaining framework, 
concentrating on the reasons for which hours of work are not changed as frequently as 
wages. More recently, and following the work of McDonald and Solow (1981) on wages 
and employment, Johnson (1990) examined the determination of "effort" and hours of work 
in a bargaining framework. He showed, that under special conditions bargaining over
1 See however Manning (1992), who offers alternatives to the conventional results by 
modifying the assumptions of the production process.
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effort may not be a substitute for bargaining over employment. The issue of bargaining 
over effort has also been examined by Bulkley (1992).
Earle and Pencavel (1990) and Pencavel (1991), have provided a detailed analysis of the 
determination of hours of work in a bargaining framework, allowing for various 
combinations of variables in the bargaining set and different sequences for the 
determination of hours, employment and wages.
In this Chapter we use a similar framework to examine the effect of different assumptions 
about the determination of hours of work on the relationship between hours of work and 
hourly wages. We show that union bargaining over hours is likely to lead to a level of 
hours below what a firm would determine unilaterally and present evidence which supports 
this result. If  lower hours increase employment, it follows that, ceteris paribus, a union 
bargaining over hours of work exerts a positive indirect effect on employment. As a 
consequence, estimates of the employment effects of unions based solely on union wage 
differentials are likely to overestimate the employment effects of unions. We then provide 
a specific example with a Cobb-Douglas production technology and show that the 
conditions under which bargaining over hours of work will increase employment are 
realistic.
The analysis of bargaining over hours provides us also with a framework for understanding 
the conditions under which the level of hours observed may exceed the optimal for the 
individual or union. Recall that under this assumption, we showed in Chapter II, that 
reductions in hours of work would not increase the hourly wage and therefore would not
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have a negative indirect employment effect.
Union demands for reductions in the standard length of the workweek have also been 
accompanied by demands for a compulsory maximum length of the workweek - or 
overtime. Such legislation exists in most industrialised countries and is usually fairly 
comprehensive, specifying maximum hours per day, week, month and year and 
mechanisms by which firms are penalised when hours worked exceed these limits (see 
Arrowsmith (1988)). The European Commission has also decided, as part of its Action 
Programme implementing the Community Charter of Social Rights for Workers, to 
introduce a directive on the adaptation of working time. This stipulates a number of rules 
on minimum daily and weekly rest periods, breaks, duration of night work and annual 
leave. The Directive includes also a provision for a maximum length of work-week of 48 
hours including overtime - unless a different agreement is made with unions. The main 
provisions of the directive including the 48 hours rule must be implemented by November 
1996.
The UK has by far the highest percentage of workers working more than 48 hours 
compared with other European Commission countries, see Table 10. It currently does not 
have any legislation and has negotiated an opt-out on the 48 hour week but accepted the 
principle that no-one can be compelled to work more than 48 hours. Still, it intends to 
challenge the overall procedure of proposing the directive under Health and Safety 
provisions, at the European Court of Justice.
The framework provided in Chapter II and in section 6J2 of this Chapter, can be used to
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explain the reasons behind demands for maximum hours legislation (MHL) and the likely 
effects of the introduction of such legislation on wages, employment, profits and union 
utility.
If MHL is binding, the effects on employment, wages, utility and profits are very similar 
to the cases examined in Chapter II. If hours are above the optimal for the individual, 
employment is likely to increase, the wage is likely to fall, union utility is likely to 
increase whereas the effect on profits is uncertain. The results are largely independent of 
whether the firm bargains over employment with the union or has unilateral control of it.
When maximum hours legislation is proposed however, it is likely to be binding for a 
small minority of workers and firms. In the US for instance, when most states introduced 
such legislation during the first two decades of this century, the laws applied mainly to the 
employment of women - see Landes (1980). The strong negative reaction of employers 
and the strong support of unions for such legislation is therefore difficult to explain. In 
the last part of this Chapter we provide an explanation for this "curiosity" by examining 
two different bargaining solutions, showing that even when MHL is not binding it can 
increase the bargained level of utility and reduce the level of profits. We show that similar 
arguments can be applied to all legislation that affects the maximum or alternative pay-offs 
o f workers and firms, like legislation on minimum wages.
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6.0 THE DETERMINATION OF HOURS OF WORK
6.1 Hours of Work in the Efficient Bargaining Model
Consider the efficient bargaining model - eg McDonald and Solow (1981) but assume 
that the firm bargains over wages, employment and hours of work. Assume there is no 
overtime and the profit (P) and union utility (Z) functions are - where F and U have the 
usual properties:
P = F(N,h) - whN (TV.l)
Z = N[U(wh,T-h)-V] + MV (IV.2)
The symmetric Nash solution is obtained from maximising:
max N,h>w X = (P-P) (Z-Z) (IV.3)
P and Z are the fall-back levels of profits and utility. These are the pay-offs to the firm 
and the union respectively if no bargaining solution is achieved. Assume that P is zero and 
Z=MV in which case the FOCs are:
XN = (FN-wh) NDU + P D U  = 0 (IV.4)
X, = (Fh-wN) NDU + P N(wU,-U2) = 0 (TV.5)
X* = (-hN) NDU + P NhU, = 0 (IV.6)
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where DU=U-V. Divide through equation (IV.6) by NP and multiply by w to obtain:
(-whN/P)DU + U eUc = 0 (IV.7)
where eUc = (whUj/U), is the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. Denote 
-whN/P by e ^  (ie the elasticity of profits with respect to the wage) and rearrange equation 
(IV.7) to obtain bargained utility for the union members as a mark-up over outside utility, 
like in the models of Chapter II:
UEB(wh,T-h) = kEB V (TV.8)
where k^  = ( - e^VC - e ^  - eUc). Note that the labour demand elasticity does not appear 
directly in equation (IV.8) since the firm now bargains over employment.
The ratio of equations (IV.5) and (IV.6) defines implicitly, for any given level of 
employment, the relationship between hours of work and wages along the contract curve. 
After some rearrangement this ratio is:
Fh = N(U2/U.) = N A (IV.9)
where A (A=U2/U,) is the absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure. For a given level of employment the slope of the contract curve 
(CC) is derived by differentiating (IV.9) with respect to hours and the wage:
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dh/dw | CC.N„„„ = [NA.]/[Fkb - NA„] (IV.10)
where A ^dA /dw  and Ah=3A/dh. If the marginal rate of substitution is diminishing in 
leisure, then Ah>0, which means that the denominator of equation (IV. 10) is negative. The 
numerator will be positive if U12>0. It follows that (IV. 10) is smaller than zero and the 
contract curve is negatively sloped in wage-hours space.
The contract curve is illustrated in Figure 6 as CC, and it is the loci of tangency between 
iso-profit and iso-utility curves in wage-hours space. The iso-profit curves have a 
maximum at the level of hours that maximises profits for the firm, if it was free to choose 
hours of work for any given level of wage (ie the w-h combinations that satisfy Fh-wN=0, 
for given w and N). The curve that connects the maximum points of the iso-profit curve 
is a conventional demand curve for hours; this is drawn as DD in Figure 6. The further 
away from the horizontal axis, the lower the level of profits achieved.
Similarly, the iso-utility curves have a minimum in wage-hours space at the level of hours 
that would maximise individual utility, if the workers were free to choose hours of work 
for any given wage (the w-h combinations that satisfy wU,-U2=0, for given w). The curve 
that connects the minimum points of the iso-utility curves is the conventional hours 
(labour) supply curve and it is drawn as SS in Figure 6; this is drawn with a positive slope, 
assuming a stronger substitution effect. The further away from the origin, the higher the 
level of utility achieved.
In the special bargaining case of this section, where we assumed that the bargaining power
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of the two parties is the same, the precise solution on the contract curve will depend on 
the size of the profit and consumption elasticities which determine the mark-up (ie ePw and 
eUc, see equation (IV. 8)). In the general bargaining case, the precise solution along the 
contract curve will depend also on the bargaining power of the two parties since the mark­
up of equation (IV. 8) will be increasing in the bargaining power of the union - the 
generalised wage equation is derived in the next Chapter, see equation (V.7); for a given 
level of employment, the stronger the union, the higher the wage and the lower the level 
of hours negotiated.
Note however that as we move up the contract curve, the contract curve itself may shift 
since its position depends on the level of employment. By differentiating equation (IV.9) 
with respect to employment and the wage, holding hours of work constant, it is easy to
show that dw/dN | h constant wM be negative if Fsl)<0 or A>FNh (assuming that is positive -
recall that this will hold if U!2>0). It follows that an increase in employment will shift 
the contract curve inwards if A-Fnv>0 and A^ is positive. In order to determine whether 
a movement up the contract curve leads to a higher or lower level of employment we need 
to totally differentiate equation (IV.4) with respect to employment, the wage and hours of 
work. After some rearrangement we obtain:
[2(FN-wh) + N Fnn] dN = 2hN dw + [Fh + 2wN - NFNh] dh (IV.4’)
or B dN = C dw + D dh
where B = 2(FN-wh) + N F^, C = 2hN and D = Fh + 2wN - NF^. B is negative from the 
FOC. dN/dw holding h constant is therefore negative and dN/dh holding w constant will
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be negative if  < 0 or (Fh+2wN) > NF^,. It follows that a movement up the negatively 
sloped w-h contract curve will have an uncertain effect on employment which means that 
the contract curve can shift in either direction. More definite results can be obtained by 
using specific functional forms and we do that in the next section.
The little available empirical evidence for the US supports the view however that stronger 
unions will achieve higher wages and lower hours. Earle and Pencavel (1991) report a 
negative union non-union hours differential for annual hours of work using US time-series 
data and for weekly hours of white males from a cross section of workers from the 1979 
Current Population Survey. Perloff and Sickles (1987) also report a significant negative 
effect of unionisation on hours of work in the construction industry. The evidence suggests 
therefore that a movement up the contract curve:
• has no effect on employment (ie C dw + D dh = 0), or
• may have an effect on employment but any change in employment does not affect 
the position of the contract curve (ie A=FNh), or
• increases employment (ie C dw + D dh < 0) and therefore the contract curve shifts 
inwards - which would suggest that the positive employment effect of lower hours 
((D/B) dh) is larger than the negative employment effect of higher wages 
((C/B) dw), or
• decreases employment (C dw + D dh < 0), but for any given initially negotiated 
level of hours-wages, the resulting outwards shift of the contract curve is not 
significant enough to lead to a level of hours above the initial level.
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In what follows we examine the implications of the above analysis for:
• the relationship between the bargained level of hours of work and the competitive 
level,
• the effect of unions on employment and the impact of legislation restraining union 
power, and
• estimates of labour supply elasticities.
To address the first issue it is useful to distinguish between three possible regimes for the 
negotiated w-h combinations. By rearranging equation (IV.5) we obtain that at the 
negotiated employment and wage levels, bargained hours of work (h ^ )  satisfy:
Ph = -(P/DU) Uh (IV .ll)
It follows from equation (IV. 11) that at the bargained level of hours (h*EB), Ph and Ub will 
either both be zero or have the opposite sign. The three possible regimes for the level of 
negotiated hours are - see Figure 6:
h*EB
(i)
(ii)
h*EB is such that PK=UK=0
h*EB is such that Ph>0, Uh<0
(to the right of the hours supply curve)
h*EB = h„ w = w.
1^  < h*^ < hv 
wv < w < we
(iii) h*EB is such that Pb<0, Ub>0
(to the left of the hours supply curve)
hm in  <  f t  EB 
W e <  W
where he is the level of hours at the intersection of the demand and supply curve of hours 
(with a corresponding level of wage of we, hv is the level of hours corresponding to the 
level of outside utility V - ie at the tangency of the iso-utility curve for V and the 
corresponding iso-profit curve (with a corresponding level of wage of wv), and h ^  is the 
level of hours corresponding to the zero profits iso-profit curve.
There is no reason, a priori, to expect negotiated hours to be at the intersection of the 
implicit hours demand (DD) and hours supply (SS) curves (wc,hc), ie regime (i). These are 
also drawn on the figure, with their conventional shapes.
The contract curve is negatively sloped which implies that, if employment does not affect 
the position of the curve or a movement down the curve has no effect on employment or 
shifts the curve outwards, h*EB is higher in regime (ii) than in regime (iii). Regime (ii) 
describes probably the situation faced by unionised employees, when reductions in hours 
of work are a persistent union demand. Unlike the simple wage-employment bargaining 
model therefore, the marginal cost of an hour can now fall short of its marginal product 
and this is more likely to happen the stronger the firm. The outcomes are all efficient for 
the assumed bargaining structure. Union demands for lower hours are simply an 
alternative way of attempting to by-pass a strong bargaining position for the firm, in 
regime (ii).
If, however, the union is strong and manages to obtain a level of hours in regime (iii), 
negotiated hours will fall short of the optimal for the individual and union.
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The above analysis has also implications for the employment effects o f unionism. Studies 
estimating the effect of unionism on employment by examining the union non-union wage 
differential and then assuming that a firm with unionised workers will be pushed up a fixed 
labour demand curve, are likely to overestimate this effect2.
If employment depends negatively on hours of work and these are bargained over, the 
conventional result that a union will push wages up a fixed labour demand curve may be 
misleading. As shown earlier - see equation (IV.4’) -, the labour demand curve faced by 
a unionised firm is likely to shift to the right if unions bargain with firms over hours of 
work. The available empirical evidence - see subnote 2 in Chapter II - suggests that this 
is a realistic assumption. In such a case the total effect on employment will need to take 
into account the size of the union non-union hours differential; given the evidence 
presented in the introduction on the elasticity of employment with respect to hours of work 
and the available estimates of the union non-union hours differential, the bias of the effects 
of unionism on employment can be significant3.
The other significant implication of the analysis is that a reduction of union power will not 
necessarily lead to a significant increase in employment. The reason is that firms facing
2 See Pencavel (1991, p. 30-45) for a summary.
3 Pencavel and Hartsog (1984) report an average union non-union wage differential for 
the 1920-1980 period in the US of +23% and Earle and Pencavel (1990) an average 
hours union non-union differential of -11%. Furthermore, there is a wide variability 
depending on the sub-periods considered. In the 1930’s for instance, the wage 
differential is +30% and the hours differential -29%; estimates of the employment 
effect of unions in such a period, based solely on union wage premiums, are likely to 
grossly overestimate the true effect. This is true even if the labour demand elasticity 
with respect to the wage exceeds the labour demand elasticity with respect to hours.
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weaker unions will negotiate lower wages but also higher hours - or a smaller reduction 
in hours than would otherwise be the case - ie they will move down the contract curve. 
The labour demand curve may therefore shift inwards and any given increase in 
employment due to lower wages will be restrained by the increase in hours of work. This 
seems to reflect accurately the path of manufacturing employment, wages and hours in the 
UK in the 1980s.
Consider now the implications of bargaining over hours of work on the estimates of labour 
supply elasticities. These are usually estimated to be negative or zero and this is 
interpreted as evidence of a strong income effect - for a summary see Table 1.19 and Table 
1.20 in Pencavel (1986). The wage-hours solutions on the contract curve are off the labour 
supply curve, as illustrated in Figure 6. This will be valid for individual workers that 
bargain over hours and wages or, more likely, for unions or representatives of workers 
bargaining on their behalf. Actual estimates of labour supply elasticities may therefore be 
biased since they will be picking up the negative effect of unionism on hours of work and 
its positive effect on the hourly wage, if no variable is included to proxy for union 
representation or strength. In other words, estimates of labour supply curves may be 
picking up points along the CC curve rather than the SS curve. The evidence that does 
exist - Perloff and Sickles (1987, Table 2, p. 188) - suggests that a variable proxying union 
strength is significant, both on its own and interacting with other worker characteristic 
variables.
A final note concerns the relation between the above analysis and the assumptions we made 
in section 2J) of Chapter II concerning the relation between the initial level of hours and
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the optimal for the individual. We argued there, that, if the mark-up of union over outside 
utility is constant, a reduction in hours of work will lead to the same (a lower) hourly 
wage if hours are at (above) the optimal level for the individual initially. We have shown 
in this Chapter that efficient bargaining over wages and hours can lead to negotiated hours 
being at or above the optimal level for the individual, in regimes (i) and (ii) respectively.
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6.2 A Reconsideration of the Employment Effects of Unions
In this section we adopt the assumption of a CD production function and a utility function 
with a constant elasticity of utility with respect to consumption to provide a definite 
prediction about the implications of bargaining over hours of work on employment. This 
enables us to obtain an explicit solution for hours of work, employment and wages under 
two different bargaining regimes. The model is very similar to the model analysed in the 
last part of section 5J2 but we drop the distinction between actual and standard hours as 
well as the assumption of a constant elasticity of utility with respect to hours of work - this 
allows the conventional labour supply function to depend on the wage.
Since we are interested in the effects of introducing bargaining over hours we assume first 
that the firm sets hours of work - the "right to manage (RM) hours" model - and then that 
it bargains over them with the union - the "bargaining (B) over hours" model. In both 
cases employment is set unilaterally by the firm, either simultaneously with hours of work 
or after it has bargained over wages and hours with the union. We then proceed to derive 
an explicit expression for the effects of bargaining over hours of work on employment and 
show that ignoring the "hours effect" of unions can lead to an overestimation of the 
employment effect of unions.
Consider first the "right to manage hours" model. Assume that the firm’s profit and the 
union’s utility functions are:
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P = N‘hb - w(h+g,)N 
Z = N{U(wh,T-h)-V} + MV = NDU + MV
(IV. 12)
(IV.13)
The firm is assumed to set employment and hours of work after it has bargained over the 
wage with the union. The solution for employment and hours therefore is obtained by 
maximising equation (IV. 12), setting PN=Ph=0, for a given wage. The optimal demands 
are:
N'rm = (W ^/a)1'1*”  h,RM(' bw-" '«-> (IV.14)
h’nM = {b/(a-b)} g, = q„, g, (TV.15)
where = b/(a-b). The bargained wage will maximise the symmetric Nash maxim and 
subject to the factor demand equations (IV.14) and (IV. 15):
max w X = [N*hb - w(h+gl)N] [NDU] s.t. Ph=PN=0 (IV.16)
where we made again the assumption that the fall back level of profits is zero and of union 
utility MV. We can obtain again union members’ utility as a mark-up on outside utility:
U RM  =  {[ ’  e Pw ■ e N w ] / [  ■ e Pw ■ e Nw “ e L c  ]} V = V (IV. 17)
This is identical to the mark-up equation obtained when hours were exogenous - equation 
(11.10) in section 2.1.2. Substituting the relevant elasticities from the functional form 
assumptions in the mark-up implies that:
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k™ = [(1+a) / (1-a)] / [{(1+a) / (1-a)} - e j (IV. 18)
By substituting h*^ from equation (IV. 15) in (IV. 17) we can obtain the solution for w*^. 
We do not need to solve explicitly for the wage however, since as will be seen this is not 
needed for comparison with the "bargaining over hours" case. This therefore completes 
the derivation of an explicit solution for employment and hours in the "right to manage 
hours" case.
Consider now the equivalent "bargaining over hours" case. The problem facing the firm 
and the union is:
max Wth X = [N*hb - w(h+g,)N] [NDU] s.t. PN=0 (IV.19)
Employment is set by the firm after it has bargained over the wage and hours with the 
union. From PN=0 we therefore obtain again:
N*b = (w ya)1/(- ,} h*B {l+(gl/h*B)} (TV.20)
This is the same labour demand equation as (IV.14), evaluated at a different level of wage 
and hours. It is straightforward to derive a mark-up equation for the utility of employed 
union members. This will be exactly the same as in the case where the firm set hours of 
work since our profit assumption implies that hours of work are independent of the wage. 
If the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is constant and, under the CD 
assumption, the level of utility achieved under the two bargaining assumptions is the same;
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the way hours are set does not affect the wage bargaining outcome. It follows that 
U*B = kB V, U 'rm = V and kB = k ^  = [(l+a)/(l-a)]/[{(l+a)/(l-a)}-eUc], so that:
U*B -  kB V = V = U*™ (IV.21)
Consider now the determination of hours. These will satisfy:
Xh = (bNahb 1 - wN) NDU + PNh DU + P N(wU,-U2) = 0 (IV.22)
Multiply equation (IV.22) by h/NPDU to get:
[(bNahb - whN)/P] + + [(hwU^hUO/DU] = 0 (IV.23)
Assume that [(bNahb - whN)/P] + eN11 = A1 and [(hwU,-hU2)/DU] = A2. Substitute the 
profit function and the direct elasticity of employment with respect to hours of work - see 
Table 1 in Chapter I - in A 1 to obtain:
A1 = [(bNV-whNVCNV-wCh+g^N)] + [(l-b-f)/(a-l)] (IV.24)
where f  is the ratio of fixed to total labour costs (f=g1/(g1+h)). From the solution for
employment, equation (IV.20), it follows that:
Nahb = [w(h+g,)N/a] (IV.25)
-153-
Substitute equation (IV.25) in (IV.24), denote h/g, by x  and rearrange to obtain:
A1 = [2b(l+jc)-(l+a)xl/[(l+jc)(l-a)] (TV.26)
Multiply now the numerator and denominator of A2 by U to obtain:
A2 = [(hwU,-hU2)/U] [U/DU] = [e^+e^] [kB/(kB-l)] (IV.27)
where e^  is the elasticity of utility with respect to hours of work, holding consumption
constant (e^ = -(h/U)U2, e^  < 0). Substitute kB, which is equal to k ^ ,  from equation
(IV. 18) and rearrange equation (IV.27) to obtain:
A2 = [(l+a)/(l-a)] [1 + (e^ /e j)]  (IV.28)
It follows that A2>0 if and only if eUc > -e^ and A2<0 if and only if eUc < -e^. Denote
by b0 the ratio of the hours to the consumption elasticity, ie bo^e^/e,^), bo<0 . If we
substitute equations (IV.26) and (IV.28) in (IV.23) and solve for h*B we obtain:
h‘B = {[2b +(l+a)(l+b0)]/[(a-b)+(l-b)-(l+a)(l+b0)]} gl, or (IV.29)
h‘,  = q , g, (IV.30)
where qe = [2b+(l+a)(l+b0)]/[(a-b)+(l-b)-(l+a)(l+b0)]. In line with our earlier results we 
will assume first that the union members’s utility is decreasing in hours of work at the
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bargained level of hours. In that case (wU,-U2)<0, (l+bo)<0 and eUc < -e^. It is then 
possible to show that qB<qRM and therefore the level of hours negotiated between the union 
and the firm will be lower than the level of hours the firm would set unilaterally, if  it was 
free to do so.
To prove this result we assume that qB is bigger than (which is equal to b/(a-b), see 
equation (IV. 15)) and end up with a contradiction. If we denote (l+a)(l+b0) by z we 
assume then that [(2b+z}/((a-b)+(l-b)-z)] > b/(a-b). Note now that it is sufficient to prove 
that [(2b}/((a-b)+(l-b))] can not be bigger or equal to b/(a-b), since [{2b+z}/((a-b)+(l-b)- 
z)] is smaller than [(2b}/((a-b)+(l-b))].
After some rearrangement [{2b}/((a-b)+(l-b))]>b/(a-b) becomes (a-b)+(a-b)>(a-b)+(l-b). 
Note however that since a<l the LHS will always be smaller than the RHS. It follows that 
h*,^ is larger than h*B.
In order to determine the effect of bargaining over hours on employment, we need to 
specify whether the bargained wage when firms bargain over hours (w*B) is smaller than 
when hours are set unilaterally by the firm (w*^). From (IV.30) and (IV. 15) we have that:
h*B < h*R M  (TV.31)
Under the assumption that Uh is negative at the level of hours negotiated between the firm 
and the union, utility under the right to manage model will be smaller than utility under
the bargaining model, for the same wage \  We know from (IV.21) however that 
since the mark-up in both the bargaining and right to manage models is the same. 
For this equality to hold, the wage when hours are bargained over must be lower than 
when hours are set by the firm, since utility is increasing in the wage.
Total logarithmic differentiation of equation (IV.14) or (IV.20), for any level of hours h, 
and wage w, implies that:
dlnN = l/(a -l) dlnw + (l-b-f)/(a-l) dlnh (IV.32)
If (1-b-f) is positive - f  is the ratio of fixed to total labour costs -, equation (IV.32) will 
be negative, since (a-1)<0 and, when unions bargain over hours of work, dlnw and dlnh 
are positive. Employment will therefore be higher when bargaining over hours of work 
than when hours are set unilaterally by the firm, with a constant consumption elasticity 
utility function, a constant elasticity production function, under the realistic assumption that 
1-b-f is positive.
The intuition behind this result is that a lower level of hours when the union can bargain 
over hours, implies that union members will be better off under the assumption that Uh is 
negative. This leads the union to negotiate a lower level of wage since the level of utility 
achieved in the bargaining over hours case is the same. Employment depends negatively 
both on the wage and hours of work and will therefore be higher. In other words a union
4 Note that since Uhh = w2!!,, - 2wU12 + U22 is negative, Uh will be negative at h*^ if 
it is negative at h*B.
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bargaining over hours of work will opt for a utility neutral trade-off between hours and 
wages to increase employment.
If  the negotiated level of hours is such that union members are indifferent to small changes 
in the level of hours (ie Uh=0), then eUc = -e^ at the bargained level of hours, (l+b0)=0 and 
A2=0. From equation (IV.29) it follows that h*B = {[2b]/[(l+a)-2b]} gj. It is possible to 
show that h*B is again smaller than h*^ (ie {[2b]/[(l+a)-2b]} is smaller than {b/[a-b]} 5)- 
Uhh is negative for any level of hours so that if Uh is zero at h*B it will be negative at h*,^. 
The level of utility under the right to manage hours model would be lower than under the 
bargaining over hours model, for the same wage. The mark-up in both cases is the same 
however and for equation (IV.21) to hold the wage must be higher in the right to manage 
hours model. The results are therefore similar to the case just analysed, where Uh was 
negative at h*B and h*,^.
Note that if the firm bargained also over employment - the "efficient bargaining" model - 
then the wage and hours outcome would be the same as in the "bargaining over hours" 
model. Employment would be higher, just like in the simple wage-employment bargaining 
case. Our main results from the "right to manage hours" model could therefore be 
compared with the efficient bargaining model. Under our profit assumption, hours are 
independent of employment and this means that if the firm sets hours unilaterally, the level 
o f hours chosen will be independent of the employment determination assumptions - just 
like the union utility mark-up is independent of the hours determination assumptions. The
5 We have already proved this result in the case where Uh was not zero.
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main results concerning the effect of bargaining over hours on employment will therefore 
be qualitatively the same to the comparison of the "right to manage hours" with the 
"bargaining over hours" models.
We have demonstrated in this section, with an example that allows us to solve explicitly 
for employment, hours and wages, that a union that bargains over hours of work and wages 
will negotiate a lower level of hours - and possibly a lower hourly wage -, compared to 
a union that bargains only over the wage, with the firm having unilateral control over 
hours of work. This implies that bargaining over hours can have a significant positive 
effect on employment and confirms the assertion made in the previous section, that studies 
ignoring the effect of unionisation on hours of work are likely to overestimate the 
employment effects of unionism.
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7.0 MAXIMUM HOURS LEGISLATION
7.1 The Effects of Binding Maximum Hours Legislation fMHL')
7.1.1 MHL when Hours are Exogenous
The effects of Maximum Hours Legislation when hours are exogenous can be derived 
directly from the models examined in Chapter II. Table 3 in Chapter II summarises the 
total effect on employment under the different assumptions about the reaction of the hourly 
wage and the direct employment effect.
We briefly repeat the main results here. Following the evidence presented in Table 2A and 
Table 2B in Chapter I we assume that a reduction in hours of work is likely to have a 
positive direct employment effect. Under the assumption of a constant mark-up, if hours 
are initially below the optimal for the individual and the firm sets employment unilaterally, 
a reduction in hours will reduce the hourly wage and therefore also have a positive indirect 
employment effect. It will also increase individual and union utility but will have an 
uncertain effect on profits.
If hours are at the optimal level for the individual initially, a reduction in hours will have 
no indirect effect on employment. Individual utility is unaffected, but union utility will 
increase since the hours reduction leads to a direct positive employment effect. Profits are 
now more likely to fall, since there is now no reduction in the wage following the 
reduction in hours.
-159-
If employment is determined jointly with wages in a Nash bargain, the qualitative effects 
of maximum hours legislation on employment and wages are unaffected. If hours are 
below the optimal level for the individual then the effect on union utility becomes 
uncertain since a reduction in hours increases individual utility and raises directly and 
indirectly employment but also leads to a lower wage. If hours are optimal for the 
individual however, a reduction in hours will lead again to a higher level of union utility. 
The effect on profits is again uncertain but MHL is more likely to reduce profits, if hours 
are at the optimal level for the individual initially and the wage remains unaffected.
7.1.2 MHL when Hours are Endogenous
Since our focus in this section and in section 1_2 is the explanation of the strong support 
of unions for maximum hours legislation and the opposition of employers, we concentrate 
on the effects of such legislation on profits and union utility. In order to keep the analysis 
simple we therefore abstract from the employment issue and we take the level of 
employment to be fixed. The Nash bargain between the union 6 and the firm would then 
set the wage and hours 7 in order to maximise:
max wh X = (F(N,h) - whN) (NDU) (IV.33)
6 Since employment is fixed by assumption, the terms union and employees-members- 
workers will be used interchangeably.
7 Although we specify the bargaining set to include hours of work and the basic hourly 
wage, our results would be unaffected if we assumed that the firm and the 
union/worker bargained over overtime hours, with standard hours exogenous, and/or 
the overtime premium, taking the basic wage as given. The latter assumption is 
probably the least realistic since the overtime premium in most countries is fixed by 
legislation.
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where we assumed that the fall back level of utility is MV and of profits zero. For 
simplicity, we normalise N to unity and suppress it from the notation. Differentiate 
equation (IV.33) with respect to hours and the wage to obtain:
Xh = (F„-w) DU + P(wU,-U2) = 0 (TV.34)
X, = (-h)DU + PhUj = 0 (TV.35)
The ratio of equations (IV.34) to (IV.35) defines implicitly the contract curve in wage- 
hours space, like in the case analysed in section 6J.. Since we assume that maximum 
hours legislation is binding we will only analyse the effects of such legislation on wages, 
profits and union utility when the initial wage-hours bargaining outcome is such that at the 
bargained level of hours Ph>0 and Uh<0; this is regime (ii), see Figure 6.
Rearrange again equation (IV.35), to get members’ utility as a mark-up on outside utility:
U(wh,T-h) = {[ - e j  / [ - epw - eUc]} V = kBI V (IV.36)
In this framework, the introduction of binding maximum hours legislation introduces an
inefficiency since it implies a movement off the contract curve. We can distinguish 
between two cases, depending on the assumption made about the mark-up:
(a) the mark-up does not depend on hours of work, and
(b) the mark-up is a function of hours of work - and the wage.
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In case (a) we assume kB1 to be constant. It follows from equation (IV.36) that the level 
of utility offered after the introduction of maximum hours legislation will be the same. 
Since MHL is now binding, the solution will be at the intersection of the vertical line 
passing through h ,^  and the iso-utility locus for U l.
The effects of MHL in this case are depicted in Figure 6. Assume that the initial solution 
is (w^h,), delivering a utility level of Ul and profits of PI. We can then draw the iso­
utility locus, which will be increasing to the right of the hours supply curve (SS) and the 
iso-profit locus, which will be decreasing to the left of the hours demand curve (DD). If 
we denote the level of maximum hours by h ^ ,  binding MHL which does not imply a 
change in regime (he<hra>x<hI), will in this case lead to a lower wage, the same utility 8 and 
lower profits at a point like B in Figure 6 - iso-profit curves represent lower profits as we 
move upwards or to the left.
Consider now case (b), where kBI is not constant and depends on hours of work and the 
wage. The solution will be at the intersection of equation (IV.3 5) and the vertical line 
passing through h ^ .  It is easy to show that for constant eUc, the mark-up will be 
decreasing in the wage and decreasing in hours, if the average product of an hour is
8 Although not modelled explicitly, if employment depends negatively on the wage and 
hours of work then we would expect MHL, by reducing hours and the wage to have 
a positive employment effect. This would then increase union utility, although 
individual utility would remain unchanged. The result is very similar to the CD case 
presented in section 6.2, where union members are indifferent to the level of hours 
negotiated.
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decreasing in hours9. If  e ^  is constant on the other hand, the mark-up will be decreasing 
in the wage and hours if eUc is decreasing in the wage and hours - eg with a Stone-Geary 
utility function. In either case it follows that MHL will imply, for a given wage, an 
increase in both the RHS and the LHS of equation (IV.36). If the mark-up increases by 
more than union utility, then the wage will have to rise to bring back the equality, and the 
opposite will be true if union utility increases by more than the mark-up. In this case, 
individual and union utility are higher after the introduction of maximum hours legislation 
and profits are lower. Diagrammatically the solution will be at some point on the vertical 
line passing through h ^  above B - see Figure 6.
The way MHL has been introduced in practice however, implies, that it is unlikely to be 
binding for the majority of firms and workers. We turn therefore our attention in the next 
section to an explanation of why, even in cases where MHL is not binding, it is opposed 
by employers and supported by unions.
9 The mark-up is [-ePw]/[-ePw-eUc] (see equation (IV.36)), where -ePw = (whN/P) and is 
positive. The mark-up is increasing in (-epj. By substituting the expression for 
profits from equation (IV.33), (-e^) can be rearranged as follows:
(_epw) = -whN/P = - (l/(P/whN)) = (l/[l-(F/whN)])
If  the average product of an hour (ie F/hN) is decreasing in hours, then (-e^) is also 
decreasing in hours, since (-e^) is increasing in the average product of an hour. It 
follows that the mark-up is decreasing in hours (for constant (e^)).
(-ePw) is also decreasing in the wage, so that the mark-up is also decreasing in the 
wage.
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7.2 Why do Unions Support and Employers Oppose Non-Binding Maximum Hours 
Legislation
Consider now the case where maximum hours legislation is not binding. It is easier in this 
case to demonstrate the effects of maximum hours legislation by expressing the bargaining 
solution in terms of profits and union/individual utility - see Pencavel (1991, p. 114-120). 
This will also enable us to examine an alternative solution which allows the bargained 
outcome to depend on the maximum available pay-offs to the bargaining parties.
In order to derive the solution in P-U space we proceed as follows. We first derive the 
equation for the contract curve assuming that the firm has to offer a level of utility U0. 
This defines implicitly wages and hours of work as a function of the level of utility U0. 
By substituting this back in the profit function we express profits as a function of union 
utility, such that any combination is on the contract curve. This is the Pay-Off Frontier 
(PF) and is negatively sloped in profits-utility space, since by derivation, it shows the 
maximum level of profits attainable by the firm for any given level of utility. We then 
examine two different bargaining solutions and the implications for utility and profits of 
maximum hours legislation.
In order to derive the Pay-Off Frontier (PF) assume that the firm has to determine hours 
and wages in order to maximise 10 (the model is similar to the model presented in section 
7.1.2.1:
10 The PF would be the same if the union was setting wages and hours to maximise 
utility, subject to offering a given level of profits to the firm - ie the dual of (IV.37).
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max w>h P = Nf(h) - whN s.t. NU > NUO (TV.37)
The Lagrangean for the problem is:
max L = F(N,h) - whN + A N {UO - U(wh, T-h)} (IV.38)
where A is the Lagrangean multiplier, A < 0. The FOCs with respect to hours, the wage 
and X are - normalising again N to unity and suppressing it from the notation:
Lh = (Fh- w ) - ^ ( w U r U2) = 0 
Lw = - h - A (hU.) = 0 
La = UO - U(wh, T-h) = 0
By substituting X from equation (IV.40) in (IV.39) we obtain:
(Fh - w) + [(wU,-U2)/U,] = 0 (IV.42)
Equation (IV.42) defines implicitly the wage as a function of hours of work along the 
contract curve. It can be rearranged as:
Fh = U2/U, (IV.43)
Equation (IV.43) is identical to equation (IV.9) but for the absence of an employment term. 
If we denote the implicit function of the wage as a function of hours along the contract
(IV.39)
(IV.40)
(TV.41)
curve by w* = w^h), then dw7dh<0. Under the assumption that Uh is negative - ie 
restricting the bargaining outcomes to regime (ii) equation (IV.41) defines implicitly the 
wage as a positive function of hours and the level of utility UO. If we substitute w0 = 
w°(h) in equation (IV.41) and solve for hours of work we can express hours of work as a 
function of the level of utility UO:
h = hc(U0) (TV .44)
This is simply the function relating hours of work with the level of utility as we move up 
the contract curve. As is apparent in Figure 6, bargained utility along the contract curve 
is decreasing in hours of work and this can be shown by differentiating equation (IV.44) 11 
to obtain that dh/dUO < 0. By substituting (IV.44) in the profit function we can obtain the 
equation for the Pay-Off Frontier (PF), ie the equation relating profits with utility as we 
move along the contract curve:
PPF = f(hc(U0)) - wc(hc(U0)) hc(U0) (IV.45)
It is straightforward to verify that the slope of the PF is negative, whereas its curvature 
will depend on the shape of the contract curve. We draw in Figure 7 the PF as concave
11 If we substitute w°(h) in equation (IV.41) we obtain UO = U(wc h, T-h). By totally 
differentiating this equation with respect to h and UO we get after some rearrangement:
dh/dUO = l/{[hU,(dw7dh)]+(wU,-U2)}
The first term in the denominator of dh/dUO is negative by virtue of the negative slope 
of the contract curve and the second term is negative by virtue of our assumption that 
Uh is negative. Note however that dh/dUO would still be negative if Uh was zero.
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to the origin but none of the results concerning the effects of MHL would be affected if 
the PF was convex to the origin ,2.
Since the Nash solution maximises the product of the differences between the pay-offs of 
the two parties and their fall-back levels, it will be at the point of tangency between the 
PF and the iso-product line X=P(U-V) - where we assume again that the fall back level of 
profits is zero, the fall back level of utility is MV, we normalised employment to unity and 
assumed that union and firm have the same bargaining power. If we denote the Nash 
solutions by UN and PN, these will solve:
3P/3UI PlyJ0(f = 3P/3UI (IV.46)
where the LHS of equation (IV.46) is the derivative of equation (IV.45). The RHS of 
(IV.46) is:
ap/au | = -x(u-v)-’ (iv.47)
The initial Nash solution is represented by point N in Figure 7. Consider now the 
implication of introducing non-binding maximum hours legislation, assume in other words 
that hNB<hmax<hv, where hNB is the Nash bargaining solution. We can distinguish again 
between two cases, corresponding to cases (a) and (b) when MHL was binding. Recall that 
in case (a) the mark-up is constant and the level of utility achieved by workers affected by
12 Assuming that the shape of the PF does not imply either a multiplicity or no solution 
in the case of a Nash bargain.
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MHL following the introduction of binding MHL remains unchanged. This level of utility 
achieved under the binding case is the alternative level of utility V in the Nash bargain. 
The introduction of MHL in case (a) therefore has no impact on the bargained outcome, 
since none of the parameters affecting equation (IV.46) changes. The intuition is clear; if 
there is no change in what can be achieved elsewhere in the economy following the 
introduction of MHL then the Nash bargain between firms that are not affected by the 
legislation remains unaltered.
In case (b), the introduction of MHL increases the mark-up and therefore the level of 
utility achieved by workers affected directly by MHL. By differentiating equation (IV.47) 
with respect to V we obtain:
a(ap/au)/av = -2X(U-v>3 <o (iv.48)
This means that the slope of the iso-product line becomes steeper and it is easy to confirm 
that the slope of the PF remains unaffected. It follows that the new Nash solution will 
deliver a higher level of utility and a lower level of profits. The Nash solution depends 
on the fall-back levels of the two parties; although MHL is not binding, it increases what 
union members expect to obtain elsewhere in the economy and therefore increases their 
demands and share of the rents in the bargain. The new outcome is depicted in Figure 7 
by PN„„ and UN„„.
The key issue when considering the impact of the introduction of MHL is the extent to 
which employers will be able to maintain workers on their pre-MHL level of utility, ie the
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extent of the reduction in the hourly wage. If they are successful in doing so, MHL leads 
to lower profits without any change in the level of utility. This is true of workers affected 
directly by MHL and those that are not, but bargain with their employers about the wage 
and hours of work in a Nash bargain. If employers can not maintain the pre-MHL level 
of utility which will be the case for example if workers do not accept cuts in their hourly 
wages, then the introduction of MHL will increase utility for workers affected directly and 
those involved in bargains over the wage and hours of work in a Nash bargain.
In practice, it would seem unlikely that MHL would be accompanied by a reduction in the 
hourly wage (or the overtime premium), especially if such legislation is introduced on the 
grounds of health and safety. It is quite likely therefore that case (b) would describe more 
accurately the impact of introducing MHL.
The key link in the above results about the transmission mechanism of MHL is the 
dependency of the bargained outcome in the Nash-solution on the fall-back levels of utility 
and profits. If MHL does not affect the fall-back level of utility and profits, it will have 
no impact on the bargaining outcome in a Nash bargain. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1974) 
and Raiffa (1953) ,3, by replacing Nash’s "independence of irrelevant alternatives" 
property with a "monotonicity" property, have proposed a solution which allows changes 
in the set of feasible outcomes - in addition to the fall-back levels - to affect the solution.
The monotonicity principle implies that, if the maximum available pay-off to one of the 
parties in the bargain increases, the bargaining solution will also lead to a higher pay-off
13 See also Roth (1979, p.98-107) for a summary of the different solutions.
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for that party. Formally, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (P^, U^) is obtained in the 
model of this section by solving equation (IV.45) and P = [Pmax/Umax] (U-V), where we 
make the same assumptions concerning the fall-back levels of utility and profits as in the 
Nash bargain. It follows that Pmax=PPF(V) and Zmax is obtained from solving PPF=0.
Within the current model, the introduction of MHL will always reduce the maximum level 
of profits attainable, ie Pmax with MHL is lower in both cases (a) and (b). Because of the 
monotonicity property, this will also decrease the bargained level of profits and increase 
the level of utility. The situation is depicted in Figure 8, with a movement from P^, LP  
to P ^ ^ l  and U «M 1 (corresponding to case (a)) and PKSmax2 and UKSmax2 (corresponding 
to case (b)). The reaction of utility and profits to maximum hours or other legislation 
under the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution will therefore differ from the Nash one, if such 
legislation affects the maximum level of utility and/or profits but does not affect the 
alternative available elsewhere in the economy. In such a case the Nash solution pre- and 
post- change is the same whereas the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution would increase the pay­
off to the workers and reduce the pay-off to the firm.
This framework can also be used to examine the strong support of unions and the equally 
strong opposition of employers to minimum wage legislation (MWL). The introduction 
of a minimum wage, to the extent that it affected some workers, would increase the 
alternative level of utility and thus decrease the maximum level of profits attainable by the 
firm. With either a Nash or a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, MWL would therefore lead to 
a decrease in profits of firms and an increase in utility of workers not affected by the 
legislation. If MWL does not affect the alternative level of utility, it will lead under KS
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to a higher level of utility and a lower level of profits if it decreases the maximum level 
of profits attainable.
The above model is also consistent with the effects of maximum hours legislation in the 
US. Such legislation was introduced at the beginning of this century in most US states and 
concerned predominantly the employment of women. Landes (1980), concluded that such 
legislation reduced significantly hours worked per week, but also, by making female 
employment more unattractive relative to male, it reduced the share of females in the 
employment of the manufacturing sector, the major sector covered.
Goldin (1988) re-examined the evidence and asserted that maximum hours did reduce hours 
of work but affected equally male and female weekly hours of work; she says " 
...maximum hours legislation served to reduce scheduled hours in 1920,... Curiously, the 
legislation appears to have operated equally for men". She concluded therefore that MHL 
had no impact on the composition of employment in the manufacturing sector. This is 
what our model would predict if we assumed that male hours and wages were determined 
in either a Nash or a Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain and specified V as the alternative 
household level of utility. Note finally that any legislation which affects the alternative 
or "fall-back” level of utility for Nash bargains, and/or the maximum pay-off available to 
the bargaining parties for Kalai-Smorodinsky bargains will have an impact on the 
negotiated outcome. It is possible therefore for groups of workers to benefit from 
legislation that is not directly targeted at them, to the extent that it affects what that group 
can get elsewhere in the economy.
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Conclusions
The aim of this Chapter was to examine in more detail the hours determination process. 
We showed that negotiated hours can be off the conventional hours supply and hours 
demand curves when firms bargain with unions over hours of work. This implies that the 
negative employment effect of unionism, which assumes that a union pushes a firm up a 
fixed labour demand curve may be misleading. The labour demand curve is likely to shift 
to the right as unions negotiate wages above the competitive level, since they are also 
likely to negotiate lower hours of work. We showed that this will definitely be the case 
with a Cobb-Douglas production technology and a utility function with a constant elasticity 
of utility with respect to consumption.
We also concluded that legislation affecting a minority of workers, like maximum hours 
or minimum wages, can have an impact on the outcome of bargains between parties that 
are not directly affected. The reason is that such legislation is likely to affect the 
alternative pay-offs of one or either of the bargaining parties (Nash) or the maximum pay­
offs of the parties (Kalai-Smorodinsky); it will thus affect the negotiated outcome in 
favour of one or other of the parties. We showed that the analysis could be used to 
explain the US paradox of introduction of maximum hours legislation covering female 
workers, not affecting their relative attractiveness compared to males; this would be the 
outcome if the fall-back or minimum level of utility corresponded to the household rather 
than the individual.
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TABLE 10
Percentage of Workers Working More Than 48 Hours in 1990
48-50 51-59 >60 More Than 
48 Hours
Belgium 0.9 0.3 1.1 2.3
Denmark 2.8 0.6 1.1 4.5
France 2.6 0.9 1.8 5.3
Germany 1.9 0.7 2.2 4.8
Greece 1.1 1.6 2.0 4.7
Holland 0.5 0.3 0.9 1.7
Ireland 3.7 1.1 3.5 8.3
Italy 1.9 0.5 1.1 3.5
Portugal 1.7 0.8 2.2 4.7
Spain 2.1 0.8 2.0 4.9
UK 4.8 6.3 4.9 16.0
EUROPE 12 2.5 1.9 2.4 6.8
Source : Eurostat and UK Labour Force Survey
-173-
FIGURE 6
The w age-hours contract curve
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FIGURE 7
The Nash Bargaining so lution  and MHL
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FIGURE 8
The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining solution and MHL
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF LOWER 
HOURS OF WORK ON WAGES IN THE UK: 1950-1990
-Ml-
Introduction
The growth and persistence of unemployment in the UK and Europe has triggered demands 
for reductions in hours of work to "spread more widely the available work". We have 
shown in Chapter II that reductions in hours of work are likely to have a direct positive 
employment effect, and an indirect uncertain effect through the wage. The sign and size 
of this indirect effect is therefore crucial for the proper evaluation of the merits of 
reductions in hours of work as an employment promotion policy.
We have argued in Chapters II, III and IV that, when hours of work are integrated properly 
into union models, such models do not provide, ceteris paribus, a justification for increases 
in the hourly wage accompanying reductions in hours of work. On the contrary, it is 
possible that unions would be prepared to forego wage increases for lower hours of work, 
because they are likely to have a beneficial effect on the utility of union members and 
employment. The aim of this Chapter is to use a generalised version of the union models 
of the previous Chapters to derive an estimable wage equation and test the income sharing 
hypothesis with annual UK data.
It should be noted that a number of authors and policy makers have been unfavourable to 
hours reductions because of their presumed adverse indirect effect. Such views have been 
strengthened by findings of macroeconometric models that the effects on employment from 
a reduction in weekly hours of work, would be reduced significantly if the hourly wage 
increased to maintain weekly income unchanged - section 1.4.1 in Chapter I.
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The empirical evidence on which such assertions are based is however weak. As 
mentioned in the introduction, survey evidence finds typically, that when hours reductions 
are negotiated, unions do not accept a proportional reduction in their weekly income. Most 
hours reductions are usually associated however with other cost reducing and productivity 
enhancing measures. This explains why employers are prepared to accept eventually the 
introduction of such reductions - see for instance the Volkswagen deal as described in 
Bosch (1990).
Within this type of analysis, it is therefore in general difficult to calculate the precise effect 
of reductions in hours of work on labour costs, and probably impossible to calculate the 
effect on unit labour costs. When such a task has been undertaken - eg Richardson and 
Rubin (1993) -, a 5% reduction in hours of work was estimated to have added less than 
1% to labour costs. This is not what one would expect if the reduction in hours of work 
was associated with compensating increases in the hourly wage.
Further evidence on the relationship between hours reductions and the hourly wage comes 
from the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) enquiries, as reported in Knowles and 
Robinson (1969). This is reproduced in Figure 9. The relationship is interesting because 
the engineering industry has initiated and negotiated most reductions in hours of work in 
the UK, the data covers the two major hours reductions in the post war period and is not 
available elsewhere '. As can be seen from the figure, the hourly wage in the whole of 
the UK - bottom line seems to have followed its long-run trend in both periods of 
significant reductions in hours of work (1946-47 and 1959-60), and the years following
1 I am grateful to Marcus Rubin for providing me with this information.
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them. There is therefore no evidence from this figure of a compensating increase in the 
hourly wage following reductions in hours 2.
Although the recent wage bargaining literature has prompted a number of authors to 
estimate real wage equations both for the UK and other countries 3 the role of hours of 
work has not been examined in detail. Pissarides (1991), after allowing for an independent 
effect from hours of work, found that reductions in average hours of work through the 
growth of part-time employment, resulted in equilibrium unemployment increasing only 
to 6% rather than more than 9% - from 1970/73 to 1976/79; this is due to a direct positive 
employment effect - since Pissarides’s employment variable is manhours more than 
counterbalancing an indirect negative effect. The elasticity of the hourly wage with respect 
to hours was however estimated to be, absolutely, much smaller than unity (-0.4). Also, 
the possibility that the hours variable is simply capturing an accounting effect or a 
productivity effect is not explored.
Nymoen (1989) has used a simplified version of the union models developed in this thesis 
to examine the issue of the effects of lower hours on hourly wages in the Norwegian 
manufacturing sector. He first estimates the long-run version of a wage equation and 
reports that hours have no long-run effect on hourly wages. He then estimates a short-run 
equation with an error correction mechanism, where he finds a contemporaneous elasticity 
of hourly wages with respect to hours of work of -0.28. This implies, in line with our
2 Graphs for the manufacturing sector and the engineering industry based on Department 
of Employment Gazette data are very similar.
3 Andrews and Nickell (1983), Bean et al (1986), Layard and Nickell (1986), Pissarides
(1991).
earlier theoretical results, that even in the short-run, changes in hours of work have a very 
small negative effect on the hourly wage.
Nymoen (1989) calls this low elasticity result "intriguing", and suggests replacing the 
actual hours variable with a normal hours variable; this leads to an absolutely higher 
coefficient. The derivation of the hourly wage does not take into account overtime hours 
however and the coefficient of the normal hours variable could be capturing simply an 
accounting effect, which has nothing to do with income compensation demands by workers 
or unions. This "accounting" elasticity is, for realistic values of overtime, normal hours 
and the premium \  approximately -0.45. If we add to that the elasticity of the wage with 
respect to actual hours, which does capture the economic effect, we get an elasticity of 
-0.73; this is very close to Nymoen’s reported elasticity of the hourly wage with respect 
to normal hours of -0.83.
A test of the effects of lower hours on wages and employment was also done with Japanese 
data. Brunello (1989) uses a two sector model, which follows closely Bemanke (1986), 
with primary sector firms choosing the level of employment and actual hours subject to 
offering the secondary's sector level of earnings to their employees. This constraint allows 
earnings to be determined endogenously. In this context, a reduction in standard 5 hours 
increases - for given or increased actual hours worked -, the earnings per period available 
in the secondary sector and therefore implies an increase in the earnings per period that
4 The values used are time and a half for the overtime premium, a 40 hours standard 
week and 5 hours of overtime.
5 We use the terms "normal" and "standard" interchangeably, to denote the number of 
hours per week payed at a non-overtime hourly wage rate.
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firms of the primary sector must offer; this results in an unambiguous fall in employment 
of that sector. Brunello’s assumptions are broadly consistent with the movement of actual 
hours in Japan - see Table 7 in Chapter III - and since these have not changed much, it 
is not surprising that he does not find a significant employment effect from reductions in 
standard hours. Even so, he warns that the long-run solution of his system might not be 
stationary, so that his results should be treated with caution.
The available survey and econometric evidence does not seem to support the assertion of 
an unchanged weekly income, following reductions in the length of the workweek, when 
other variables affecting the hourly wage are taken into account. In this Chapter we 
investigate further the issue, by examining whether hours reductions have resulted in 
compensating or other hourly wage increases in the UK.
Our data covers the manufacturing sector in the 1948-91 period. During this period large 
reductions in "normal" or "standard" hours took place in 1960-1962 and 1965-1967 (-4.8% 
and -4.1% respectively), and then again in 1982-1984 when standard hours decreased by 
1.3%. The annual rate of fall for standard hours is 0.30% (for the 1951-1990 period). 
Actual hours have followed this decline one for one - average rate of fall in the 1951 -90 
period was 0.26% -, with the exception of the 1980’s when there has been a moderate 
increase in the average hours of overtime, due mainly to the mid-80’s boom.
Our findings suggest that, controlling for other variables that might influence the hourly 
wage and for the possible endogeneity of hours of work, the effect of reductions in 
standard and actual hours of work on the hourly wage was insignificant or even positive,
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in line with theoretical predictions. This does not mean that an ad hoc reduction in the 
length of the workweek in the future will have no effect on the hourly wage, since, as the 
theoretical analysis makes clear, this will only be true under specific conditions. The 
results cast doubt however on the claims that reductions in hours of work have a negative 
indirect effect on employment, and provide support to the income sharing hypothesis.
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KO THE EFFECTS OF LOWER HOURS OF WORK ON WAGES IN THE UK: 
1950-1990
8.1 A Generalised Bargaining Model
Given that our empirical work covers male manual workers in UK industries, the most 
appropriate theoretical framework to study the effects of a reduction in hours of work is 
the union-firm bargaining framework, which was presented and analysed in Chapters II- 
IV6. Our procedure will be to derive a wage equation under the most general and realistic 
assumptions about the bargaining process and then discuss the effects of alternative 
assumptions on the form of the equation to be estimated.
The basic structure of the model is similar to the one analysed in section 5^ 2 of Chapter 
III. The union bargains with the employer over the wage and then the employer sets 
employment and hours of work unilaterally. The justification for the hours determination 
assumption is based on the costs of monitoring and enforcing an hours agreement on the 
part of the union, especially when hours are made contingent on the state of demand. We 
assume also that demand for hours of work does not depend on the wage. The justification 
for this is based on the small and insignificant estimates of the elasticity of hours demand 
with respect to the wage, when one controls for fixed employment costs and standard 
hours. The implication of this assumption is that the determination of hours of work does
6 The percentage of manual workers who’s pay was determined as a result of collective 
bargaining agreements in the private manufacturing industries was 70% in 1990 and 
79 % in 1984 according to the 1990 WIRS - Millward, Stevens, Smart and Hawes
(1992), Table 7.3 - and 84 % in 1980, according to the 1984 WIRS - Millward and 
Stevens (1986), table 9.3. It was 78 % in 1978 for males, according to the 1978 NES.
-184-
not affect the wage bargain. Even if hours depended negatively on the wage however, the 
derivation of the wage equation would be unaffected if hours were bargained over 
simultaneously with the wage.
The assumption of employment being set unilaterally by the firm is based on the mixed 
empirical results on this issue as well as on the available survey evidence. MaCurdy and 
Pencavel (1986) and Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) with US data and Bean and Turnbull 
(1988) with UK data find evidence against a neoclassical labour demand function but do 
not necessarily support the case for efficient bargaining. Alogoskoufis and Manning 
(1991), using more aggregate data end up with the same conclusion but Machin et al 
(1991), estimating an Euler equation using UK micro-data, conclude that a dynamic labour 
demand -right to manage - function best fits the data; the same is true of Symons and 
Layard (1984). Survey evidence for the UK on the other hand seems to support also the 
view that unions do not bargain directly over employment (Clark and Oswald (1991)). 
Farber (1986), Oswald (1985) and Layard et al (1991) have provided possible explanations. 
Although some ambiguity about the proper model of employment determination remains, 
in the theoretical model that follows we will assume that the firm sets employment 
unilaterally and comment on the effects of assuming that employment is bargained over.
In the most general case we can write firm profits, union utility and the Nash maximand 
as:
P = F(N, h, Z l) - w(h+g,)N (V.l)
Z = N{U(w(l-tinc)h, T-h)-V) + MV = NDU + MV (V.2)
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x  = (z -z a p -p)(,*» (V.3)
where we denote (U(w(l-tinJh, T-h)-V} by DU. We assume that F and U have the usual 
properties, and that the fall back level of profits is zero and of union utility MV. Z1 
includes variables like the capital stock and technical progress, tinc is the income tax rate 
and p denotes the relative power of the union in the bargain. Following our discussion and 
results in section 4 J  of Chapter III, we make no distinction between actual and standard 
hours of work in our theoretical derivation of the wage equation. We take into account
however the existence of overtime in our estimation. All other variables have already been
defined - see Notation.
The problem then facing the union and the firm is to maximise equation (V.3) with respect 
to the wage, subject to the factor demand functions derived from maximising (V.l) with 
respect to employment and hours of work. Formally, N, h and w solve:
PN = FN(N,h,Zl) - w(h+gl) = 0 (V.4)
Ph = Fh(N,h,Zl) - wN = 0 (V.5)
X , = j^ N D U f1 P1 * (NwDU+NhU,) - (N D U / (1-/?)P * (h+gl)N = 0 (V.6 )
By rearranging equation (V.6) we can obtain again the familiar mark-up equation of union 
members’ utility over outside utility:
U (w (l-tinc)h, T-h) = [0ep* + eNw] / + eNw + eUc] V = kPE V (V.7)
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where 0=(l-P)/(3. Note that eNw and ePw are both negative. It is easy to show that the 
mark-up will be:
(a) increasing in eUc, since the union will push for a higher wage if the value of any
given wage increase is higher,
(b) increasing in p, the bargaining power of the union,
(c) increasing in e^, since a higher elasticity of profits with respect to the wage implies
a smaller reduction in profits for any given wage increase, and
(d) increasing in e^ , since a higher labour demand elasticity - ie absolutely smaller
elasticity - leads to a smaller fall in employment for any given increase in the 
wage.
If the firm bargained with the union over employment or if the union was indifferent to 
the level of employment. kPE would be independent of the labour demand elasticity. If on 
the other hand the wage was set by a monopoly union, kPE would be independent of e,^.
Equation (V.7) could be approximated with a log-linear transformation and estimated as 
a wage equation if we assume that V is constant. This is essentially the equation estimated 
by Nymoen (1989). with a number of additional restrictions. Since however our data 
covers manual workers in manufacturing, the mobility between this and other sectors in 
the economy is limited. The expected level of outside utility available is therefore a
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function of utility when unemployed and utility when employed in the manufacturing 
sector. We can write V as:
v = n U(b, T-hSE) + (1-/7) U(w(l-tjnc)h, T-h) = /7 U“ + (1-/7) Ue (V.8 )
where we denote by Uu utility when unemployed (U(b, T-hSE)) and by Ue utility when 
employed (U(w(l-tinc)h, T-h)) . q is the probability of being unemployed, in which case 
the worker obtains unemployment benefit (b) and has to search hSE hours per period for a 
job. (1 -rj) is the probability of obtaining employment with another firm in the 
manufacturing sector, in which case the worker will obtain utility U(w(l-tinc)h, T-h). In 
our empirical work we use unemployment and other variables to proxy this probability.
By substituting equation (V.8) in (V.7) we obtain:
u e = [kpE n\ [1 -M 1 -/7 )]1 uu = uu (V.9)
Assume now that the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is constant - denote 
it by a 0 - and b is partially indexed to weekly earnings (b=p(wh)\ 0<y<l). Utility when 
employed is therefore Uc = (w(l-tinc)h)ao l(T-h) and utility when unemployed is Uu = 
(p(wh)y)“° l(T-hSE), where 1 is the utility7 of leisure. If we denote by 10 leisure when 
unemployed (l0=l(T-hSE)) and substitute l0, Ue and Uu in equation (V.9) we obtain, after 
some rearrangement:
w i - u r 1" h”111'1 = [(i0 p")/i>] (v.io)
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If we take logs on both sides of equation (V.IO) and then solve for the wage we obtain:
lnw = d0ln(l-tinc) + d,Inh + d2ln(I) + d3In(l0) + d4ln + d5ln (p) (V .ll)
where d0=d,=-l, d2= -l/a0(l-y)<0, d3=d4= l/a 0(l-y)>0 and d5=l/l-y>0. If kPE is constant - 
which will be true if the production technology is Cobb-Douglas then one could proxy 
In kcE with the unemployment rate and test the income sharing hypothesis by testing 
whether the coefficient of hours of work in an equation like (V. 11) is significantly different 
from zero. The coefficient will be capturing two effects. First, if leisure matters and hours 
are initially at or above the optimal level for the individual/union, the direct effect from 
a reduction in hours of work on the wage should be zero or positive. Second, in general 
equilibrium, a reduction in hours of work will reduce utility from unemployment and 
therefore the bargained wage, if  the unemployment benefit is partially indexed to weekly 
rather than hourly earnings.
If the unemployment benefit is fully indexed to the hourly wage, then the wage would 
disappear from equation (V .ll), which would essentially become an unemployment - or 
hours - equation. If that is the case however, y would be close to unity and the coefficient 
of the replacement ratio (ie the ratio of income when unemployed to income when 
employed or p in this case) or variables proxying it, in conventional wage equations, 
should be "very" large. Furthermore, if the mark-up is not a constant, it is likely to depend 
on the wage, in which case one could solve again equation (V.IO) for the wage. We 
therefore keep the general version of the model and test whether the assumption of full 
indexation of the unemployment benefit is supported by the data.
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If the mark-up is not constant then equation (V .ll) must be amended to include the 
variables that determine it. First, increases in the probability of being unemployed reduce 
the mark-up as can be easily confirmed from equation (V.9); it follows that 5kGE/5rj<0.
It can also be confirmed from the same equation that an increase in kPE, the mark-up in 
partial equilibrium, increases k^, the mark-up in general equilibrium. The effects of the 
variables determining kPE on kGE therefore are: dk^/de^ >0. dk^/de^ >0, dk^/dey,. >0,
dk^/dp >0.
All three elasticities may depend on the level of the wage and hours of work. If we
assume that none is increasing in the wage 7, then a higher wage will either decrease or
leave the mark-up unchanged. Even if one of them is increasing in the wage - as could 
happen with e ^  the total effect on k ^  from an increase in the wage is likely to be 
negative and we therefore adopt dk^/dw <0. We discuss the effects of hours below.
Note that ePw is :
ePw = -[w(h+g,)N] / [F(N,h,Zl) - w(h+g,)N] (V.12)
Dividing numerator and denominator by -N(h+g,) and rearranging we obtain:
ePw = w/[fir(l-f) - w] (V.13)
7 This will hold for eUc if the utility function is Stone-Geary and will be true for eNw if 
Fnnn<0. The elasticity of profits with respect to the wage can be rearranged as 
ePw=(-(h+g,)Nw)/P. Differentiate e ^  with respect to w (noting that PN=0) to obtain, 
after some rearrangement de?Jdw= -([(h+gl)(l+eNw+ePw)]/P2). The elasticity will not 
be increasing in the wage if (1+e^+epJ > 0.
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where we denote by pr hourly productivity (pr=F/Nh) and by f  the ratio of fixed to total 
costs (f=gl/(h+g,)). It is easy to see that e,^ is increasing in pr and decreasing in f, so that 
the mark-up also increases in productivity and decreases in the ratio of fixed to total costs; 
it follows that dkGE/dpr >0 and Sk^/df <0. This is simply saying that, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in productivity or a decrease in fixed employment costs, increases profits, and 
therefore leads to a higher mark-up through a higher ePw 8.
Hours of work now can, in theory, affect the mark-up through all the elasticities that may 
appear in it. The total effect on the mark-up can be split into three components:
dkcE/dh — 3kGE/3eNw 3eNw/3h + 3kGE + dk£E/deUc 3eUc/3h
= A l + A2 + A3 (V.14)
If lower hours have a positive direct employment effect then they are equivalent to a wage 
fall and will, under the assumptions made earlier, increase the labour demand elasticity - 
or leave it unchanged of course, if it is constant. Al may therefore be negative or zero.
If we assume that the utility function is Stone-Geary then eUc will be decreasing in hours 
and A3 is also negative. Note that in that case the log-linearisation we did earlier - see 
equation (V .ll) - will only be approximate with respect to the wage.
8 Changes in pr may also affect the mark-up through eNw (eNw = (FnANF^)), if it is not 
constant. An increase in productivity should increase FN and, if ¥m is unaffected or 
if it increases, the labour demand elasticity and the mark-up will be reduced. If on 
the other hand FNN falls following an increase in pr, the effect becomes uncertain.
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The effect of hours through e^  can be separated into an effect through pr and an effect 
through f. If productivity is decreasing in hours, which is a consistent finding of all survey 
evidence on hours reductions (White (1983), Bosch (1986), Richardson and Rubin (1993) 
and references therein), then lower hours will increase ep,v. On the other hand, f is likely 
to be decreasing in hours of work 9, which means that lower hours reduce (1-f) and 
therefore reduce the mark-up. Given the evidence cited earlier and the possibility of f  not 
being affected by changes in hours of work we believe that the productivity effect of lower 
hours will dominate the fixed costs effect; it follows that A2 is also likely to be negative 
so that we can assume that dk^/dh <0. In practice now, if we control properly for 
productivity and fixed costs, we would expect the effect of lower hours on the mark-up to 
come mainly through changes in eL c. By taking a log-linear approximation of the mark-up 
we therefore obtain 10:
In kcE = j0 + j,ln #7 + j2ln p + j3ln pr(h) + j4ln f(h) + j5ln h + j6In w (V.15)
We have written pr(h) and f(h) to highlight the fact that both variables are likely to depend 
on hours of work and we have also included an hours variable independently, to capture 
the effects of changes in hours through eUc and possibly eNw.
Following our discussion above the expected signs of the j ;’s are; j, < 0 ,j2 > 0 ,j3 > 0 ,j4 <0, 
js <0* j& <0- Substituting (V.15) back in (V .ll) and solving for the wage we obtain:
9 f  will be constant if fixed costs are indexed to weekly rather than hourly earnings.
10 For expositional purposes we express the mark-up as a linear function of the 
logarithms of all the variables on the right-hand side. This is of course only an 
approximation and different specifications are used at the estimation stage.
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In w n0 + n,ln (l-tinc) + n2In I0 + n3In p + n4ln 17 + n5ln p
+ + +
+ n6 In j>r(h) + n7 In f(h) + n8 In h (V.16)
+ + /0/-
where the are functions of the parameters of the jjS and the d(s - see equations (V.l 1) 
and (V.15). Equation (V. 16) forms the basis for our estimation, and the second row of the 
equation shows the expected signs of the. coefficients under the employment, hours and 
wage determination assumptions made earlier. If kPE is constant - Cobb-Douglas 
production function -, then n* = n7=0. If kPE is constant and b is fully indexed to the wage, 
then n3 should be "large”.
The coefficient of the hours variable can not be signed definitely a priori. If the 
productivity and fixed costs variables included capture the effects of changes in hours on 
the wage through e^, then the coefficient on hours of work will be capturing three effects. 
The first and second effects operate through the utility function when leisure matters and 
through utility when unemployed, if the unemployment benefit (b) is indexed to weekly 
hours of work. As mentioned already, this should be zero or positive if hours are at or 
above the optimal level for the individual/union initially and b is indexed to hours. The 
third effect operates through the change in the mark-up, excluding e^; this is likely to be 
negative or zero, if a reduction in hours of work increases or leaves eUc unchanged. Unless 
this latter effect is therefore very significant, we would expect a reduction in hours of work 
not to affect the hourly wage or even reduce it, if we account properly for changes in 
productivity and the ratio of fixed to total costs.
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8.2 Estimation and Results
Before proceeding with the presentation of our results we discuss briefly the identification 
problem and the variables used in the regressions. The identification problem with the 
estimation of wage equations arises from the fact that, in principle, all the variables 
affecting employment through PN=0 11 - ie the variables shifting the labour demand curve - 
are likely to be the same variables that affect productivity. This, as we mentioned earlier, 
is expected to have a positive effect on the wage. In such a case it will not be possible, 
in general, to include both a productivity per worker/hour variable, and find suitable 
instruments for the endogenous variables, unemployment and hours of work, in an equation 
like (V.16). The practical but relatively arbitrary solution, is to use exclusion restrictions 
and assume that some variables that affect unemployment in the reduced form, possibly 
only in the short run, do not have an effect on productivity. This is also one of the 
methods used here.
Alternatively, as noted by Bean (1992), one can proceed and estimate equation (V.16) with 
OLS if employment from the labour demand function does not depend on the wage and 
the error terms of the labour demand equation and an equation like (V.16) are uncorrelated. 
Bean argues that these are not unrealistic assumptions and we have already argued that 
these are also reasonable assumptions with respect to demand for hours of work. We 
therefore report also the OLS estimates of (V.16).
11 If unions bargain also over employment and hours of work then in principle, none of 
the three structural employment, hours and wage equations is identifiable.
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As noted earlier the main problem arises from the inclusion of an employment productivity 
variable in the wage equation. A simple solution is therefore to exclude it from the 
equation and try to proxy productivity with some other variable. The problem is that there 
is no economic explanation for the presence of such an alternative variable. This is rather 
unsatisfactory when the point of the exercise is to identify a structural economic 
relationship. We present therefore in the next section an intertemporal version of the wage 
bargaining model analysed earlier which enables us to derive an estimable dynamic wage 
equation and replace the productivity variable, as well as provide an economic rationale 
for such a solution.
Several variables in Equation (V.16) are not directly observable and therefore need to be 
proxied. Starting with 10, leisure when unemployed, this will be affected negatively from 
the time spent searching. This in turn will be increasing in unemployment (the variable 
used is male unemployment rate, U - Figure 14) so that we can expect the unemployment 
rate to exert a negative influence on the hourly wage. We would also expect that, for any 
given unemployment rate, time spent searching is likely to be higher the larger the increase 
in unemployment or alternatively, the lower the unemployment rate of the last period. We 
therefore included DU with an interactive dummy, taking the value of 1 when DU>0, as 
well as the lagged unemployment rate (UL). Since r\ is positively related with hSE, it will 
also be proxied by the same variables.
The logarithm of (l-tinc) is approximated by the average income tax (INCTAX - see Figure 
16). p is proxied by the log of the replacement ratio, ie the ratio of unemployment 
benefits to average weekly earnings (LRER - Figure 20), and P by the log of the union
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density (LDEN - Figure 15). The ratio of fixed to total costs is proxied by the ratio of 
employers’ contributions to wages and salaries (FIXCOST - Figure 16). This does not 
capture variations in training costs, which will be operating through the hours variable, if 
training costs are indexed to weekly earnings. To the extent that firms can borrow freely 
in the capital markets, training costs and the hourly wage should also be correlated 
negatively with the real interest rate (RSTR - Figure 18) l2.
Other variables used include indirect taxes (INDTAX - Figure 17) and an indication of the 
mismatch in the economy (MM). An increase in indirect taxes reduces consumption in 
partial equilibrium and leads to a higher wage demand on the part of the union; if it 
reduces also the price received by producers then it would lead to a stronger opposition 
from employers to any given wage increase. In general equilibrium an increase in indirect 
taxes will also lead to a reduction in V. The effect on the hourly wage is therefore 
uncertain. The mismatch has also opposing effects on the wage; the higher the mismatch 
the longer the period any unemployed person will be expected to search for a job and this 
exerts downwards pressure on the wage. Andrews and Nickell (1983) on the other hand 
argue, that the higher the mismatch, the smaller the wage restraint any given aggregate 
unemployment rate will exert. Since variables capturing the length of search are already 
included, we should probably expect the mismatch variable to have a positive effect on the 
wage.
12 The real interest rate will also have a positive effect on the current wage since it 
proxies the - inverse of the - discount factor of the workers; the higher the interest 
rate, the smaller the value of future utility and the higher current union wage demands 
- see next section. The net effect is therefore uncertain but is likely to be positive, the 
smaller training costs as a share of total and the more binding the capital market 
constraints faced by the firm.
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We used three real pre-tax wage variables, based on October weekly male earnings in 
manufacturing, see Figure 10. First, we use the log of a basic hourly wage variable which 
takes into account the distinction between normal and overtime hours and corresponds to 
the wage in our theoretical derivation (LWAG1). We also use the log of an average 
hourly wage variable which does not take into account the distinction between normal and 
overtime hours (LWAG2). The results using LWAG1 and LWAG2 may be affected by 
an accounting effect, since actual and/or normal hours are used on the RHS as well as to 
derive the dependent variable. We report therefore also the results with the log of weekly 
rather than hourly earnings as a dependent variable (LWAG3).
The productivity variable appearing in equation (V.16) is defined as output per 
employeehour, and we report results using both the log of output per manhour in 
manufacturing (LYMEMH,) and economy wide capital per manhour (LKEMPH). Since 
this will be obviously correlated with the hours variable, we use also the log of 
productivity per worker (LYMEM - Figure 12) and capital per worker (LKEMP - Figure 
13). When the productivity variables are per person rather than per hour, the hours 
variable will be capturing the effects of reductions in hours of work on the wage through 
increased productivity and we should therefore expect a smaller coefficient.
In Chapter III we argued that actual hours can be modelled as a positive function of 
normal hours, which could be unit elastic. This implies that the inclusion of either the log 
of actual (LH) or normal (LNH) hours on their own - see Figure 11 -, should be enough 
to capture the effect of changes in hours of work on the wage, with the overtime premium 
and the other parameters determining the relationship between standard and actual hours
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"going in" the constant of the equation. This is however a long-run relationship and in the 
short-run the two variables could have different effects. We therefore examine the effects 
of replacing the actual with the normal hours variable in section 83, where we estimate 
the dynamic version of the model presented earlier.
The results of the estimation of the static model are presented in Tables 10 to 12. Table 
10 reports the OLS results with the basic hourly wage, Table 11 with weekly earnings and 
Table 12 the IV estimates; t-statistics are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients 
and we report for our preferred equations a Chow test, a Lagrange multiplier test for first 
and second order autocorrelation and an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the stationarity 
of the residuals. We use annual observations and the full sample period is 1950-1990, but 
some regressions run over a shorter time period due to lags and lack of observations for 
some of the RHS variables. Data definitions and sources can be found in Appendix K, and 
the actual dataset used in Appendix L.
Starting with Table 10, column (i) uses as a productivity variable output per manhour in 
manufacturing and column (ii), economy wide capital per manhour. The equations are well 
determined and most variables are significant and with the expected signs. Although the 
size of the coefficients varies from column (i) to (ii), their sign and significance is largely 
unaffected. The only significant difference between the two columns is the interchange 
in the significance of the log of the replacement ratio lagged (LRERL) and log of the 
union density lagged (LDENL) in the two equations.
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Concerning the other variables used, we did experiment with the fixed costs variable but 
it was either insignificant or wrongly signed so we included only the interest rate (RSTR). 
This was found to have a small but well determined positive effect, suggesting that the 
discount effect on the union side counterbalances the fixed cost effect on the firm side, if 
such an effect exists. We also found no role for the positive changes in unemployment so 
we dropped it in favour of the lagged unemployment rate (UL). Although its coefficient 
is not very well determined, its relative stability across the static and dynamic OLS 
equations suggests that this is due to its correlation with the unemployment rate (U).
The indirect tax variable (INDTAX) has a negative effect on the hourly wage and the 
income tax variable (INCTAX) a positive effect. The unemployment rate has a significant 
negative effect, and the lagged unemployment rate a positive effect, both as expected and 
in line with other similar studies - see footnote 3 in this Chapter and Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1989) for a summary of findings using different datasets.
The lagged replacement ratio (LRERL) has a significant positive effect when used with the 
capital per manhour productivity variable but although its coefficient is positive, it is 
insignificant when used with the manufacturing output per manhour productivity variable. 
The opposite is true of union density lagged (LDENL). This could be explained by the 
fact that the replacement ratio is an economy wide variable which might not be correlated 
with the hourly manufacturing wage when the effects of changes in manufacturing 
productivity are controlled for. When however we control only for changes in aggregate 
productivity by using capital per manhour, the manufacturing hourly wage is more likely 
to reflect changes in the aggregate hourly wage, in which case the replacement ratio has
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a role in explaining its variability. A similar argument can be made for the union density 
variable.
The MM variable is positive and significant across all the equations, but its effect is small. 
The productivity variables, as is usually the case, are very significant and their coefficients 
are smaller than unity.
Turning now to the variable of interest, the coefficient of the hours variable is positive 
when either productivity variable is used. The coefficient is larger as well as very 
significant when the economy wide productivity variable is used (column (ii)). A possible 
explanation is that to the extent that the equation of column (i) describes better the 
unionised manufacturing sector, any given reduction in hours is likely to lead to a smaller 
reduction of the hourly wage, compared to the whole economy.
When the productivity variables reflect output/capital per person rather than per hour - 
columns (iii) and (iv) -, the coefficient of the hours variable is lower, as expected, since 
it captures the positive effect on the mark-up from an increase in productivity. The 
coefficients are still positive however, although insignificant in the manufacturing 
productivity equation, which suggests that even when the hours variable incorporates the 
productivity effect, lower hours still lead to a lower or an unchanged hourly wage.
The last column of Table 10 - column (v) -, reports the "best" equation within the static 
framework, using the basic hourly wage, economy-wide productivity per person and 
dropping the insignificant union density. We used also the average hourly wage and the
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results were unaffected so we do not report them separately. Since an accounting effect 
may be operating with both of these variables we also used the weekly earnings variable, 
unadjusted for overtime. The results are reported in Table 11 and are very similar to the 
hourly wage case. In fact the coefficient of the weekly hours variable is now significantly 
larger than unity in all equations.
All the results from the simple OLS estimation of the wage equation suggest therefore that, 
unlike what has been suggested from casual observation and survey results, reductions in 
hours of work have led in the past to a lower hourly wage and thus to a more than 
proportional reduction in weekly earnings. This is perfectly consistent with the union 
model presented in the earlier section.
Returning to the identification issue recall that OLS will provide consistent estimates of 
the structural coefficients of the wage equation if the labour demand curve is nearly 
vertical in wage-employment space. If this is not the case however then the appropriate 
estimation technique is instrumental variables. The results of estimating the wage equation 
with instrumental variables, treating unemployment (UHAT), the replacement ratio 
(LRERLHAT) and hours (LHHAT) as endogenous variables are reported in Table 12. 
The instruments used include two lags of the dependent variables (ie unemployment, the 
wage, hours and the replacement ratio), the interest rate, taxes (fixed costs, indirect and 
income taxes), mismatch, union density as well as prices of raw materials and government 
spending.
We report only the results using the economy wide productivity variable since these are
typical of the general findings. The coefficient of the hours variable is now significantly 
higher in all columns. The same is true of the productivity variable and the replacement 
ratio variable but, more importantly, the unemployment coefficient. This now becomes 
significantly smaller (absolutely) and as a result the coefficient on unemployment lagged 
becomes significantly negative. The IV results therefore strengthen the support for the 
income sharing hypothesis, despite the changes on the effects of the other variables on the 
hourly wage.
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8.3 A Dynamic Wage Equation
In order to derive a dynamic wage equation, we use the intertemporal version of the model 
analysed in section 8.1. We will assume that the firm maximises again per period profits
by setting employment and hours of work. The union however is interested in the present
value of the utility of its members. The structure of the model we present is an extended 
version of Layard and Nickell (1990) and Manning (1993) so we only highlight its main 
features. The present value for an employed union member in period t is We, and of an 
unemployed union member W"t. These are given by 13:
W't = U \ + 6 E {(1-/7) We,+i + n W VJ (V.17)
W , = U \ + 6 E {(1-q) W \+1 + q W“t+1} (V.18)
where 5 is a discount factor (0<8<1), E is the expectations operator and (l-r|) is the 
probability of an employed union member remaining employed in the following period. 
(1-q) is the probability of an unemployed union member becoming employed in the next 
period.
Utility when employed and utility when unemployed are the same as in section 8J_; we do 
not write these explicitly here for notational convenience. The value of alternative utility 
(Wa), if not employed with the firm in period t is:
13 For expositional reasons we will only index union objectives with time.
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W't = i? w et + (1-/7) w t (V. 19)
This is simply the dynamic equivalent of V - see equation (V.8). It is also useful at this 
stage to derive the difference between the present value of the utility of an employed and 
an unemployed union member (Yt = Wet - W0,). Subtract (V.18) from (V.17) to get:
Yt = U't - U\ + 6 E{(q-n) Yt+1} (V.20)
Note that if the transition probabilitiy from employment to employment (r|) and from 
unemployment to employment (q) are the same, then Y, will only depend on the same 
period levels of utility when employed and unemployed. The model would therefore 
degenerate to the static model presented in section 8.1. Union utility and the Nash 
Maximand can now be written as:
Zt = N {\V\-W\} + MW'= N DW, + MW't (V.21)
X, = (ZrZy?(P-P)(,-^ ) (V.22)
where DWt -  (Wer W‘J. Under the assumptions of P=0 and Z=MWat we can again 
maximise (V.22) with respect to the wage and solve for union utility when employed 
which will now be a function of DWt:
U*t = Kpe DW, (V.23)
where the mark-up, KPE, will depend on the same parameters as in the static case. By
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substituting W*t from equation (V.19) we can express utility of an employed union member 
in period t as a function of Yt:
V\ = Keg Yt (V.24)
where depends on KPE and (l-r|). By using equation (V.24) to solve for Yt, and then 
forwarding it one period to solve for Yt+1 we obtain:
Yj = UVKge (V.25)
where i=t, t+1. Substituting equation (V.25) in equation (V.20) and then solving for Uet 
we obtain:
U*t = K Uut + K 6 E {(q-/;) (U ^ /K ^ }  (V.26)
where K=(1-(1/KGE)). Under rational expectations the second term on the right can be 
replaced by the actual value plus a white noise error. This will then produce an equation 
of the form:
wt = f d (wt_„ ht, h,.„ <5, Z2„ Z2t l) (V.27)
where Z2 includes all the variables affecting the mark-up and the transition probabilities 
q and r|. These are the same variables as in the static equation. The inclusion of the 
dependent lagged on the RHS however can now act as a trend. This means that we can
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drop the productivity variable from the RHS variables and/or use proxies for productivity 
that do not include employment or employeehours.
Equation (V.27) can then be approximated loglinearly and the results of the estimation of 
such an equation with OLS are reported in Table 13. The results using different wage 
variables are very similar so we only report the results using the basic hourly wage, 
LWAG1. Unlike the static equation the coefficients on unemployment suggest that there 
is no level effect on wages, in line with other studies for the UK (see Manning (1993) and 
references therein). We therefore use the first difference in unemployment in columns (ii) 
to (iv). The other variables have the expected signs and are well determined although the 
size of the coefficients of the tax variables and their significance is reduced compared to 
the static equations. As can be seen from columns (iii) and (iv), we were unable to 
establish a significant role for the productivity variables excluding employment - the log 
of the economy wide output per unit of capital variable (LYK, column (iii)) or the log of 
the manufacturing output per unit of capital variable (LYMK, column (iv)).
The coefficient of the current and lagged hours variables are now positive again but 
insignificant. This may be due however to the correlation between the lagged dependent 
variable and the hours variables. The long-run elasticity of the hourly wage with respect 
to hours estimated from these regressions is in the region of 1.6-2.7. Despite being large, 
such estimates are consistent with the coefficients of the static equations, see col. (ii) in 
Table 10.
The dynamic estimation allows us to examine also the role of normal hours. The last two
-206-
columns report the results using normal instead of actual hours. The results are very 
similar with the exception of the coefficients of normal hours. These are found to have 
a positive contemporaneous effect but a negative effect in the following year which is 
unlikely and counter-intuitive. Given the relatively poor determination of these coefficients 
our tentative conclusion would be that variations in normal hours do not affect the level 
of hourly wages.
In summary, the results of the dynamic estimation confirm the findings of the static 
regressions, where we found no evidence of a negative link between the hourly wage and 
weekly hours of work. Empirical analysis at a more disaggregate level is clearly needed 
however, to capture properly the link and direction of causation between hours of work and 
the hourly wage.
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Conclusions
In this Chapter we provided a test of the income sharing hypothesis with aggregate annual 
post-war UK data. We found that, under a most general specification of a wage equation 
and controlling for a number of factors that can affect the hourly wage, there was no 
evidence of the hourly wage compensating for the hours reductions that have occurred in 
the past.
This was true when estimating both static and dynamic versions of the wage equation, 
when using different variables to proxy productivity, when using ordinary least squares or 
instrumental variable estimation and when using actual or normal hours. It seems therefore 
that hours reductions that have occurred in the past were not accompanied by arbitrary 
compensating or otherwise increases in the hourly wage, as is the conventional view. It 
is therefore quite likely that productivity increases accounted for any observed increases 
in the hourly wage.
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TABLE 10
OLS of Static Real Wage Equation
Dependent Variable: Log of Basic Real Hourly Wage (LWAG1)
t-stats in parentheses
(i) (ii)
RSTR .0081 .0066
(4.89) (4.02)
INDTAX -1.36 -1.71
(-3.51) (-4.36)
INCTAX 3.54 2.35
(5.51) (3.15)
U -.016 -.029
(-1.64) (-3.91)
UL .0097 .014
(.92) (1.59)
MM .073 .069
(3.80) (3.79)
LRERL .054 .212
(.56) (2.09)
LDENL .306 .024
(3.43) (.279)
LYMEMH .527
(6.23)
LKEMPH .672
(6.75)
LYMEM
LKEMP
LH .81 1.74
(1.49) (3.00)
R2 .991945 .992697
DW 1.76 1.71
CHOW (6,30)
LM1/LM2
ADF
(iii) (iv) (v)
ident. to(i) ident. to(ii)
see text see text
.0063
(4.53)
-1.73
(-4.57)
2.27
(3.33)
-.029
(-3.99)
.013
(1.60)
.068
(3.89)
.213
(2.14)
.527
(6.23)
.672 .68
(6.75) (7.27)
.28 1.08 1.01
(54) (2.02) 2.13)
.991945 .992697 .992938
1.76 1.71 1.68
.96
.68/4.22
-4.94
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TABLE 11
OLS of Static Real Wage Equation
Dependent Variable: Log of Weekly Earnings (LWAG3)
t-stats in parentheses
(i) (ii) (iii)
ident. to(i) 
see text
(iv )
ident. to(ii) 
see text
RSTR
INDTAX
INCTAX
U
UL
MM
LRERL
LDENL
LYMEMH
LKEMPH
LYMEM
LKEMP
LH
R2 
DW 
CHOW (6,30)
LM1/LM2
ADF
.0082
(4.76)
-1.33
(-3.27)
3.67
(5.45)
-.016
(•1.59)
.0089
(.80)
.074
(3.68)
.080
(.80)
.294
(3.15)
.545
(6.15)
1.99
(3.50)
.988211
1.72
.0067
(3.89)
- 1.68
(-4.09)
2.44
(3.12)
-.030
(-3.81)
.014
(1.46)
.070
(3.66)
.243
(2.28)
.0029
(032)
.694
(6.63)
2.96
(4.84)
.989218
1.65
.545
(6.15)
1.45
(2.67)
.988211
1.72
.98
.75/3.61
-5.07
.694
(6.63)
2.26
(4.05)
.989218
1.65
2.23
.84/5.07
-4.86
-210-
TABLE 12
Instrum ental Variables Estimation of Static Real Wage Equation
Dependent Variable: Log of Basic Hourly (LWAG1) - Weekly Earnings (LWAG3)
t-stats in parentheses
LWAG1 LWAG1 LWAG3 LWAG3
(0 (ii) (iii) (iv)
RSTR .0024 .0032 .0011 .0021
(1.39) (1.96) (.54) ( l . i i )
INDTAX -2.29 -2.18 -2.19 -2.05
(-5.86) (-5.65) (-4.83) (-4.58)
INCTAX .067 .38 -.092 .32
(10) (.67) (-.12) (48)
UHAT -.0096 -.0084 -.0071 -.0056
(-1.54) (-1.36) (-.98) (-■77)
UL -.011 -.011 -.015 -.014
(-2.32) (-2.18) (-2.60) (-2.42)
MM .029 .031 .024 .027
(1.92) (2.08) (1.38) (1.54)
LRERLHAT .50 .49 .55 .54
(4.88) (4.76) (4.66)
LDENL -.124 -.16
(-1.19) (-1.34)
LKEMP .96 .95 1.01 1.01
(12.26) (12.14) (11.19) (10.99)
LHHAT 1.57 2.19 2.92 3.73
(1.86) (2.98) (4.76)
R2 .990510 .990361 .982648 .982127
DW 1.79 1.87 1.68 1.83
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TABLE 13
OLS of Dynamic Real Wage Equation
Dependent Variable: Log of Basic Real Hourly Wage (LWAG1)
t-stats in parentheses
(0 (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (Vi)
LWAG1L .82 .82 .83 .83 .84 .82
(10.57) (10.77) (8.04) (10.62) (7.14) (S.25;
RSTR .0053 .0053 .0052 .0052 .0053 .0052
(4.30) (4.40) (4.23) (4.29) (4.47) (4.36)
INDTAX -.34 -.35 -.33 -.26 -.39 -.35
(-1.44) (-1.56) (-1.26) (-.99; (-1.42) (-1.19)
INCTAX .87 .88
o-oo .80 .65 .65
(1.42) (1.47) (1.39) (1.29) (1.02) (1.03)
U / D U -.019 / -.019 / -.018 / -.018 -.016 -.016
(-3.45) /(-3.53) /  (-2.76) /(-3.31) (-2.24) (-2.24)
UL .019 .014 .016
(3.32) (2.03; (2.5j;
MM .064 .063 .063 .064 .061 .062
(4.75) (4.83) (4.71) (*79; (*<w; (4.75)
LRERL .15 .15 .15 .12 .13 .098
(2.17) (2.33) (2.29) (1.60) (1.54) (.95;
LDENL .13 .13 .14 .13 .088 .092
(2.15) (2.38) (2.23) (2.21) (1.22) (1.43)
LYK .039 .091
(16) (.39)
LYMK .041 .062
(55; (64)
LH .14 .16 .13 .019
(.36) (.43) (.31) (042)
LHL .30 .34 .33 .26
(.83) (1.10) (1.03) (78)
LNH .55 .43
(1.00) (.73)
LNHL -.68 -.59
(-1.42) (-1.17)
R2 .996230 .996361 .996225 .996288 .996206 .9962<
DW 2.63 2.62 2.64 2.69 2.71 2.76
CH (6,30) .54 .57 .55 .59 .52 .55
LM1/LM2 4.9/4.6 4.8/4.4 5.1/4.8 5.5/5.4 7.3/9.0 8.3/1C
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FIGURE 9
Hourly Wages and Weekly Hours of Work in the UK Engineering
Industry: 1940-1963
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FIGURE 12
log output employment ratio
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FIGURE 13
log of capital labour ratios
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FIGURE 15
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FIGURE 16
fixed costs and Income tax
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FIGURE 17
ind1rect taxes
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FIGURE 18
the re a nterest rate
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FIGURE 19
output capital ratio, whole ind
and manufacturing, 1951-90
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APPENDIX K - Variable Definitions and Data Sources
The dataset we used is the Layard-Nickell (1986) dataset updated using the same sources, 
where available. We comment in detail when other methods or sources are used. All 
variables preceded by L in the tables are natural logarithms.
BASIC VARIABLES: Wages, Prices, Hours, Employment, Output.
FTME
RPIO
STR
Average weekly earnings of full-time male manual workers 21+, in October 
of each year, all industries covered. Sources: Various Issues of the 
Department of Employment Gazette (DEG). British Labour Statistics 
Historical Abstract (BLSHA).
General Index of Retail Prices, October, all Items, 1975=100. Source: 
Economic Trends Annual Supplement (ETAS), 1990.
Short-term nominal interest rate. Selected Retail Banks short-term money 
rates, October each year. Source: ETAS.
FTMH Average weekly hours of full-time male manual workers, 21+, in October
of each year, all industries covered. Source: DEG, BLSHA.
LH Natural logarithm of FTMH
FTMNH Average weekly normal hours of full-time male manual workers, 21+, all
industries covered, October figure. Source: DEG, BLSHA. From 1984 
onwards the figure is for April. Source: New Earnings Survey (NES). 
LNH Natural logarithm of FTMNH
FTMN Full time male employment (GB) at mid-year, all industries and services.
Source: DEG.
FTMNM Full time male manual employment (GB) at mid-year, manufacturing.
Source: DEG.
POP Workforce in employment. Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (AAS).
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OUTP GDP at factor cost at 1985 prices. Source: ETAS
OUTPM Index of Output: Total Manufacturing Industries. Source: ETAS
K Gross capital stock at 1975 replacement cost in bn pounds. For
interpolation technique for the 1950-58 period see Lavard and Nickell 
(1986T Source: The Blue Book, National Income and Expenditure.
DERIVED VARIABLES: Wage, Real Interest Rate, Productivity.
A. Real Basic Hourly Wage: this is the weekly wage divided by average hours worked, 
taking into account overtime hours payed at a premium of 30%.
WAG1 = FTME / {[1.3 FTMH - 0.3 FTMNH] * RPIO}
B. Real Average Hourly Wage: This is the average hourly wage without any correction 
for overtime.
WAG2 = FTME / [FTMH * RPIO]
C. Real Weekly Earnings:
WAG3 = FTME / RPIO
D. Real Interest Rate.
RSTR = STR - [{(RPIt / RPIM) - 1}*100]
E. Capital Stock per Male Employee.
KEMP = K/FTMN
F. Capital Stock per Male Employee-hour.
KEMP = K/(FTMN * FTMH)
G. Manufacturing Output per Male Manual Employee
YMEM = OUTPM/FTMNM
H. Manufacturing Output per Male Manual Employee-hour
YMEMH = OUTPM/(FTMNM * FTMH)
I. GDP per Unit of Capital 
LYK = OUTP/K
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J. Manufacturing Output per Unit of Capital 
LYMK = OUTPM/K
OTHER VARIABLES USED / INSTRUMENTS:
U Male Unemployment Rate: males wholly unemployed as a percentage of the
number of employees (employed and unemployed) at the appropriate mid­
year for the UK. Source: DEG.
DU Change in unemployment (Ut-Ut_,).
MM Index of Mismatch: one year absolute change in the percentage ratio of
employees in employment, males and females, in production industries at 
each mid-year, GB, to total employees in employment, males and females 
at each mid-year, GB. Source: DEG.
RER The Replacement Ratio: a weighted average (for five family types) of
annual income on benefit which is then related to mid-year earnings from 
Lavard and Nickell (1986). The variable was updated according to the ratio 
of benefits to basic weekly earnings for a family with two children. Source: 
Department of Social Security, Statistics 1990.
FIXCOST Fixed Employment Costs; The ratio of Employment Contributions to Wages 
and Salaries. Source: ETAS.
INCTAX Average Rate of Income Tax: (1-INCTAX) is the ratio of total personal
disposable income, mn pounds, current prices, to total income before tax, 
mn pounds, current prices. Source: ETAS.
INDTAX Indirect Taxes: the ratio of GDP deflator at market prices, 1975=100 to
GDP deflator at factor cost, 1975=100. INDTAX is the logarithm of the
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series, which is an index. Source: ETAS.
DEN
LG
INP
Union Density: union membership as a proportion of employees in 
employment. Source: ETAS/AAS.
Natural logarithm of real government spending: general government 
expenditure on goods and services, mn pounds, to GDP deflator at factor 
cost. Updated using government expenditure at 1985 prices. Source: 
ETAS.
The price of materials and fuels: wholesale price index of materials and fuel 
purchased by manufacturing industry, 1975=100. Source: ETAS.
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APPENDIX L - THE DATA
LWAGE1 LWAG2 LWAG3
-5.35585 -5.35984 -1.47305
-5.37008 -5.37407 -1.48194
-5.34010 -5.34409 -1.45462
-5.28524 -5.28989 -1.39382
-5.25869 -5.26335 -1.35148
-5.25276 -5.25742 -1.33516
-5.22190 -5.22656 -1.31469
-5.22607 -5.23139 -1.32612
-5.16380 -5.16912 -1.27709
-5.12334 -5.12866 -1.21552
-5.09834 -5.11159 -1.19637
-5.09622 -5.11537 -1.20460
-5.05172 -5.07153 -1.17016
-5.02152 -5.04132 -1.12400
-4.99338 -5.01384 -1.09262
-4.98501 -5.01327 -1.09544
-4.93394 -4.96544 -1.06817
-4.91032 -4.94182 -1.03912
-4.89418 -4.92632 -1.01695
-4.83578 -4.86793 -0.95587
-4.80626 -4.83840 -0.94806
-4.70231 -4.73510 -0.87128
-4.66490 -4.69769 -0.82544
-4.65729 -4.69008 -0.80120
-4.65792 -4.69135 -0.81503
-4.65103 -4.68446 -0.85083
-4.72480 -4.75778 -0.91350
-4.67414 -4.70693 -0.85731
-4.65123 -4.68454 -0.83387
-4.65762 -4.69158 -0.84533
-4.63622 -4.67081 -0.85239
-4.63186 -4.66710 -0.84735
-4.59160 -4.62858 -0.80821
-4.58736 -4.62594 -0.79053
-4.57323 -4.61245 -0.76990
-4.53208 -4.57130 -0.73749
-4.50226 -4.54148 -0.68454
-4.47309 -4.51231 -0.65252
-4.45607 -4.49529 -0.64122
-4.43090 -4.47012 -0.63924
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YEAR U
51 1.20000
52 1.60000
53 1.70000
54 1.40000
55 1.10000
56 1.20000
57 1.60000
58 2.20000
59 2.40000
60 1.80000
61 1.70000
62 2.30000
63 2.80000
64 2.00000
65 1.70000
66 1.80000
67 3.00000
68 3.30000
69 3.30000
70 3.60000
71 4.70000
72 5.10000
73 3.60000
74 3.60000
75 5.50000
76 7.10000
77 7.40000
78 7.20000
79 6.80000
80 6.80000
81 10.40000
82 12.10000
83 12.90000
84 13.10000
85 13.50000
86 13.50000
87 12.40000
88 10.00000
89 7.70000
90 7.10000
DU
0.40000
0.10000
-0.30000
-0.30000
0.10000
0.40000
0.60000
0.20000
-0.60000
•0.100000
0.60000
0.50000
-0.80000
-0.30000
0.100000 
1.20000
0.30000
0.00000
0.30000
1.10000
0.40000
-1.50000
0.00000
1.90000
1.60000
0.30000
- 0.20000
-0.40000
0.00000
3.60000
1.70000
0.80000
0.20000
0.40000
0.00000
- 1.10000
-2.40000
-2.30000
-0.60000
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YEAR MM LDEN LRER
51 0.56400 -0.79851 3.61362
52 0.11800 -0.79629 3.75654
53 0.10700 -0.80744 3.70130
54 0.16000 -0.81645 3.63231
55 0.48700 -0.80968 3.62434
56 0.16100 -0.81871 3.62966
57 0.27500 -0.82098 3.58906
58 0.24400 -0.83933 3.69138
59 0.53500 -0.84630 3.70377
60 0.35900 -0.84165 3.73767
61 0.065000 -0.84630 3.73767
62 0.72900 -0.85097 3.74715
63 0.66800 -0.85097 3.78191
64 0.15900 -0.84165 3.76120
65 0.061000 -0.83933 3.86073
66 0.18100 -0.85332 3.87536
67 0.58600 -0.84863 3.96272
68 0.53400 -0.84165 3.94546
69 0.031000 -0.74866 3.92790
70 0.48700 -0.67531 3.93574
71 0.99900 -0.66553 3.92395
72 1.27000 -0.66553 3.85015
73 0.60300 -0.68518 3.84160
74 0.31100 -0.66165 3.85439
75 1.54200 -0.62176 3.89589
76 0.79300 -0.59966 3.91202
77 0.095000 -0.56740 3.93769
78 0.43200 -0.54991 3.90802
79 0.51800 -0.52763 3.82864
80 1.01200 -0.57982 3.82428
81 1.80700 -0.59784 3.91800
82 1.07600 -0.61619 3.97968
83 0.98600 -0.73397 3.99636
84 0.91000 -0.67334 3.95700
85 0.70000 -0.69315 3.93574
86 0.80000 -0.70725 3.94546
87 0.80000 -0.72361 3.91602
88 0.70000 -0.76357 3.84588
89 0.60000 -0.80744 3.81110
90 0.50000 3.77046
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51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
RSTR LINP LYMEM
-9.04744
-6.55036
-1.33102
0.088926
-2.07647
-1.49837
1.42692
-0.65950
1.44127
2.17066
0.92828
-1.74467
-0.035916
-0.24212
-0.83068
1.08346
1.56042
0.45411
0.41051
-1.27394
-6.65977
-1.87123
0.38063
-6.49512
-17.22341
-5.50000
-12.87976
-1.54582
-1.65647
-6.22371
1.88927
-2.59238
0.87024
2.43245
1.75579
3.41780
1.55190
0.83284
-0.46421
2.81241
2.63620
2.53052 
2.51447
2.54318 
2.58022 
2.58626
2.52092
2.53052
2.53052
2.52092
2.52092
2.54318 
2.58324 
2.59824 
2.62177 
2.61593 
2.70002 
2.73955 
2.78994 
2.83321 
2.87695 
3.15785 
3.54674 
3.68888 
3.91002 
4.05178 
4.08766 
4.20916 
4.29046 
4.37827 
4.44852 
4.51525 
4.59411 
4.60517 
4.52613 
4.55703 
4.58904 
4.64439
4.64247
-4.48418
-4.54128
-4.47895
-4.44777
-4.41463
-4.42904
-4.40990
-4.41941
-4.35952
-4.32230
-4.33708
-4.32950
-4.28105
-4.20770
-4.19873
-4.18104
-4.15189
-4.06760
-4.04601
-4.04545
-4.02672
-3.97141
-3.88298
-3.89369
-3.92921
-4.05170
-3.87923
-3.85894
-3.84485
-3.89302
-3.84609
-3.79278
-3.74491
-3.67962
-3.66279
-3.57725
-3.50252
-3.44465
-3.39168
-3.39894
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51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
LKEMP
-4.11160
-4.09364
-4.05911
-4.04770
-4.02673
-4.01790
-3.99522
-3.97690
-3.95076
-3.92560
-3.90768
-3.88521
-3.84669
-3.82575
-3.79610
-3.75204
-3.68860
-3.63438
-3.58561
-3.53223
-3.47144
-3.43356
-3.40540
-3.36680
-3.32759
-3.28670
-3.25455
-3.23578
-3.20547
-3.15962
-3.08291
-3.04144
-3.02016
-2.98833
-2.97786
-2.95666
-2.93074
-2.90726
-2.88059
-2.85382
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YEAR LKEMPH LYMEMH
51 -7.97443 -8.34701
52 -7.96066 -8.40830
53 -7.92404 -8.34388
54 -7.91681 -8.31689
55 -7.90830 -8.29619
56 -7.90768 -8.31882
57 -7.87679 -8.29146
58 -7.85226 -8.29477
59 -7.81569 -8.22446
60 -7.80716 -8.20387
61 -7.77888 -8.20828
62 -7.74384 -8.18813
63 -7.69683 -8.13120
64 -7.68858 -8.07053
65 -7.66103 -8.06366
66 -7.60219 -8.03119
67 -7.51724 -7.98053
68 -7.46736 -7.90058
69 -7.42291 -7.88331
70 -7.37168 -7.88491
71 -7.29354 -7.84882
72 -7.23354 -7.77139
73 -7.21206 -7.68964
74 -7.18670 -7.71360
75 -7.13648 -7.73810
76 -7.06175 -7.82676
77 -7.03874 -7.66342
78 -7.02450 -7.64767
79 -6.99419 -7.63357
80 -6.94381 -7.67721
81 -6.84411 -7.60729
82 -6.80264 -7.55398
83 -6.77903 -7.50378
84 -6.75648 -7.44777
85 -6.75062 -7.43555
86 -6.72250 -7.34309
87 -6.71493 -7.28671
88 -6.69372 -7.23110
89 -6.66250 -7.17359
90 -6.61734 -7.16247
-235-
YEAR LYK
51 2.52138
52 2.50064
53 2.50630
54 2.52350
55 2.53169
56 2.52093
57 2.50269
58 2.47584
59 2.47959
60 2.48682
61 2.47474
62 2.44976
63 2.44223
64 2.45958
65 2.44191
66 2.41538
67 2.39178
68 2.38978
69 2.36947
70 2.34663
71 2.31806
72 2.31263
73 2.34118
74 2.29595
75 2.25782
76 2.25376
77 2.24905
78 2.25862
79 2.25496
80 2.20208
81 2.18044
82 2.17876
83 2.19345
84 2.18891
85 2.20452
86 2.21353
87 2.23458
88 2.24450
89 2.23209
90 2.20551
LYMK
-1.34399
-1.41473
-1.37648
-1.34406
-1.31333
-1.33489
-1.34186
-1.37101
-1.34445
-1.30786
-1.33518
-1.36251
-1.36714
-1.31088
-1.32294
-1.34474
-1.37912
-1.34565
-1.34884
-1.38583
-1.43589
-1.44488
-1.39589
-1.43865
-1.53994
-1.55139
-1.56224
-1.57656
-1.60750
-1.72839
-1.80024
-1.81804
-1.80990
-1.78912
-1.78483
-1.79191
-1.76092
-1.72292
-1.70585
-1.74593
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
LH LNH
3.86283 3.79324
3.86703 3.79324
3.86493 3.79324
3.86912 3.79098
3.88156 3.79098
3.88978 3.79098
3.88156 3.79098
3.87536 3.78872
3.86493 3.78872
3.88156 3.78872
3.87120 3.76120
3.85862 3.74005
3.85015 3.73767
3.86283 3.73767
3.86493 3.73529
3.85015 3.70623
3.82864 3.69387
3.83298 3.69387
3.83730 3.69138
3.83945 3.69138
3.82210 3.69138
3.79997 3.68888
3.80666 3.68888
3.81991 3.68888
3.80888 3.68638
3.77506 3.68638
3.78419 3.68813
3.78872 3.68888
3.78872 3.68688
3.78419 3.68437
3.76120 3.68185
3.76120 3.67933
3.75887 3.67250
3.76815 3.66612
3.77276 3.66356
3.76584 3.66356
3.78419 3.66356
3.78646 3.66356
3.78191 3.66356
3.76352 3.66356
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
9.1 Conclusions
We examined in this thesis the theory on the determination of hours of work in a 
bargaining framework and empirical evidence related to reductions in hours of work. 
When hours are taken as exogenously given, we found that the impact of reductions in 
hours of work on employment through changes in the hourly wage depended crucially on 
the initial level of hours compared to the optimal for the individual. If hours exceeded 
initially the optimal level for the individual, then any reduction would lead to a lower 
hourly wage and therefore higher, rather than lower employment.
We found this proposition to hold true in both union and efficiency wage models under the 
assumption that the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is constant. The 
proposition was also valid when we allowed for an endogenous determination of the level 
o f alternative utility, under the additional assumption that the unemployment benefit is 
partially or fully indexed to weekly rather than hourly earnings.
When we relaxed the assumption of an exogenously fixed level of hours by allowing firms 
to choose the level of actual hours for a given level of normal hours, we found that the 
proposition would again be true under the assumption that fixed costs of employment were 
indexed to standard hours of work.
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We then examined in detail the process of determination of hours of work, in order to 
provide an economic rationale for reductions in hours of work. We demonstrated that 
inefficiencies arising from the hours determination process or the structure of labour costs 
can give rise to efficiency gains through hours reductions. We also showed that, under 
efficient bargaining, hours can be off the conventional hours supply and demand curves.
We used the model with an endogenous determination of hours to assess also the impact 
of union bargaining over hours of work on wages and employment. We found that, under 
a CD production function and a constant consumption elasticity utility function, bargaining 
over hours of work could lead to a lower level of hours and a higher level of employment. 
This implies that the assessment of the employment effect of unions through a movement 
up a fixed labour demand curve because of a union wage mark-up over the competitive 
level could be exaggerated; the available evidence suggests that unions will negotiate also 
lower hours which would lead to an outwards shift of the labour demand curve and a 
higher level of employment, for any given wage.
The endogenous determination of hours of work enabled us to examine also the impact of 
Maximum Hours Legislation (MHL). We showed in particular, that even when MHL is 
not binding it can affect favourably the union in a union-firm bargain, if it increases the 
alternative pay-off for union members in a Nash bargain or the minimum pay-off in a 
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain. We showed that this will be true in general for any type of 
legislation that can affect the alternative or minimum levels of utility available to workers, 
like minimum wage legislation.
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We provided finally a test of the income sharing hypothesis - ie the proposition that hours 
reductions are not accompanied by compensating or other increases in the hourly wage - 
by deriving a generalised wage equation from a firm-union bargain and estimating it with 
annual aggregate data. We used a number of productivity variables, simple least squares 
and instrumental variables estimation, actual and normal hours variables and estimated both 
static and dynamic versions of the wage equation. The evidence suggested that reductions 
in hours of work were associated, if anything, with a lower level of the hourly wage.
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9.2 Future research
There are a few areas where this thesis has provided some findings but where more 
research is needed. Starting with our test of the income sharing hypothesis, aggregate 
annual data cannot provide a sufficient test of such a hypothesis because of its very nature. 
In order to examine in more detail the degree to which hours reductions are accompanied 
by increases in the hourly wage we need more disaggregated, firm level data for a number 
of years to capture also dynamic effects.
The estimation of the potential bias in the employment effects of unionism can be achieved 
in two ways. First, estimate at a disaggregate level a three equation system for wages, 
hours and employment, including variables that capture the potential impact of unionism. 
Pencavel and Holmlund (1988) have already estimated such a system with aggregate 
Swedish data, but imposed the monopoly union assumptions and did not account explicitly 
for union strength. The weakness of such an approach is the possible inability to identify 
separately the three equations, because of the lack of appropriate instruments. An 
alternative method would be to use micro-data to estimate union non-union hours 
differential and then assess the combined impact of the union wage mark-up and hours 
mark-down on employment, through labour demand equations.
A number of authors have tested for the appropriate model of employment determination, 
primarily by testing the form of an employment equation resulting from a union-firm 
bargain, as those derived in Chapter II and Chapter V. It would be very interesting to
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expand these tests to assess the appropriate model of hours determination. Unfortunately 
the mark-up equations are more complicated when hours are accounted for explicitly - see 
Chapter V - so that a straightforward test seems unlikely. We have shown however that 
the hours contract curve can lie between the conventional hours supply and demand curves, 
so a possible test of the hours determination models presented would be a comparison of 
the hours-wage equations of unionised v non-unionised employees.
Another implication of the hours determination model presented, is that the introduction 
of MHL would affect the wage-hours bargain, if it affected the alternative or minimum 
pay-offs available to workers. We also showed however that, under a Nash bargain, a firm 
with significant bargaining strength can maintain an unchanged level of utility following 
the introduction of maximum hours legislation by negotiating a lower hourly wage. This 
is an inefficient outcome, in the sense that the firm’s profits following the introduction of 
MHL are lower, with the utility for the workers unchanged. To the extent that MHL is 
introduced for health and safety reasons however, the key issue would be to determine 
whether the characteristics of the sectors in which it is binding would lead to significant 
or negligible increases in the level of utility achieved. Recall that the extent of change in 
the sectors where MHL is binding will determine the degree to which negotiated outcomes 
in the remaining sectors will be affected. Similar arguments hold true with mimimum 
wage legislation.
Finally, the models of Chapters III indicated that the extent to which reductions in normal 
hours of work have a beneficial indirect employment effect will depend crucially on the 
extent to which so called fixed costs of employment - training, employment taxes, holidays,
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etc - are really fixed or depend, possibly in the medium term, on weekly hours of work. 
We provided some evidence which supported the view that fixed employment costs were 
indexed to weekly hours of work, but more research at a more disaggregate level could 
provide further insights into the structure, nature and dynamic path of fixed employment 
costs.
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